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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

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VOLUME XXXII


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1938



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Vol. XXXII.

JANUARY, 1938

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¹ Pliny *Ep*
Macbeth III. i

NO. I., V

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JANUARY, 1938.

FOUR NOTES ON THE *CHOEPHORI*.

I.

283 ff.

ἀλλας τ' ἐφώνει προσβολὰς Ἑρινύων
ἐκ τῶν πατρῶων αἱμάτων τελουμένας
ὄρωντα λαμπρὸν ἐν σκότῳ νωμῶντ' ὄφρυν †
τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινὸν κτλ.

THE attempts of Verrall and Tucker to discover, without resorting to emendation, a construction for the participles in v. 285 have convinced only their authors. All other recent scholars either postulate a lacuna before this line or transpose it to follow v. 288, if they do not delete it altogether. All alike assume that both participles describe the behaviour of the victim of the underworld powers.

But what does νωμῶντ' ὄφρυν mean? Like Tucker, I cannot believe that it is 'a mere equivalent for using the eyes'. If it were, it would simply repeat ὄρωντα. And the assumption that a Greek tragic poet could speak of 'moving an eyebrow' when he meant 'using the eyes' is hardly proved by the two (non-tragic) passages cited to prove it: Eur. *Cycl.* 658, where the Chorus urge Odysseus to burn out Cyclops' ὄφρυν (i.e. make a hole in his brow?); and Ar. *Ach.* 18, where Dicaeopolis speaks of soap-suds that made his *eyebrows* smart (and not merely his eyes?).

νωμῶν ὄφρυν ought to signify the alternate raising and contracting of the brows. Why should the victim of the Ἑρινύες do that? Verrall says the words 'describe the violent frown and stare of horror'; Tucker imagines the haunted man as 'startled' or 'peering nervously'. But νωμῶν does not describe anything static: it expresses movement, normally a *repeated* movement, either circular or alternate, like the turning of a shield or of the tiller, the swinging of a weapon, the movement of the legs in running. And repeated movement of the eyebrows can mean only one thing—that their owner is *making signs*, ὄφρυσσι νενστάζων (*Od.* xii. 194). But men do not make signs to spectres: it is spectres that make signs to men, as the ghost in Pliny's story *innuebat digito similis vocanti*, as the spirit of the dead child in Heliodorus ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδέν, ἐπινεύσας δὲ μόνον . . . κατηνέχθη, or as Banquo's ghost 'nodded' at Macbeth.¹ Therefore νωμῶντ' ὄφρυν applies not to the haunted man but to his ghostly visitants.

'Unius literae mutatione, ὄρωντα in ὄρωντι converso, huic loco sensus veritatem et concinnitatem restituimus'. So wrote Schütz in 1823—truly, as I think. Subsequent editors have ignored his proposal, presumably because he spoilt it by attributing the eyebrow-wagging to Apollo. Such a view is impossible: the god of day may predict the assaults of the dark powers, but he cannot take part in them—'Not here, O Apollo, are haunts meet for thee'. νωμῶντα might conceivably be referred to τὸν πατέρα, supplied out of πατρῶων in the line before: the Ἑρινύες whose visitations are materialized out of Agamemnon's blood would then appear with Agamemnon's features (cf. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, pp. 453 ff.). But I think it more likely to be neuter plural: the haunted man sees nameless faces that gesture to him with their brows. The experience of seeing 'faces in the dark' (hypnagogic visions), which is familiar to many children and some adults, was familiar also in antiquity: Aristotle says (*de somniis* 462^a 12), ἐνίοις γε τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν ('with wide-open eyes'), εἰάν ᾧ σκότος, φαίνεται εἰδῶλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις φοβουμένων. The words λαμπρὸν² ἐν σκότῳ

¹ Pliny *Ep.* vii. 27 § 9; Hel. *Aethiop.* VI. 14; *Macbeth* III. iv. 50, 70.

² λαμπρὸν Bothe and Wilamowitz, perhaps rightly: the adverbial use of λαμπρὸν is suspect.

would gain additional point if Aeschylus had this experience in mind; for hypnagogic images are nearly always seen as if brilliantly lighted against a dark background. The physiologist Meyer compared them to 'drawings made with phosphorus on a dark wall at night'¹; and another observer says: 'I had the consciousness of shining and hideous faces grinning at me in the midst of profound darkness, from which they glared forth in horrid and diabolical relief'.²

II.

375 ff.

ἀλλὰ διπλῆς γὰρ τῆσδε μαράγνης
δοῦπος ἱκνείται· τῶν μὲν ἄρωγοὶ
κατὰ γῆς ἤδη, τῶν δὲ κρατούντων
χέρες οὐχ ὅσαι στυγερῶν τούτων
†παισὶ δὲ μᾶλλον γεγένηται.†

The nature of the 'double scourge' is defined by the two clauses beginning τῶν μὲν and τῶν δὲ (Wilamowitz, Headlam, Mazon). But the last line is unquestionably corrupt,³ and has not been convincingly emended. It is not enough to write γεγένηται: even if the line could then stand for παισὶ δὲ μᾶλλον (στυγεροὶ) γεγένηται (οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ ἡμῖν), as Blass rather surprisingly thinks, the comparison between the Chorus's feelings and the children's appears weak and irrelevant. Still less appropriate is the comparison between *Agamemnon's* feelings and his children's which is obtained by putting a stop after ὅσαι and reading στυγερὸν τούτῳ (sc. Agamemnoni) . . . γεγένηται, or στυγεροὶ τούτῳ . . . γεγένηται. Exile and ill-treatment are certainly unpleasant, but they are not *more* unpleasant than being killed by one's wife. Finally, Schömann's στυγερὸν τούτων πᾶσι τί μᾶλλον γεγένηται; is condemned by the unnatural order of the words: the heavy emphasis thrown upon στυγερὸν, and its wide separation from μᾶλλον, are justified neither by metrical necessity nor by the sense; the sense-stress falls on τούτων, which should therefore stand first—'than this what more hateful . . .?' Nor is a reference to public opinion (πᾶσι) in place here.

The corruption lies, I feel sure, in μᾶλλον, and I suggest as the easiest correction παισὶν δὲ μέλον γεγένηται, 'it has become the concern of the children', i.e. the burden of the family vendetta has been laid—for the reasons given in the τῶν μὲν . . . and τῶν δὲ . . . clauses—upon the younger generation. For μέλον = μέλημα, cf. Soph. *O.C.* 653 τοῖσδ' ἔσται μέλον. Presumably it was first miswritten μέλλον—the same miswriting occurs in the Mediceus at v. 780, and in the Palatinus of Euripides at *Andr.* 850—and this was later 'corrected' to μᾶλλον.

III.

481-2

κἀγώ, πάτερ, τοιάνδε σου χρεῖαν ἔχω,
†φυγεῖν μέγαν προσθείσαν Αἰγίσθῳ.†
τοιάνδε Turnebus: τοιάδε M.

That v. 482 is not mended by the mere addition of an accusative masculine noun meaning 'injury' or 'destruction' (μόρον, φθόρον, φόνον, βόλον, πόνον, or the like) appears to me certain for two⁴ reasons:

(1) Without the introduction of με, the use of an accus. instead of a nom. participle is extraordinary and (so far as I know) unexampled;

(2) That Electra should pray 'May I destroy Aegisthus and get away with it' matches neither (a) the tone of this scene (contrast v. 438 ἔπειτ' ἐγὼ νοσφίσας ὀλοίμαν)

¹ G. H. Meyer, *Untersuchungen üb. d. Physiol. d. Nervenfaser*, 238 ff.

² Robert McNish, *The Philosophy of Sleep*³, 274.

³ The old rendering 'The children have the advantage' contradicts the sense of the whole

passage, even if the Greek words could mean this, which is more than doubtful.

⁴ Most of the words suggested are open to further objection: μόρον, φθόρον, φόνον do not suit μέγαν; βόλον does not suit προσθείσαν.

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¹ Even Hor
of Phaeacia, a
φίλῳ (*Od.* vi. 6

² As he pro
"Αἰδου, *Supp.*
"Αἰδου, *ibid.* 41
ἐπ' ἐμαντοῦ for
ἡμετέροις for ἐ

nor (b) the subsequent course of events—for she takes no part whatever in the destruction of Aegisthus.

Of the more drastic corrections which have been proposed, some, like Schömann's *θανεῖν* μ' εἶν . . . and Wecklein's *τυχεῖν* με γαμβροῦ . . ., assume a very improbable corruption in the first word. Others fail to meet objections (1) and/or (2a); and none meets objection (2b) except Headlam's *φυγεῖν* μ' ἐς ἀνδρὸς θῆσαν *Αἰγίσθω* <τύχην>—which can scarcely be right, since an escape by marriage *before* Aegisthus' death, if it were possible, would leave Orestes in the lurch, and *after* his death there will be no 'bondage' to escape from.

I think it more likely—or less unlikely—that Electra prayed

φυγεῖν με τᾶμπροσθ' οἷς ἐν Αἰγίσθου <ξυνην>,

'to escape the old way of life that I had always in the house of Aegisthus'. She has described that way of life in vv. 444 ff., and she knows that the only escape is by killing. Escape will open to her the possibility of marriage, as she implies in vv. 486 f.; but the archaic *κόρη* of Aeschylus' imagination has too much sense of the immediate situation, and I think also too much modesty,¹ to pray publicly for a husband at such a juncture, like the shameless hussy postulated by Wecklein, Headlam and others. There is no *certain* example of *ἐμπροσθε*(ν) in tragedy, but at Eur. *Hipp.* 1228 *τοῦμπροσθεν* has somewhat better MS. authority than *τὸ πρόσθεν*.

The assumed corruption, though complex, is not difficult to account for, if we imagine (as we must do in many passages of Aeschylus) a Byzantine copyist trying to decipher an uncial manuscript of the late Roman period, written without division of words. He is faced with

ΦΥΓΕΙΝΜΕΤΑΜΠΡΟΘΘΟΙCΕΝΑΙΓΙCΘΟΥΞΥΝΗΝ.

Cheated by the fatal resemblance of T to Γ and M to N, he writes down *φυγεῖν μέγαν*, and the real mischief is done. The next group of letters looks like *προσθεῖς ἐν αἰγίσθου*. But modest as his attainments are, he knows that Electra was a woman, and that ἐν does not govern the genitive²: surely, then, *προσθεῖσαν Αἰγίσθω*? And the last word—*ξυνην*? No, that would make nonsense: perhaps the *διορθωτής* will be able to read it—meanwhile, better leave a blank.

IV.

824 ff. πόλει (πλεί Kirch.) τάδ' εἶδ'·
 ἐμὸν ἐμὸν κέρδος αὖξεται τοδ' ἄ-
 τα δ' ἀποστατεῖ (ἀπέστα Weil) φίλων.
 σὺ δὲ θαρσῶν, ὅταν ἦκη μέρος ἔργων,
 ἐπαῦσας πατρὸς ἔργῳ (αὐδὰν Seidler)
 θροοῦσά (θροομένη Enger) [πρὸς σέ] 'τέκνον' [πατρὸς αὐδὰν]
 = 830 [καὶ] περαίνων ἐπίμομφον ἄταν
 Περσέως τ' ἐν φρεσὶν
 καρδίαν — σχέθων (σχεδρὰν ἔχων Weil),
 τοῖς δ' ὑπὸ χθονὸς φίλοις (φίλοις Herm.)
 τοῖς τ' ἄνωθεν προπράσσ-
 ων † χάριτος ὀργᾶς λυπρᾶς †³
 = 824 ἐνδοθεν

¹ Even Homer's Nausicaa, in the freer society of Phaeacia, αἰδετο θαλερὸν γάμον ἐξορομῆναι πατρὶ φίλῳ (*Od.* vi. 66).

² As he proves by writing μὴν 'Αἰδου, not μὴ 'ν 'Αἰδου, *Sufr.* 226; and οὐδὲν 'Αἰδου, not οὐδ' ἐν 'Αἰδου, *ibid.* 416. Similarly we find variants like ἐπ' ἐμαντοῦ for ἐν ἐμαντοῦ, *Plat. Charm.* 155D 4, ἐν ἡμετέροις for ἐν ἡμετέρου, *Hdt.* I. 35 § 4, ἐν αὐτῷ for

ἐν αὐτοῦ, *Ar. Vesph.* 642, ἐν πυθοῖ for ἐν πυθίου, *Plat. Gorg.* 472B.

³ Perhaps *χάριτας ὀρᾶν λυγρὰς*, 'procuring that they should see a grim satisfaction', *προπράσσειν* being used like *προξενεῖν* in *Soph. O.T.* 1483, and οὐοῦ answering to -ο. Murray's ingenious *προφράσσειν φάρος* seems to leave φίλοις without a construction.

= 825

836 φοινίαν (φόνιον Wilam.) ἄταν τιθείς (τίθει Davies), τὸν αἴτιον δ'

= 826

ἐξαπολλὺς μόνον (ἐξαπόλλυ O. Müller σπόρον Tucker).

Corrupt as this passage is, and uncertain as are many of the corrections quoted above, its general sense has, I think, been restored, except as regards the three references to ἄτη (vv. 825, 830, 836). V. 830, as it stands, can mean only 'carrying through a deplorable deed of blind ruin'; and vv. 835-6 are commonly translated 'working a bloody deed of blind ruin in the house'. Surely strange encouragement (cf. θαρσύν, 827) for the Chorus to give at this crisis to their 'godlike' or 'godsent' (θεῖος, 867) champion? And how shall we reconcile it with vv. 825-6, ἄτα δ' ἀποστατεῖ (or ἀπέστα) φίλων? He who 'fulfils' or 'makes' ἄτη is surely not 'remote' from ἄτη? Wilamowitz, aware of this contradiction, explained that 'der chor ist von den hoffnungen und gebeten, mit denen er das lied begann, zu der entsetzlichen wahrheit fortgetrieben—wider willen, schritt für schritt'. But the change does *not* take place 'step by step': it happens between one sentence and the next. Others read at 830 πέραιν' ἀνεπίμομφον ἄταν, which is not so much an oxymoron as a sense-destroying contradiction in terms.

I suggest

(i) that ἄτη has the same meaning in all three places—not 'deed of blind ruin' but '*spirit* of blind ruin', the Ate who is coupled with the Erinys at *Ag.* 1433;

(ii) that περαινων is sound but is two words, not one, so that vv. 829-30 should read

θροομένα 'τέκνον' περ αἰν-
ῶν ἐπίμομφον ἄταν,

'citing, though her cry be "*My son!*"¹, Ate as the bearer of the blame';

(iii) that v. 836 means 'put murderous Ate from within', i.e. expel her from the house by killing her ministers. (Blass, who perceived that this must be the meaning, thought it preferable to read ἐκτοθεν: but in the only other passage where A. uses ἐνδοθεν² it has its original and always common sense of 'from within'; so also ἐκτοθεν 'from without', v. 473.)

If I am right in reading περ αἰνῶν, the Chorus advise Or. to retort on Clyt. the plea which she herself employed to excuse the murder of Agam. (cf. esp. *Ag.* 1481 ff. ἡ μέγαν οἰκονόμον δαίμονα καὶ βαρύμηνιν αἰνεῖς, φεῦ φεῦ, κακὸν αἶνον ἀτηρᾶς τύχας). And *this is exactly what he does do* at vv. 909-11, where all happens as the Chorus foresaw:

Op. πατρὸς κτονοῦσα γὰρ ξυνοικήσεις ἐμοί;

Κλ. ἡ Μοῖρα τούτων, ὦ τέκνον, παραίτια.

Op. καὶ τόνδε τοῖνον Μοῖρ' ἐπόρσυνεν μόνον.

The first line answers to ἐπαύσας πατρὸς αὐδάν, the second to θροομένα τέκνον, the third to αἰνῶν ἐπίμομφον ἄταν. For ἄτη as the minister of Μοῖρα cf. *Il.* xix. 86, 91. The denial of personal responsibility is repeated in v. 923 and again in v. 927. This seems strong confirmation of περ αἰνῶν, which has the further advantages (a) of accounting for the intrusive καί that precedes it in the Mediceus (περ may have been glossed καίπερ to exclude the misreading περαινων); (b) of reserving the advice to *kill* for its natural position as a climax, whereas περαινων weakens the force of the final words by anticipating them.

In the last line Tucker's σπόρον seems better than the traditional correction μόνον: Or. is to expel Ate and destroy 'her guilty seed' (cf. v. 805, *Ag.* 386, 1505).

E. M. DODDS.

¹ I take it that περ is displaced to follow τέκνον, not θροομένα, because it belongs logically to τέκνον—Clytemnestra will in any case presumably say

something.

² *Sept.* 194 αὐτοὶ δ' ὅφ' αὐτῶν ἐνδοθεν πορθοῦμεθα. At *Pers.* 991 the word is usually emended.

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MARTIAL'S *KALENDAE NATALICIAE*.

HISTORIES of Roman literature state under Martial that his birthday was on 1st March.¹ Martial repeatedly says so himself. But these statements must now be questioned, since they harbour a peculiar difficulty, perhaps even a problem, whose solution is here attempted.

In several passages he states that he was born on the Kalends of March: IX 52, X 24, XII 60.² In the first of these epigrams he is celebrating the birthday of his friend Quintus Ovidius, and we learn that this birthday fell on the Kalends of April, while his fell on the Kalends of March. A strange coincidence, but one can accept it nevertheless. He dedicates Epigram X 87 to the birthday of an acquaintance, the lawyer Restitutus. This fell on the Kalends of October. Our astonishment grows. But there is stranger to come. The custom of giving birthday presents existed among the Romans and in Martial's day enjoyed a particular vogue. Many a shrewd man invited a large number of prominent people on his birthday hoping to garner a rich harvest of presents. A certain Clytus carried off the palm of this type of greed by celebrating his birthday no less than eight times in one year (Martial VIII 64). The first lines of this epigram run as follows:

Ut poscas, Clyte, munus exigasque,
Uno nasceris octies in anno
Et solas, puto, tresve quattuorve
Non natalicias habes Kalendas.

Of the twelve Kalends in the year only three or four pass for him without birthday festivities. There can no longer be any question here of a mere coincidence. In these circles it must have been the custom to hold birthday parties not on the real birthday but on the first of the month. This was either on the first of the month in which the birthday fell or else on the first of the month following.

This peculiar custom must now be explained. Commentaries pass over the difficulty in silence. Evidently we are dealing here with a day celebrated in place of the real birthday. In the same way in Catholic countries the name-day, that is the day of the saint whose name one bears, is always celebrated as the birthday. We find a similar custom among the Greeks; very likely many a man with the name of Apollodoros celebrated his birthday on Apollo's day (Wilh. Schmidt, *Geburtstag im Altertum*, pp. 34 sqq.). This, further, is reminiscent of a similar custom prevalent in some circles in Germany to-day. In families with many children, where great store is set by a large birthday party of relations, or where the father is perhaps prevented during the week by his business hours or the children by afternoon school, the birthday party is often put off until the following Sunday. It is possible to imagine that these passages of Martial refer to a similar custom.

This was in the time of Domitian, that is to say in an age when the passion for luxury and extravagance was at its height (Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, I 25 sqq.). It is understandable that many people wished to assemble a large company on their birthday, particularly if they could thereby hope to receive a large number of presents. This must have been the aim of many when they issued their invitations (Martial VIII 64, X 87).

If we now ask why of all the thirty days in the month the Kalends were chosen for such celebrations, the answer is to be found in the importance of the Kalends in

¹ E.g. Teuffel II 7. 310; Schanz—Hosius II 2.
546 not. 2.

² Compare also X 92. 10.

religion and commerce. All Kalends were sacred to Juno, the goddess of women, as the Ides were sacred to Jupiter (Wissowa, *Religion der Römer*, pp. 114 sqq.; Wilh. Schmidt, *Geburstag*, pp. 24 sqq., 117). Hence she was also called Juno Kalendaris (Macrob. *Sat.* I 15. 18). Juno was also the guardian of birth (Martial X 63. 5). But the Kalends were also sacred to Janus. He was related to Juno and bore the additional name of Janus Junonicus (Macrob. I 15. 19; Wissowa, *Religion der Römer*, pp. 91 sqq.).

Their religious importance would alone suffice to explain the choice of the Kalends. Let us turn now to their commercial and financial significance. Large sums of money were held liquid on this day to meet business obligations. It was the date on which interest repayments of capital were made (Martial VIII 44. 11; Horace, *Sat.* I 3. 87).¹ On 1st July rents were due (Martial XII 32. 1). Money-lenders re-lent money on the first of the month which they had called in on the Ides (Horace, *Epodes* 2. 70). It is understandable that on the Kalends those who were forced or were willing to lend money were again assailed, and for this reason important celebrations, including birthday parties, were put off to these days.

Furthermore, the laws against extravagance in everyday life, the *leges sumptuariae*, permitted daily expenditure of only 200 sesterces, except on the Kalends, Nones and Ides, that is the festivals of the Lares, when 300 sesterces might be spent (Martial IV 66. 3; and Friedländer II, p. 373; Wissowa, p. 149).²

These observations offer a perhaps adequate explanation of Martial's striking use of the expression coined by him in VIII 64. 4—the *Kalendae Nataliciae*.

HANS LUCAS.

BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG.

¹ Compare Ovid, *Remed. am.* 561. sqq. *Fast.* 3. 99 sqq.

² Gell. II 24, particularly para. 14; Daremberg et Sagl. III 2, 1141, 1151.

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THE PORTENTS IN HORACE, *ODES* I. 2. 1-20.

THE ancient scholia and various modern editors interpret these lines as a description of the prodigies which followed the death of Caesar. It is bold to criticize a view so widely held, but its acceptance, to me, involves considerable difficulties. The first is the long interval between Caesar's death and the date of the Ode. About this date editors vary, but the general view is that it belongs either to the year 29 or 28 B.C.

hic magnos potius triumphos,
hic ames dici pater atque princeps (49-50).

In August 29 B.C. Octavian celebrated his triple triumph, and at the beginning of 28 B.C. he was acknowledged as princeps senatus. The derivation of his favourite title Princeps from princeps senatus is now generally rejected, but Horace may include an allusion to the specific dignity in his phrase. Until 2 B.C. the Emperor refused the official title of pater patriae, but it was frequently applied to him by popular usage.¹ 'Magnopere erravit Acron', says Orelli, 'si . . . hoc carmen rettulit ad proxima post Caesaris interitum tempora'. According to T. E. Page, 'Plüss argues for B.C. 36, immediately after the defeat of Sextus Pompeius, when the portents which followed the death of Caesar were past but not forgotten'. The impossible suggestion attributed to (pseudo-)Acron and the improbable date put forward by Plüss are both due to the same difficulty. It is very hard to refer the vivid description of lines 1-20 to portents which occurred fourteen or fifteen years earlier.

'Jam satis . . . misit Pater, . . . vidimus flavum Tiberim', are phrases more naturally used of recent phenomena. 'The events', says Wickham, 'are recalled dramatically, not happening at the moment'; but on any interpretation the events are past, even if they are recent. To Page 'the verb' (what he terms 'the graphic *vidimus*') 'by its abrupt and prominent position at once brings back the mind from the days of the flood [Deucalion's] to what had actually happened in the days of living men'. Conington, discussing the description of the portents at Caesar's death given in *Georgics* I. 466-488, suggests that they were 'spread over a considerable period'. The *Georgics*, however, on the most accepted dating, are in the main some years earlier than this Ode, and Virgil definitely refers the portents to the death of Caesar and to the past—tempore illo (469).

But heavy storms of snow and hail, the Tiber in flood, and even lightning which strikes the Capitol are phenomena which are not connected solely or mainly with Caesar. This brings me to the next point—the nature of the portents in this Ode. Those which presaged or followed the death of Caesar are well known. The longest list, of seventeen or eighteen items, is given by Virgil (*Georgics* I. 466-488); Tibullus (II. 5. 71 foll.) describes seven 'belli mala signa', six of which, though not specifically connected by him with Caesar's death, are among those in Virgil's list; Ovid (*Met.* XV. 782-798) gives ten portents of which eight are found in Virgil. Dio Cassius (XLV. 17) includes seven of Virgil's portents and adds six more. In 44 B.C. Virgil and Tibullus were young men, Ovid was born in the following year, Dio, of course, was a contemporary of the Emperor Severus. Thus, the list of Virgil probably represents the reports accepted at the time.

In brief summary, Virgil tells of an eclipse (or darkening) of the sun, howling of dogs, cries of ill-omened birds, eruptions of Etna, the clash of weapons in the sky

¹ Dio Cassius 55. 10. 10.

(heard in Germany), earthquakes in the Alps (Ovid says, in Rome), voices heard in groves, appearances of ghosts, cattle speaking, rivers standing still, earth gaping, statues weeping, a destructive flood of the Po, ill-omens at sacrifices, blood in the water of wells, wolves howling at night in city streets, thunderbolts from a clear sky, and comets.

Tibullus adds a shower of stones, Ovid showers of blood and ominous appearances in the moon. Dio's additions are interesting. He says that the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol was struck by a thunderbolt, a great wind damaged the Temples of Saturn and Fides, a statue of Minerva was injured, the ebb of the flooded Po left snakes on the banks, fish were stranded at the mouth of the Tiber, and there was a famine in Italy. Against this formidable list what do we find in Horace? Heavy snow and hail, thunderbolts on the 'sacras arces', and the Tiber in flood. Snow and hail do not appear in the list of Caesarian portents,¹ the flood mentioned by Virgil and Dio is that of the Po, Virgil's thunderbolts fall from a clear sky but their goal is not indicated. Had they struck the Capitol, he would surely have intensified his description by this added omen. The only real coincidence in Horace is, significantly, with Dio, who wrote two hundred years later, and he very possibly took the portent from Horace, or, rather, from the commentators on Horace. The scholia on lines 13-16 of the Ode which say that a Tiber flood was a portent after Caesar's death are obviously an inference from the Ode itself, for nowhere else is a Tiber flood recorded among those portents of 44 B.C.

Many of the acknowledged portents are more 'prodigious' than even the thunderbolts on the Capitol, and if Horace really referred to 44 B.C. or to the years immediately following the murder, it is curious that his list differs so much in length and content from those of his friends Virgil and Tibullus. It is perhaps hypercritical to add that at that period Horace was not in Italy. A German school-edition (Müller-Jäger) has a naïve comment on 'Vidimus'. 'Horaz selbst hat es freilich nicht gesehen, da er sich damals in Athen befand'.

Moreover, the flood threatens to go beyond the limit of warning set by Jupiter. 'Nimium. . . Jove non probante' are hardly courtier-like phrases in an ode addressed to Octavian, if the punishment is for Caesar's murder.²

I doubt whether, apart from the scholia, a reader would interpret these twenty lines and the *querela* of Ilia as references to Caesar, since the next stanza pursues the theme, so frequent in Horace, of the crime of civil war—the crime which had stained so many of the past hundred years. It is noteworthy that in the whole of Horace's poetry Julius Caesar is only mentioned twice—in the trivial 'Caesaris hortos' of *Satires* I. 9 and in this Ode, 'filius Maiae, patiens vocari Caesaris ultor', a phrase curiously worded if it is 'the keynote of the poem' (Sellar p. 153 n.). Horace had served under Brutus; in his earliest published work he included a Satire of which the point, such as it is, is a jest on Brutus as a regicide (*Satires* I. 7. 33-5). The only opponents of Octavian whom he attacks (though not by name) are the foreigner Cleopatra and Sextus Pompeius, against whom he seems to feel some personal bitterness. He makes his peace with, and becomes a supporter of, the new regime, but he never denies his past nor condemns his old associates (*Odes* II. 7 and

¹ Snow and hail are not, I think, recorded as portents by Livy or Dio Cassius, although snow is a comparatively rare phenomenon in a Roman winter. Tiber floods are frequently mentioned. In 27 B.C., in the night after Octavian had received the title of Augustus, the Tiber rose, covering all the lower ground of Rome (Dio 53. 20). 'From this sign the soothsayers prophesied that he would rise to great heights and hold the

whole city [or state] under his sway.' In 22 B.C. the flood was accompanied by thunderbolts on the Capitol (Dio 54. 1). 22 B.C. is, however, too late a date for the *Odes* of the first three Books, and the omen in 27 B.C. was interpreted as favourable, though the 'prophecy' seems rather a statement of existing facts.

² Contrast the flattering interpretation in 27 B.C. (Dio 53. 20 above).

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III. 4. 26). It is not the crime of rebellion or tyrannicide, but that of civil war which rouses his horror and for which he fears the punishment of heaven. In *Epodes* VII and XVI he already gave expression to this feeling. We may compare *scelesti* and *scelus fraternae necis* in *Epode* VII with the *partes scelus expiandi* of this Ode, and with the cry in *Odes* I. 35. 33-4:

Eheu cicatricum et sceleris pudet
fratrumque.

The same feeling, 'arma nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus' (5) and 'impia proelia' (30), runs through the important and interesting Ode (II. 1) in which Horace warns Pollio that it is a dangerous task to write the history of the last half-century:

periculosae plenum opus aleae
tractas et incedis per ignes
suppositos cineri doloso (6-8).

To sum up: the phenomena described in the first twenty lines of this Ode may belong to the winter or spring before it was written.¹ They are all occurrences of nature, not prodigies such as 'bos locutus' and other marvels, and Ilia may well lament the death of her children the Romans in internecine strife rather than or in addition to the death of Caesar. The 'scelus' to be expiated is first and foremost that of civil war.

The rest of the Ode, of course, refers to Octavian, but such a shift of emphasis or theme is highly characteristic of Horace.² He is compared to the deified Romulus and tentatively identified with a deity, Mercury,³ who, in the person of Octavian, must expiate the crime of civil war as he has already (for this is long after Philippi and the defeat of Sextus Pompeius off Sicily) avenged the murder of Caesar. Then he must turn to a nobler task, the subjugation of foreign foes.

Neu sinas Medos equitare inultos
Te duce, Caesar.

This, again, is a favourite theme in Horace, as in the twelfth Ode of this Book (53-56), and in the thirty-fifth, where it is definitely contrasted with the *scelus* of fratricidal war (33-4):

o utinam nova
incude diffingas retunsum in
Massagetis Arabasque ferrum (38-40).

So here the *ultio* of Caesar and the *expiatio* of civil strife lead to the opportunity for *ultio* upon the legitimate enemies of Rome and a *justus triumphus* (I. 12. 53). Horace, however, was more imperialistic than the Emperor, whose policy was to avoid an Eastern war. The standards lost by Crassus and the survivors of his captured army were surrendered by the Parthians in 20 B.C., 'a notable diplomatic success which Augustus ranked higher than a victory in the field'.⁴

MARGARET E. HIRST.

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

¹ So Dr. Gow in his edition of the Odes. He also makes the suggestion that Caesar's expressed intention to surrender his power to the Senate on Jan. 1 27 B.C. might give rise to the entreaties to complete his task, which are contained in the second part of the Ode.

² For example, *Odes* I. 3, II. 13, III. 3. 4. 11.

27. 29.

³ For the interest of this early attempt at the deification of Augustus see Professor Gertrude Hirst's article on the Prologue to the *Georgics*, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* LIX (1928) pp. 25-28.

⁴ *C.A.H.* X. p. 263, see also p. 255.

THE THIRTEENTH IDYLL OF THEOCRITUS.

THAT the thirteenth Idyll of Theocritus and the Hylas episode in the first book of Apollonius are not independent of each other was perhaps first pointed out by Casaubon, who supposed T. to be the earlier of the two¹. The opposite view was upheld, whether for the first time or not I do not know, by Wilamowitz in his lectures, and it was assumed, without much argument, by his pupil G. Knaack², who presently defended it, with little more³, against an attack by G. Türk⁴. Gercke⁵ and Susemihl⁶ were persuaded, and later on Wilamowitz himself touched briefly on the matter⁷. Legrand, who had doubted before, remains unconvinced⁸, and Cholmeley⁹, to whose chronology this theory was disastrous, took shelter behind the unsubstantial shades of Antimachus and Philetas. In Italy, G. Perrotta has supported Wilamowitz's view¹⁰, but L. Bignone¹¹ says that the problem is insoluble. I have myself no doubt that Wilamowitz was right, but the arguments employed have not been very cogent¹², and, as the evidence has not been well set out, it may be useful to outline it here and to add a little to it.

First then for the general proposition that the two poems are related. I do not think that this can be doubted by anyone who reads A. 1. 1207-1272 side by side with T.'s poem. In particular the description of Hylas's departure to get water (T. 37-9, A. 1207-10), the dancing nymphs (T. 43-5, A. 1222-5), the capture of Hylas (T. 46-9, A. 1232-9), the wild-beast simile (T. 62 f., A. 1243-7) show a general resemblance which can hardly be accidental, and to these may be added the bivouac scene (T. 32-5, A. 1182-6; cf. 453-7). These general resemblances are reinforced by a number of verbal similarities and coincidences of detail—T. 16, A. 4 (cf. 2. 211, 871, 3. 58): T. 36, A. 1209: T. 39, A. 1207: T. 48, A. 1232: T. 59, A. 1249: T. 63, A. 1252: T. 70, A. 1264. I should myself add that T.'s use of ἀθρόος (in the sense of *headlong*, *plump*, *at one go*) in 50 f. is an Alexandrian novelty nowhere common, and where resemblances are already so numerous it would be odd, if an accident, that it should occur at A. 428, 1007 (cf. 2. 97): odd also that the extremely rare heteroclite accusative Ἡρακλέην which T. seems to have used at 73 should occur at A. 2. 767 in the context Κίον θ' ὄθι κάλλιπον ἦρω | Ἡρακλέην¹³. These two things suggest unconscious, or semi-conscious, reminiscence rather than deliberate imitation¹⁴.

These facts establish, I think beyond question, that there is a relation between

¹ *Volui autem tironibus, velut ad fontes intenso digito, indicare quam poetae huius, aequalis prope-modum sui, studiosus fuerit Apollonius* (Lect. Theocr. cap. xiv). ² *Hermes* 18. 29, 23. 137.

³ *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1896. 884.

⁴ *Bresl. phil. Abh.* 7. 4. 29.

⁵ *Rhein. Mus.* 44. 143.

⁶ *Gr. Lit. d. Alexandr.* 1. 208.

⁷ *Textig. d. gr. Buk.* 177, *Bucolici Graeci* p. 161.

⁸ *Etude sur T.* 76, *Buc. Gr.* 1. 86.

⁹ *Ed.* 2, p. 402.

¹⁰ *Stud. Ital.* n.s. 4. 85.

¹¹ *Teocrito* 166.

¹² Knaack and Wilamowitz both said that the resemblance between T. 16 χρύσειον ἐπλεῖ μετὰ κῶας Ἰδῶων and A. 1. 4 χρύσειον μετὰ κῶας, 2. 211,

871 μετὰ κῶας Ἰήσων was decisive, but this seems to me much too strong. Wilamowitz said that Telamon was chosen as Herakles' comrade (T. 37) because he takes his part at A. 1. 1289. But, as Cholmeley points out, Telamon had been associated with Herakles before, and in A. Herakles' comrade is not Telamon but Polyphemos son of Eilatos (1242).

¹³ It occurs at A. *Plan.* 97; and an oracle twice quoted by Eustathius (561. 42, 989. 44) presents it in the second citation but Ἡρακλῆ in the first. Ἡρακλῆν is commoner but late: see Pauly-Wissowa 8. 522.

¹⁴ Add perhaps ποτὶν of a spring (T. 46, A. 1149), though if this stood alone it would hardly arouse suspicion.

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the *Idyll* and *Apollonius*. They do not show that T. wrote after A. unless it may be argued that one or two of the contacts are with passages in A. outside the Hylas episode, and that, whereas T. may well have had all the *Argonautika* then available in his mind, there was no reason for A. to think particularly of T. except when writing of Hylas¹. I should, however, base my own belief rather on the superiority of T.'s narrative. In A. Hylas is a squire and servant to Herakles (132, 1211), and a more tender relation is only to be inferred from the commotion caused by his loss. His arrival at the spring unfortunately coincides with a nightly dance in honour of Artemis held there by all the Oreads, Dryads, Hamadryads, and other nymphs of the neighbourhood. A Dryad (whose devotion to Artemis does not seem excessive) is just rising from the spring to join the party when she catches sight of Hylas, falls in love, and retiring again to the depths pulls him after her. Polyphemos son of Eilatos (who is here pursuing, very ineptly, an aetiological errand of A.'s) hears his shout, and hurries to the rescue, meeting Herakles, who, on learning the news, goes off in distracted search. In spite of the fact that Polyphemos is roaring like a wild beast and Herakles bellowing like a bull, their absence is unnoticed, and the Argonauts, who set sail before dawn, only discover when it is light that they have left the trio behind—an oversight the more remarkable in that on the previous evening Herakles had rowed them ashore by his own efforts (1161)². Now in A. the Hylas incident is only an episode in a long narrative of adventure, and his account serves its purpose. The story, however, is clumsily told, as anyone may see by comparing it in these particulars with T.'s version, and its clumsiness, except for the intrusion of Polyphemos, serves no purpose in A.'s design. Since therefore A., whether you like him or not, was a considerable poet and man of letters, I decline to believe that he can have written thus with T.'s narrative before him. And if he could not, then it follows that T. wrote second of the two, and I pass on to consider a small detail which, unless I am too fanciful, confirms that view.

When T. in his continual search for linguistic novelty uses an out-of-the-way word or misuses a familiar one, it is occasionally possible to guess what has stimulated his choice even when the stimulus has been indirect. For instance Herakles, going in search of Hylas, takes (57) *ρόπαλον τὸ οἱ αἰὲν ἐχάνδανε δεξιτερὰ χεῖρ. χανδάνειν* should mean to *enclose* or *contain*, not to *retain*, and its use as a mere synonym of *φέρειν* or the like, though unnoticed by T.'s commentators,³ is unexampled⁴. The following lines are:

τρίς μὲν ὕλαν ἄνυσεν ὅσον βαθὺς ἤρυγε λαιμός.
τρίς δ' ἄρ' ὁ παῖς ὑπάκουσεν⁵,

and in writing them T. was visibly imitating *Il.* 11. 462 *τρίς μὲν ἐπειτ' ἦνυσεν ὅσον κεφαλὴ χὰ δ' εὖ φωτός*, | *τρίς δ' αἶεν ἰάχοντος ἀργήφιλος Μενέλαος*; and since he substitutes *λαιμός* for *κεφαλὴ* he may well have remembered also *Ar. Ran.* 258 *κεκραξόμεσθ' ἂν ὅσον ἢ φάρυξ ἂν ἡμῶν | χανδάνη*. At this point in the poem, therefore, T. has in mind certainly one, and perhaps two, passages containing the verb *χανδάνειν*, and I do not think it venturesome to suggest that his choice of that verb in 57, for quite

¹ Perrotta has argued that some of the resembling phrases derive from Homer, and that as A. is closer to Homer than T., Homer, not T., was his source. There is perhaps something in this, but none of the phrases are very close to Homer.

² I do not understand this feat. Herakles occupied the centre thwart with Ankaioi (396) and used, naturally, not a pair of sculls but an oar, which he presently broke (1168). If the rest ceased to row, or rowed feebly (the verb is

μετελώφειν), I should have thought that Herakles' efforts would have caused the Argo to go round in a circle.

³ Not by Legrand (*Étude* p. 282).

⁴ Unless *χανδών* means *λαβών* at *Nic. Al.* 145, 307.

⁵ I do not think it has been noticed that T. is apparently providing an *αἶτιον* for part of the Hylas-cult: *Ant. Lib.* 26 (= *Nicand. fr.* 48) *Ἵλαρ δὲ θόουσιν ἄχρη νῦν παρὰ τὴν κρήνην οἱ ἐπιχώριοι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐξ ὀνόματος εἰς τρίς ὁ ἱερεὺς φωνεῖ καὶ εἰς τρίς ἀμείβεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡχώ.*

a different use, is accounted for by conscious or unconscious suggestion derived from them. Now in A., when Polyphemos hears Hylas's shout, he hurries towards it like a hungry wild beast which hears the bleating of sheep and rushes after them (1242-9). He meets Herakles, who, on hearing his news, makes off like a bull distracted by a gad-fly (1265-9). Polyphemos has no place in T., where Herakles, already in anxious search for Hylas, hears his cry and goes after it like a ravening lion who hears a fawn crying on the mountain—a simile markedly resembling, as has been said, the first of A.'s. There is no occasion for a second, and T. goes on (64)

Ἡρακλῆς τοιοῦτος ἐν ἀρίπτοισιν ἀκάνθαις
παῖδα ποθῶν δεδόνητο.

The verb *δονεῖσθαι*, most commonly used, as T. uses it at 7. 135, 24. 90, of trees shaken in the wind, involves no such catachresis as *ἐχάνθαι*, but it is *recherché*, and I think I know where T. got it from. Nobody so soaked in Homer as T. could read A.'s bull-and-breeze simile without thinking instantly of its probable source; and that is *Od.* 22. 299 οἱ δ' ἐφέβοντο κατὰ μέγαρον βόες ὡς ἀγελαῖαι· τὰς μὲν τ' αἰόλος οἶστρος ἐφορμηθεὶς ἐδόνησεν | ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ. I suggest, in short, that *δεδόνητο* is due to the conscious or unconscious inspiration of the *Odyssey*, to which T.'s mind was directed by A.'s second simile¹. And if that is so, there is an end to the question which of these two poets writes with his eye on the other.

Whatever may be thought of this last suggestion, the evidence seems to me in any case sufficient to show that the *Argonautika*, in some shape or form, is presupposed by T.'s Idyll, which consciously improves upon it, and if ever the chronology of Alexandrian literature is to be unravelled this fact must be taken into account. What part, if any, the Idyll played in the famous quarrel between A. and Callimachus is not to be determined. *Gewiss hat er nicht*, says Wilamowitz² of T., *sein Gedicht gemacht um literarische Polemik zu treiben*, but I see no ground for his confidence. The *Hekale*, we are told³, was Callimachus's demonstration of what he could do himself in the epic line, and though I should not assert it, the *Hylas* may have been T.'s, and (like the Amykos episode in *Id.* 22) the more effective since the choice of ground is conceded to A., who, at least to modern taste, must necessarily suffer, not only from his inferior handling of the story as a story and his unseasonably paraded erudition, but by his failure to endow the episode with either atmosphere or charm. That T. stood for the principles of Callimachus is shown not only by his own epic writing but by the profession of faith introduced somewhat *mal à propos* at 7. 47 f. With regard to this passage, however, it is important to remember that, as Ziegler has pointed out⁴, the *Argonautika* was no bombshell dropped into a camp of orthodoxy. The innovators were Callimachus and T., and their innovations are likely to have been the subject of discussion and controversy in Alexandrian literary circles before Callimachus's quarrel with A. Therefore, though it is absurd to deny that 7. 47 f. refer to the controversy, it is right not to assume that they are necessarily connected with A., though they may be. The importance of *Id.* 13 (and 22) is that it shows T. handling A.'s themes after the publication of the *Argonautika*; that is to

¹ *Ἐχάνθαι* and *δεδόνητο* are examples of what Dr. A. B. Cook has called 'associated reminiscence': see his paper in *C.R.* 15. 338. It is there suggested that *καταρρεῖ* at 1. 5 comes from Sappho *fr.* 4 Bk.; the form, however, can hardly be right in Sappho, and the context is now known to be unlike T.'s (*Philol.* 92. 117). A directer reminiscence in this Idyll is *ἄωρος* (27). Callimachus and A. use the neuter form, T. the masculine here (2. 2 is ambiguous) because he is

thinking of Pind. P. 4. 188 ἐς δ' Ἰαωλκὸν ἐπέλ κατέβα ναντῶν ἄωτος. I imagine also that at 44 νύμφαι ἀκοίμητοι the adj., which is not elsewhere applied to nymphs, was suggested by the ἐννύχαι ἀοιδαί of the corresponding passage in A. (1225). See also my notes on 7. 10, 23 below.

² *Textgesch.* p. 177.

³ Schol. Call. H. 2. 106.

⁴ *Das hellenist. Epos* (Leipzig 1934).

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say, after the quarrel with Callimachus. One cannot tell; but if T. had wished his poem to be considered purely on its own merits he might have been expected to avoid the repeated challenges to comparison which it contains, and I should have thought it rather likely than not that he had a controversial purpose¹. The controversy, so far as can be seen, is conducted without venom², and T.'s intention is somewhat veiled by the fact that the ostensible purpose of the Idyll is to prove to Nikias a proposition about love; but Nikias was a poet as well as a doctor, and if it also implied some propositions about epic poetry, no doubt he understood them well enough.

I add notes on some points of detail in the Idyll, and where I have occasion to refer to A. I assume, in view of what has been said, his priority. In most cases however it is immaterial which poet wrote first.

7. τοῦ χαριέντος Ὑλα, τοῦ τὰν πλοκαμίδα φορεῦντος.

The second phrase puzzled the scholiasts, who were driven to the suggestion that Hylas was bald and wore a wig. It has not elicited much comment from moderns except that Cholmeley suspects 'some unexplained reference or allusion'³ and Legrand says that *étant donné le tour de la phrase grecque, il ne doit pas s'agir d'une indication d'âge, mais d'une particularité individuelle, ou sociale, ou ethnique*. I do not myself see any objection to interpreting it of age, and I think the phrase should be explained, and was probably suggested, by A. 2. 707 (of Apollo) κοῦρος ἔων ἔτι γυνυός, ἔτι πλοκάμοισι γεγηθώς; and that both passages should be illustrated by Euphron, A.P. 6. 279 πρώτας ὅπποτ' ἔπεξε καλῶς Εὐδοξος ἐθείρας, | Φοῖβω παιδείην ὤπασεν ἀγλαίην. | ἀντὶ δὲ οἱ πλοκαμίδος, Ἐκηβόλε, κάλλος ἐπέει | ὠχαρνήθεν αἰ κισσὸς ἀεζομένη. According to A., Hylas was νηπίαχος when captured by Herakles and by now πρωθήβης (132, 1212). Whether T. and Euphron are using πλοκαμὶς of a particular lock, such as the σκόλλυς (Ath. 11. 494F), reserved for dedication, or, as A. and Euphron rather suggest, using it of the whole crop, can hardly be determined, and the whole question of the cutting and dedication of the hair in boyhood and early manhood is obscure. See on it Pauly-Wissowa 7. 2118, A. B. Cook *Zeus* 1. 23⁶.

10. οὐτ' εἰ μέσον ἄμαρ ὄροιτο.

*Ορνυθαι, used, though not very commonly, of nightfall and of daybreak, is strange of noon, which is a climax, not an inception; and A.'s use of ὄρωρε, -ει = ἐστί, ἦν, noted by the lexicons, is confined to those tenses. It can be understood if we regard dawn, noon and nightfall as successive sectors of a revolving ring or sphere, in which case the same verb will fit all. A., using σταθερὸν ἡμαρ similarly, regards it rather as the central point of the sun's track: 1. 450 ἥλιος σταθερὸν παραμείβεται ἡμαρ.

14. . . . ὡς αὐτῷ κατὰ θυμὸν ὁ παῖς πεποναμένος εἴη
αὐτῷ δ' εὖ ἔλκων ἐς ἀλαθινὸν ἀνδρ' ἀποβαίη
αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ Schol.

Αὐτῷ δ' εὖ ἔλκων is usually understood by its defenders from the scholia onward to be the figure from yoked oxen which T. uses at 12. 15 ἀλλήλους ἐφίλησαν ἴσῳ ζυγῷ⁴, but, apart from the difficulty of the simple dative, and the omission of ζυγόν (which seems essential), this figure is here inappropriate and even ridiculous. It is well enough to speak of lovers, however disparate in age, loving ἴσῳ ζυγῷ, with mutual

¹ So Knaack, Susemihl (1. 208) and Perrotta.

² Apart from the fact that T. tells the story better, he also differs from A. as to some of its de-

tails (examples in my notes on 23, 46, 73 below).

³ So also Wilamowitz, *Textg.* 175.

⁴ See Headlam on Herodas 6. 12.

and equal affection, because the capacity for affection may be considered independent of mental and physical development, but T. is here talking not of affection but of exploits and accomplishments, and the picture of Hylas, who is a mere child, ploughing that furrow in harness with the superman Herakles is absurd. Donaldson (*New Crat.*⁴ p. 459) suggested that ἐλκων meant 'weighing well, like pure gold', and some who hold the other view have preferred αὐτῶ = αὐτόθεν *from that point* (which appears to be an invention of the scholia), but neither is satisfactory, and between πεποναμένος and ἐς ἀνδρ' ἀποβαίη there seems no suitable place either for plough or for scales. Others have proposed emendations but none are convincing¹, and Wilamowitz says with reason *versus non intelligitur*.

My own feeling about the phrase is first that αὐτῶ, αὐτῷ, and αὐτῶ are one and all improbable after αὐτῷ in 14 and that they are due to that word having caught the scribe's eye: and, second, that one of the interpretations in schol. K, ἐπ' εὐδοξίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ζῶν, points plainly not to ἐλκ- but to κλε-: Hesych., Suid., *Et. Magn.* κλέος· δόξα, Hesych. εὐκλεία· ἐνδοξα: εὐκλεία· εὐδοξία, ἐνδοξότης: *Et. M.* s.v. εὐκλείας. The error is of a common type illustrated by Housman in *J. Phil.* 16. 261, 20. 40. I think, then, that this scholiast was attempting to explain αὐτῷ δ' εὐκλειῶς, but that T. wrote οὕτω δ' εὐκλειῶς, οὕτω meaning 'as a result of his teaching'. It would be a mistake to suppose that ζῶν in the note necessarily implies a participle in the text; see, e.g., 3. 30 (αὐτῶς) ψόφον μὴ ποιῆσαν, and adverbs in -ην at any rate were regularly explained by participles².

23. ἀλλὰ διεξάιξε, βαθὺν δ' εἰσέδραμε Φάσιν,
αἰετὸς ὥς, μέγα λαῖτμα.

I have given elsewhere (*C.R.* 41. 166) reasons for thinking this the right order and punctuation of these words and that they mean *sped like an eagle into the great gulf of the Phasis*³. I mention the passage here only because it is possibly another in which A. is at the back of T.'s mind. Sails and oars had often enough been compared to wings, and wings to oars (see *C.Q.* 11. 117), and, though I do not remember such a simile, I dare say that somebody had compared a ship to an eagle. But they are not really much alike, and it would be an odd coincidence, if a coincidence, that when in A. the Argonauts entered this same bay of Phasis there was an eagle about which differed from other eagles in precisely that respect. It passed over the Argo on its way to and from its daily ration of Prometheus's liver, shaking the sails in its passage, οὐ γὰρ ὅγ' αἰθερίοιο φνὴν ἔχεν οἰωνοῖο, | ἴσα δ' εὐξίστοις ὠκύπτερα πάλλεν ἱερτοῖς (2. 1254). The Symplegades and Phasis have nothing to do with Hylas, who was ravished in the Propontis, and in connexion with the Symplegades T. discloses a difference with A. which is the more likely to be deliberate since it is no part of his narrative but the subject of this parenthesis⁴. And if his mind is here on A. it may well have been haunted by some recollection of this remarkable fowl.

¹ Here are some: αὐτῷ δ' εὐ εἰκων Vossius, ἰκελῶν Jacobs, ἀρκέων Hartung, εἰκῶς Sitzler: αὐτῷ δὲ συνεῶν Blaydes, δ' εἰκλος ὦν Naber: αὐτῷ δ' εὐ ἦκων Heinsius, εὐ ἐλθῶν Meineke, ἐξέλκων Stephanus, εὐ εἰκῶν Tucker: αὐτῷ δ' ἐξ αἰκλῶν Wordsworth: αἰλακα δ' ἐ. ἐ. Unger, ἰῶν Zettel, σὺν δὲ οἱ Kaiser: αὐτὸν δ' εὐ ἐλκῶν Hartung.

² E.g. schol. Soph. *O.C.* 1621, Ar. *Ach.* 410, cf. *C.R.* 12. 247.

³ My account of λαῖτμα overlooked its use by Leonidas in elegiacs, *A.P.* 7. 264, and I ought not to have suggested that it disappears between Apollonius and the 5th cent. A.D. It occurs at Opp. *Hal.* 2. 75, 4. 531 and Quint. 7. 307, 397.

⁴ 22 κυανῆν οὐχ ἄψατο συνδρομάδων ναῦς. In A. the Argo gets her sternpost nipped (2. 601). The divergence may denote a disagreement as to the authority to be followed.

To the not very impressive list of differences noticed by Knaack (*Gött. gel. Anz.* 1896. 884) there should perhaps be added also T. 66 σχέτλιοι οἱ φιλέοντες. T. fixes the responsibility for the affair on Herakles. In A. Herakles's behaviour passes without criticism: the σχέτλιοι (1302) are Zetes and Kalais, who prevent Jason from putting back to look for him and are presently murdered for their pains. The criticism is not pointed and may not be intended, but it is at least deserved.

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46. ἦτοι ὁ κούρος ἐπέχε ποτὶ πολυχανδέα κρωσσόν.

I mention this line because, in the cause of what I believe to be the truth, it has been misused. In A. Hylas sets out (1207) χαλκή σὺν κάλπιδι, to the scandal of the scholiast, who writes ἀπρεπὲς δὲ νεανίαν ὑδρίαν βαστάζειν. Ὅμηρος δὲ πρεπόντως παρθέον. πιθανώτερον δὲ ἦν ἀμφορέα εἰπεῖν ὡς Καλλίμαχος. It is argued, therefore, that T. is deliberately correcting A. He may be, but if it was a solecism to equip a youth with a κάλπις, then T., whether he knew what A. wrote or not, had the best of reasons for avoiding the word.

This matter, however, perhaps deserves to be investigated a little further. κάλπις is not to be distinguished, and is not distinguished by A.'s scholiast, from ὑδρία, which is used to gloss it in Suidas, and for which, according to A.B. 1095, it is the Thessalian word; and the archaeological evidence, as Professor Beazley assures me, shows that there was no impropriety in men carrying hydriae. Youths carry them on the Parthenon frieze and often on vases, Echoeax carried one in Polygnotus's *Iliupersis* at Delphi (Paus. 10. 25. 3), bronze hydriae were commonly given as prizes in games (J. D. Beazley, *Greek Vases in Poland* 20, 79), and these prize-hydriae are called κάλπιδες by Callimachus (*fr.* 60. 36 Pfeiffer = 122 Schneider). Further, another synonym for κάλπις = ὑδρία is κάλπη, and that is one name for the vessel carried by Aquarius himself (Vett. Val. 12. 29 Kroll, *Procl. Sph.* 15).

In short, A.'s scholiast has discovered a mare's-nest, and A., who was as good an antiquary as any scholiast, is guiltless of a blunder of which he might well have been acquitted on a *priori* grounds. The difference between the two poets as to the vessel carried by Hylas has no seeming significance¹ and does not help to decide the order in which they wrote. If T., as I think, wrote second, it is conceivable that he shared the opinion of A.'s scholiast and believed himself to be avoiding a blunder made by A.; but it is not very probable, and if he did so he was wrong.

68. ναὺς μὲν ἄρμεν' ἔχουσα μετάρσια τῶν παρόντων,
ἰστία δ' ἡμίθεοι μεσονύκτιον ἐξεκάθαιρον
'Ηρακλῆα μένοντες.

In these corrupt lines it seems reasonably plain that in 68 the Argo is ready to sail; and plain also from the present participle in 70 that in 69 her crew does something other than put to sea. Legrand prints ναὺς γέμεν (Hermann) and αἶτε καθαίρουν (Wordsworth, after Cobet and Hartung), and I agree that these are the best proposals which have been made, and though they are uncertain they cannot be far from the right sense. It has been objected that ἄρμενα and ἰστία are synonyms, and ἄρμενα is in fact used to gloss ἰστίον and λαίφος (Hecych. and Suid.), but it is the wider word and includes ropes and spars, as is shown, e.g., by T. 22. 13, A. 4. 889. It has also been objected that γέμειν is used only of freight, and that μετάρσιος in connexion with a ship should mean *at sea* and not *aloft*². The first of these objections at least is valid, but in T. its weight is very slight. T., like Herodas, cultivates the 'heightened and remoter synonym'³ and loves not only to invent new words but to refresh old ones with new applications, new senses, and new constructions, as anyone may see by investigating the history of *ταλαεργός* (19), *εὐδρον* (21), *καθιδρυθέντες* (28), *ὄρμον ἔθεντο* (30), *ἀστεμφεῖ* (37), *ἡμένψ* (40), *χορὸν ἀρτίζοντο* (43), *ἐξεφόβησεν* (48), *παρεψύχοντο* (54), *ἐχάνδανε* (57), *ἐπελάμβανε* (65), and half a dozen other words from

¹ It is not really plain that there is a difference in anything but the name, for the shape of a *κρωσσός* cannot be precisely determined and *ὑδρία* is among the words by which it is glossed (Hesych., *Et Magn.*). It may be noted, how-

ever, since *κρωσσός* is not a very common word, that it is used at Ant. Lib. 26 (= Nicand. *fr.* 48) in a version of the story quite different from T.'s.

² *J. Phil.* 34. 143.

³ Headlam, *Herodas* p. xxix.

this Idyll alone. I do not think T.'s editors and critics have fully appreciated this essential aspect of his style¹, and that is part cause of this note.

The other is a doubt provoked by *μεσονύκτιον*. The Argonauts land in Bithynia after a three days' voyage (29), make preparations for supper, and cut materials for a *χαμείνη* from a neighbouring meadow. *Χαμείναι* and *στιβάδες* may no doubt denote resting-places for an entertainment², but if they have only landed for a meal, these preparations seem somewhat elaborate for heroes who have cloaks on which they can sit or lie; and, if it is a meal and no more, it is odd that, whereas all share one *χαμείνη*, so much stress should be laid on their messing in couples (32³, 37). The picture of the whole sixty (74) couched together yet eating by pairs is not impossible, but I think the natural inference from 30-8 is that they meant to sleep on shore, and it is confirmed by the parallel scenes in A., where the gathering of materials for *στιβάδες* is followed by a night's rest (1. 453, 1182, cf. 3. 1193, 4. 883)⁴. But if so, why are they now thinking of starting before midnight on what must be the same evening? *Μεσονύκτιον* is in a corrupt context and may therefore be itself corrupt (I anticipate that someone on reading this will propose *ιστία* . . . καὶ ἐπὶ κριν from A. 2. 1262), but a note of time is here desirable, and I do not think it likely. More likely, I suspect, that this passage is to be added to those discussed at C.Q. 24. 146, where one who follows the lines of T.'s pictures with too curious an eye will find them slightly blurred.

73. Ἡρακλέην δ' ἥρωες ἐκερτόμεον λιποναύταν,
οὐνεκεν ἠρώησε τριακοντάζυγον Ἀργώ.
περὶ δ' ἐς Κόλχους τε καὶ ἄξενον ἵκετο Φῶσιν.

These lines are so punctuated by Wilamowitz as they had been by Reiske, Valckenaer, Jacobs and half a dozen others before him, and he supposes that the point of the poem lies in the last line. Nikias, he thinks, had advised T. to abandon amorous adventures, and T. replies that Herakles, though for a while distraught from such a cause, nevertheless reached in the end the same goal as his companions. This view, however, seems to be open to various objections. Logically, it invites the retort that T. is the only authority for the statement that Herakles rejoined his friends, and that other authorities either took him to Phasis on the Argo or left him behind for good (Schol. 75, Schol. Ap. Rh. 1. 1289); and, grammatically, if so much emphasis is to be laid on this one line (which seems unlikely), or even if it is to be regarded as a new sentence, an emphasizing pronoun (e.g. *περὶ ὁ δ' ἐς Κ.*) might reasonably be expected. There is also another reason for punctuating with a comma at the end of 74 and treating 75 as part of the causal clause. I will not, for the reason already given, stress the point that *κερτομεῖν* is commonly, as at 1. 62, used of reproach or mockery addressed directly to its object. More important, I think, is this, which affects the whole structure of the poem. If 75 is an assertion of T.'s, he has told us that Herakles reached Phasis, and in a parenthesis (23) he told us that the Argonauts got there too; but, so far as his narrative is concerned, the Argonauts are left kicking their heels in Bithynia. If on the other hand 75 belongs to the *οὐνεκεν* clause and forms part of what his comrades said to Herakles, then they

¹ As might be expected, there is much to the point in Legrand, *Etude* pp. 255 ff.

² 5. 34, 7. 133; in the latter, however, the diminutive form *χαμεινίς* perhaps marks a distinction. At 7.67 Lykidas is at home and his *στιβάς* is both couch and bed.

³ I agree with the scholia that *κατὰ ζυγά* here must mean *σύνδυο* as at Arist. *H.A.* 544 a 5. If, as is usually supposed, it meant 'by rowing-

benches', we should expect to hear in 37 (as at Val. 1. 353 we do hear) that Herakles and Telamon always shared a thwart, not that they messed together, which would, in that case, be a natural consequence.

⁴ At T. 22. 33 the Argonauts in similar circumstances prepare *εἶναι*, but there is no other indication whether they were intending to stay the night or not.

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can only have said it after they had met again in Phasis. In other words, the Argo is by plain implication conveyed from Bithynia to Phasis, the loose end is knotted in, and the story brought to a happy close. I do not know that others will agree with me, but the gain seems to me enormous, and I regard the passage as a pretty example of the havoc which careless punctuation may cause¹.

I may add that those who cling to Wilamowitz's view of the poem—which I think ingenious but highly speculative—will now find it improved; the Argonauts addressed to Herakles the sort of criticism you address to me (T. will now be made to say), but they could not have done so if he had not rejoined them before their chief adventure began. L. 75 is no longer an unsupported statement of T.'s but an admission placed in the mouth of those best qualified to speak.

A. S. F. Gow.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ Another triumphant example is 16. 46. T. is applying to Hieron for poetical commissions and says that the patrons of Simonides would have perished without a name if they had not employed him to sing their praises, whereas, as

it is, even their racehorses are immortal. Substitute, as Wilamowitz does, a comma for a colon after *ὀπλοτέριος*, and he is made to say that their reputation is due (i) to employing Simonides and (ii) to winning races.

THERAMENES AGAINST LYSANDER.

ON the Athenian disaster at Aegospotami the reaction, suppressed half a dozen years before, against the régime responsible for the war and its calamitous results sprang up again with double force. The capture of the fleet, the loss of the empire, which had been a useful buffer between the selfish interests of the wealthier citizens and the predatory appetites of the proletariat, the bankruptcy of the treasury, the discredit of the whole democratic system, the grim privations of the blockade, and the imminent return of the exiles eager for power and vengeance,¹ all portended the speedy downfall of the constitution, should the victorious enemy leave it standing. Yet the progress of the revolution was slower than might have been expected. In fact the oligarchs were at first crippled by the absence of their banished chiefs, and throughout they had to reckon not only with a people which had long enjoyed liberty and empire² and with a democratic administration already in office,³ but also with the middle party, disgusted indeed with the existing form of government but unwilling to substitute for it the rule of a narrow privileged class, and led by a statesman of great ability and experience.

Theramenes, upon whom the leadership of this middle party had devolved when Alcibiades went into exile, found himself restored by the sudden catastrophe to something like his old ascendancy and given a fresh chance of introducing his cherished scheme of reforms. He was on the spot, and except the demagogue Cleophon he had no formidable rival there; his central status in politics recommended him as the best intermediary between Athens and Sparta and between the extreme factions that threatened civil war at home; the flowing tide of public opinion was in his favour. But he was destitute of any means but argument and cleverness to impose his will upon the Athenians or re-establish his ideal constitution of the Five Thousand. He had no troops to back him, nor even the authority of a magistrate; he was reduced to directing to his purpose by dexterous management forces not under his own control. His party was the sorriest instrument of a revolution; they nursed no subversive creed, nor any deep grudge against the democracy so long as it did not damage their properties or interests by bad government and extravagance; their opposition dissolved as soon as the pressure of their grievances was relaxed; they had never developed the zeal or the machinery of partisans.

The oligarchs on the contrary, animated by fervid hatred of the democracy and marshalled in their disciplined Clubs, had the conviction and the organization lacked by the moderates, but they wanted the numbers and the fair programme which these could supply. Theramenes tempered a doctrinaire's belief in constitutional forms and methods with much practical sagacity; he knew that to compass his first object, the overthrow of the established polity, he must enlist the help of the oligarchs and go share and share with them. As in 411, mutual needs drew the two parties together; but, as in 411, the coalition was hollow, for both intended to betray their ally; the oligarchs meant to destroy the democracy under cover of the name and by aid of the moderates, and to keep the whole power to themselves; the leaders of the moderates meant to use the oligarchs to pull down the constitution, and then to turn against them and rebuild it after their own ideas. For the time however the united front was maintained; Theramenes, for example, advocated the claim that the

¹ Andoc. III. 12; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 34. 3; Xen. II. iii. 15. (When I refer to Xenophon tout court, please understand his *Hellenica*.)

² Xen. II. iii. 24. Cf. Thuc. VIII. 68.

³ Cf. Lys. XII. 43, δημοκρατίας ἐτι οὐσῆς; XIII. 7. seqq.

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restoration of the exiles should be inserted in the terms of capitulation,¹ and the oligarchs did him the unsolicited service of ridding him of the obstructive Cleophon.²

The reactionaries had to rely, as the sequel shows, upon the countenance, if not the active assistance, of the victorious enemy; much depended on the attitude of the conquerors at the coming surrender; the fate of the Athenians and their institutions might be very different according to the way in which the war was concluded. There were three alternatives, among which each of the three parties in the State would have made a different choice. The first was the proposal which the democrats made to Agis, *βουλόμενοι σύμμαχοι εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους ἔχοντες τὰ τεῖχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις συνθήκας ποιέσθαι*.³ It would have left Athens in a position to reassert her independence in the near future and, what mattered more at the moment, to resist any pressure from abroad to alter her constitution. The second was the capitulation negotiated by Theramenes on which the subsequent treaty of peace was based. The terms⁴ included the demolition of the Long walls and of the walls of the Piræus, the surrender of the ships, and the recall of the exiles; Athens would be defenceless against intervention from without and her democracy be exposed to collusive aggression from within, but in the Spartan league she would enjoy a limited autonomy, and there was no injunction about the constitution beyond the stereotyped provision in the treaty that it should be *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*,⁵ and this could be diversely interpreted and be regarded as a guarantee rather than an instruction. The third alternative remained latent, but must have constantly haunted the thoughts of Theramenes—an unconditional surrender, to which intransigence and famine might drive the people. It would presumably be received by Lysander, the associate, patron and champion of the banished oligarchs, who was busy every day in setting up decarchies and harmosts in the 'liberated' cities of the empire.⁶ If the Athenians capitulated unconditionally and to Lysander, a decarchy and a harmost were the inevitable doom in store for them.

Theramenes had a difficult game to play, more difficult because he had played it already once before; true, he held some strong cards in his hand, but the highest trump, Lysander the King of Clubs, was not among them. How was he to win his points?

The democrats were right in opening negotiations while there was yet time, and they addressed their overtures to the right quarter. But their offer was hopelessly inadequate in the circumstances, military and political; Theramenes was content to leave the Spartans, to whom Agis had referred them, to reject or amend it. The Ephors turned the envoys back from the frontier, telling them to go away and think again; they added an intimation that the demolition of ten stades of the Long walls was an indispensable condition of a peace. Cleophon vehemently repudiated the suggestion; was it not clearly a manœuvre to enable the Lacedaemonians to destroy Athens and enslave the citizens? were not their attendant jackals yapping for this sop?—the scaremongers retailed frothy stuff, but if the Athenians would swallow it, it would serve to stay the pangs of hunger and sustain the resistance. A decree was carried forbidding any discussion of the Spartan demand in the Council, and Archestratus, who had advised its acceptance, was sent to prison.⁷ The deadlock proved that the

¹ Lys. XII. 77, confirmed by the postscriptive position of the clause in the *δόγμα τῶν ἐφόρων*, Plut. Lys. 14.

² Xen. I. vii. 35; Lys. XXX. 10-14; XIII. 12 (where, by the way, Markland's conjecture *ἀναπανσόμενος*, 'although he was exempt from military service', cf. Demosth. XLII. 25, 32; Isocr. VIII. 20, is preferable to the MS *ἀναπανσόμενος*). Theramenes was absent, and had he been an accomplice, Lysias would not have

omitted to note it.

³ Xen. II. ii. 11. Cf. Lys. XIII. 5.

⁴ Plut. Lys. 14; Andoc. III. 11-12, 31, 39; Xen. II. ii. 20; Lys. XIII. 14; Diod. XIII. 107.

⁵ Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 34. 3; Diod. XIV. 3. Cf. Thuc. V. 77, 79; Xen. III. iv. 2.

⁶ Xen. II. iii. 7 (cf. ii. 5), III. iv. 2, 7, v. 13; Plut. Lys. 13, 14; Corn. Nep. Lys. 1; Diod. XIV. 10, 13.

⁷ The negotiations, Xen. II. ii. 11-15; Lys.

Demos was not yet ripe for a capitulation. Theramenes, debarred from any practical proposal and unwilling to court defeat by showing his hand prematurely, but anxious above all things to keep the negotiations alive, volunteered and was authorized by a majority of the Assembly to go to Lysander and ascertain whether the Lacedaemonians insisted upon the surrender of the walls in order to enslave the citizens or simply to secure the execution of the terms of peace. At the same time, according to Lysias, he promised to procure a peace which should exact no securities whatsoever, neither demolitions of walls nor surrender of ships, nor any loss to the State, but on the contrary, if he gained his end, confer a precious boon which he would not yet divulge.¹

It was an astute move. Theramenes observed the letter of the decree; he made his offer in the Assembly, not in the Council; he proposed to approach, not the Ephors, but Lysander; he evaded the intention of the prohibition through the loophole presented by the controversy about the duplicity of the Spartans. He was ostensibly continuing the negotiations begun by the democratic government, but he got the sole management of them; he transferred them and himself out of the illusions and intrigues that baffled him at Athens to the headquarters of the supreme commander who would certainly have the first word in the military questions and probably the last word in the final settlement; ensconced there, like a pointsman in his box at a railway junction, he could pick up his signals, pull his levers, and direct the engines of policy along the lines towards his end; above all, he was placed in control of the time-table.

Lysias sees in Theramenes the arch-traitor of the surrender and attacks him bitterly on his conduct of the negotiations;² his fallacious promises misled his fellow-countrymen to trust him for a better peace, but in fact he not only inflicted on them, instead of the original requirement of a breach of ten stades, the total demolition of the Long walls and the sacrifice of the ships, but even voluntarily and spontaneously proffered, what the Lacedaemonians had never mentioned nor the citizens conceived, the dismantlement of the Piraeus and the destruction of the constitution; such was the 'precious boon' which he had planned for them! The attack is effective, but unscrupulous. There is, to be sure, no reason to doubt that Lysias has reported Theramenes' promises correctly and assigned them to the proper occasion,³ but he has maliciously strained his evidence against him; there is no hint of any constitutional change in the terms brought back by Theramenes from Lacedaemon, and that question first emerges out of the clause in the subsequent treaty; (Lysias would however reply, not without justice, that Theramenes' terms involved it, and that he knew it); the dismantlement of the Piraeus was not a novel suggestion of Theramenes, but inevitably arose out of the original proposal of the Athenians; the *παράδοσις* of the ships and the demolition of the whole of the Long walls (like the

XIII. 8: Aeschines, II. 76, adds details on Cleophon's action, but it may be doubted whether he has not confused two occasions (cf. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 34. 1). The fears of the Athenians and their justification, Xen. II. ii. 3, 10, 14, 16, III. v. 8, VI. v. 35, 46; Andoc. I. 142, III. 21; Isocr. XIV. 31, XVIII. 29; Demosth. XIX. 65; Diod. XV. 63; Plut. *Lys.* 15; Polyae. I. 45. 5. Evidently there was much loose talk, and even a motion in the Peloponnesian Congress, about their punishment; but Cleophon had an interest in exploiting it, and it looms so large in the tradition because it had been a subject of controversy in Athenian politics; the 'Hang the Kaiser' clamour in 1919 supplies a parallel.

¹ Xen. II. ii. 16; *Lys.* XII. 68-9, XIII. 9-10.

² XII. 70, XIII. 14.

³ They might be suspected of going farther than the position of the negotiations at the moment required, but they are quite compatible with the circumstances. Securities were of course the main point at issue; the walls of the Piraeus might or might not be included in the reference to demolitions, but the question was already implied in the Athenian claim to retain the fortress; the problem of the ships had not (so far as we are told) been expressly raised by either party, but it must have been foreseen; the veiled allusion to the constitution in the 'precious boon' is indubitably authentic. As to the date, it is obvious that Theramenes could never have made those promises after his return from Lysander.

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renunciation of the empire) were demands too obviously possible to need a sponsor, but they are thrown into the scale against Theramenes.

But these misrepresentations are not the head and front of Lysias' offending; he has deliberately manipulated the facts to suit his case. In short, he sinks the mission of Theramenes to Lysander in his mission to Lacedaemon.¹ The confusion might pass as an oversight in a summary reference, for the two were practically continuous, but its intention is clearly revealed in its consequences. It enables Lysias to heap upon Theramenes the whole blame for the results of the two missions although, as appears from Xenophon, on the first he was not really a plenipotentiary, and on the second he shared the responsibility with nine colleagues. But also, and more important, by merging the first mission into the second Lysias can eliminate Lysander entirely and ignore his almost autocratic power to dictate what conditions of capitulation he pleased, and can affect to impute to Theramenes alone the guilt of all and every aggravation of the terms originally propounded by the Ephors. This calculated omission is extremely significant; it means that Lysias was conscious that Lysander was the true villain of the tragedy, and that Theramenes was, after all, if not defending the cause of democracy, yet striving to ward off oligarchy in its direst form. But Lysias cannot afford to recognize such nice distinctions; he is out to smash the posthumous rehabilitation of Theramenes behind which his opponents were taking refuge from his prosecutions,² and he must not let Theramenes himself seek shelter under the shield of Lysander.

How far Theramenes believed in his own promises we cannot know; the decree of the Assembly obliged him to adopt that pose, and he was not fastidious in his choice of means; but even Lysias (XII. 78) allows that his aspirations were less damnable than his methods, and we may credit him with hopes of more than he achieved. Probably he persuaded himself that, by the offer of a stable government based on a constitution approved by the Spartans and accepted by at least the two parties dominant, or about to be dominant, at Athens, he might purchase some mitigation of the military securities, but the counterplea, that more autonomy meant more guarantees, reduced him to a nonplus. The eloquent silence of Lysias indicates that Lysander was the rock on which any such hopes were wrecked; he cared nothing for constitutions and treated political pledges with contempt; he was obdurate in his demand for the walls and the ships; these were the real objects at stake; he would have them, and nothing less. Yet he was unwilling, as may be inferred from his ambiguous reserve on the constitutional question, to forfeit the co-operation of Theramenes and his party; they could expedite the surrender and (especially in the absence of the exiles) be useful in other ways at Athens; they might launch what political experiments they pleased, but would only oil the slips for the oligarchic friends whom he intended to put into power; once he held the walls and the ships in his grip, he was master of the whole situation. Accordingly, while firm and definite on the military sureties, he did not reject Theramenes' proposal for the remodelling of the Athenian State, and avoided any declaration incompatible with it. This attitude of correct aloofness suited also his relations with the Spartan government. He could rely upon the Ephors to endorse the decisions of the commander-in-chief on military matters; on political affairs it was unnecessary to commit himself and prudent to keep his own counsel, lest the jealous distrust which was always felt at Sparta towards a too independent proconsul, and was doubtless already awake there, should take alarm at the annexation of Athens to the provinces now ruled by his decarchs and harmosts.³

¹ This is perfectly clear if Xenophon's straightforward narrative (II. ii. 16-19) be compared with Lys. XIII. 9-11 and XII. 69, 70. Mark in particular *παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων* (9), *πρεσβυτήν*

αὐτοκράτορα (9, 10), *εἰς Λακεδαίμονα* (11), *πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους* (69), *ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* (70).

² Lys. XII. 50, 62, 64, 78, 84-5.

³ Cf. Xen. II. iv. 29; Plut. Lys. 21.

Theramenes had bartered away the last defences of his country; what had he got in return? The sacrifice might have been tolerable, even advantageous (as disarming all opposition), if he had secured with certainty the constitution of his dreams; but in fact he had nothing to show except that Lysander did not include in his terms of the capitulation any reference to the future government of Athens—in other words, did not impose the dreaded decarchy. What was the worth of that negative concession? If Theramenes ever had any illusions about Lysander, his long stay with him must have dispelled them; he clearly expected the worst, for he had his countermine ready and he sprang it at the right moment. He had been content to spin out the business for three months while the Athenians were eating up their corn,¹ but there was a limit to their endurance and a reckless impulse might fling them into Lysander's clutches. When he judged that the crisis was approaching Theramenes pressed for an answer to his question on the constitution. Lysander replied that he had no authority to decide such matters and referred him to the Ephors as the proper arbiters of peace and war; none the less he took good care that they should know his own decision, for he sent not only Lacedaemonians to tell them but also Aristoteles, one of the Athenian exiles.² Back at Athens Theramenes was at once elected, this time with nine colleagues and with plenary powers, to go to Sparta and conclude a peace. The famine had done its work, and no opposition declared itself. The negotiations were brief, and were expedited by the Spartans themselves, who summoned their allies to a joint session. Indeed there was nothing to cause delay, for the terms of the capitulation were simply those dictated by Lysander and the treaty of peace was already agreed upon in principle and had only to be drafted for ratification three or four weeks later. The hungry Athenians thronged the envoys on their return, fearful only lest their mission had been fruitless. On the next day the Assembly with few dissentients accepted the terms, and—'the Lacedaemonians and their allies' occupied the Long walls and the Piraeus.³

It was a diplomatic triumph for Theramenes; unaided except by the dummy hand of Sparta he had won his points. First, timing his action with premeditated precision, he contrived that the terms of the capitulation were presented at the moment when the starving populace was ready to submit to them without demur, and that the surrender was completed in a single day. Thus the Long walls and the Piraeus were delivered over, not to Lysander, who was absent, but to Agis and his troops, who were on the spot.⁴ Second, the negotiations at Lacedaemon were a continuation of those originally begun through Agis.⁵ The Athenians had then offered to enter the Spartan alliance, and the deadlock had occurred, not on that head, but on the demand by the Ephors of a breach in the Long walls. When the negotiations were resumed, the preliminary proposal of alliance appears to have been treated as already agreed. The Spartans were therefore committed to the admission of Athens to the league; and the autonomy of its members was a fundamental and loudly proclaimed principle of the league. In accordance with precedent the treaty

¹ Xen. II. ii. 16; Lys. XIII. II.

² Xen. II. ii. 17-18. The constitutional must have been the question at issue; Lysander was dictating military capitulations every month, but when the point was a political stipulation implicated with admission to the Lacedaemonian alliance he could disclaim authority to decide it. So Agis too had referred the Athenian envoys to the Ephors.

³ Xen. II. ii. 17, 19-22; Thuc. V. 26. For the distinction between the capitulation or armistice and the peace, and their respective dates, I may refer to my article 'The End of the Pelopon-

nesian War' in *C.Q.* XXXI. (1937), pp. 32-38.

⁴ *C.Q.* *l.c.*

⁵ One indication of the continuity may be seen in the reply of Theramenes and his colleagues at Sellasia to the Ephors, which is in word and in fact an answer to the reply of the Ephors to the former envoys at Sellasia (Xen. II. ii. 13, 19). The omission of any reference to the alliance in the terms of the capitulation seems to show that the proposal was taken for granted. Xenophon (20) does indeed introduce it into the terms, but he is giving the terms of the final peace.

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would include a stipulation that the Athenians should be governed *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, but the formula was conventional and elastic and the negotiators, if they desired a speedy settlement, had good reason to avoid debate on it. At all events, whether bound by the principle or in deference to Lysander or simply indifferent, the Ephors dropped no hint of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Athenians, and could hardly have shown less concern for their constitution had it been that of the Scythians.¹ Thus, subject to that one reservation, the right was guaranteed to the Athenians of framing their own constitution for themselves. Third, the stipulation, however vague, had (after all) its content, and not even Lysander could pretend that a decarchy was *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*.² Fourth, the treaty of peace was very quickly concluded after the armistice, and the fortifications were not handed over to Lysander until the day on which it was sworn; so that he had no opportunity for interference.

Thus, when Lysander arrived to celebrate his victory by a triumphal entry into the Piraeus he was confronted with a *fait accompli*; he was no longer the omnipotent autocrat that he had been on the other side of the Aegean; to his astonishment and chagrin the fortifications of Athens were occupied by the land army of the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians, over whom he had no authority, under the command of King Agis, whose commission he could not challenge; the Athenians had been accepted as autonomous allies of Sparta, pledged indeed to a constitution *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, but free to construct it for themselves; the blockade had been lifted, the people lived again, and the democrats were rallying their partisans in defence of their liberties;³ his oligarchic clients would have to conduct their own revolutionary campaign with what aid he could furnish from outside. Lysander had doubtless won the war, but Theramenes might claim to have won the peace.

A stormy encounter between the two antagonists was inevitable, for Lysander was not the man to be thwarted and flouted with impunity and Theramenes, withal his pliancy, had pluck and spirit. Diodorus (XIV. 3) has, I believe, preserved an authentic record of the scene, although he has mixed the circumstances and mistaken the issue in dispute. The story is that, when Lysander came from Samos to install the Thirty, Theramenes opposed him in the Assembly and, reading the words of the treaty to prove that Athens had agreed to establish her ancestral constitution, protested that it was monstrous to rob her citizens of their freedom contrary to the oaths sworn; Lysander replied that the Athenians had dissolved the treaty by their own infringement of it, for they had not pulled down the walls within the time prescribed; he levelled terrible threats at Theramenes and menaced him with death if he persisted in defying 'the Lacedaemonians'; Theramenes and the people were intimidated and were compelled to vote the abolition of the democracy and the appointment of the Thirty—among whom nevertheless he was himself elected as a counterpoise to the ringleaders!

The story is told more fully by Diodorus, but a comparison of the two passages shows plainly that it also underlies the account given by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 34. 3) of the institution of the Thirty. Its apologetic character is obvious, and it is no doubt derived from the controversial literature which sought, under the restored democracy and in the interests of his former associates, to vindicate the conduct of Theramenes. That fact may explain its paradoxical features. Both Aristotle and Diodorus, evidently drawing on their common source, begin with a survey of the aims of the Athenian parties in the debate which followed the conclusion of the peace and preceded the appointment of the Thirty Commissioners to draft the *πάτριος πολιτεία*.

¹ Πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* III. iii. 1112a.

² Xen. III. iv. 2, (Λύσανδρος) αὐτὸς συνελθεῖν αὐτῷ ἐβούλετο, ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας

ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ' Ἀγησίλδου. Cf. Plut. *Lys.* 21.

³ *Lys.* XIII. 13-17, 30.

as required by the treaty. The debate (or debates) must have been held very soon after Lysander's entry into the Piraeus and before he sailed to Samos, for the Thirty were elected before he went.¹ Yet Diodorus expressly and Aristotle implicitly place the incident after Lysander's return from Samos and after the lapse of the time permitted for the demolition of the walls, in fact (as Aristotle's mention of Dracontides proves) at the meeting of the Assembly described by Lysias (XII. 71-76) at which the Thirty were finally installed in the government. It is perfectly plain from Lysias that on that occasion Theramenes and Lysander were acting together in complete accord for the establishment of the Thirty. Lysias exposes their unanimity with pitiless clarity, but the apologist had to cloak it as best he could and to slur over their collaboration at this cardinal juncture. On the other hand the apologist would fasten upon their conflict at the preliminary debate and would make the most of it for his purpose. We may well believe that by rhetorical artifices and the use of ambiguous phrases he contrived to confuse the two occasions and to convey the impression that Theramenes had all along, on the second as on the first, withstood Lysander. But what about the cause of their conflict at the preliminary debate? It is incredible that Theramenes was resisting the appointment of the Thirty Commissioners and that Lysander was enforcing it, to the exclusion of his decarchy;² nobody writing within living memory of the events could have hoped to palm off such a travesty. Here however another delusive factor comes into play, a psychological aftermath of the experience of the revolution. The apologist must have written that Theramenes resisted the establishment of 'the oligarchy' intended by Lysander, and the suggestion is confirmed by Aristotle's rendering of the finish of the story, *καταπλεῖς ὁ δῆμος ἡναγκάσθη χειροτονεῖν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν*. The writer was fully conscious of the differences between the three parties and had prefaced his story by a special note of them; we cannot doubt that he used the word in its strict party sense and meant by 'the oligarchy' the government of the extreme faction, Lysander's clients. But all distinctions within the Thirty were obliterated when Critias got control and were quickly forgotten, and after the amnesty the old divisions were deliberately obscured and the three-party system, which had a long history, fell into oblivion; 'the oligarchy' became to the Athenians³ a synonym for the Thirty. That was why the apologist wrote his exculpation of Theramenes; he had to show that Theramenes was not an oligarch and to insist upon the differences between the parties. He did not mean that Theramenes opposed the appointment of the Thirty, who were ostensibly representative of the three parties,⁴ but only the threat of an oligarchic Ten; but he reaped a success with posterity beyond all his intentions, for by a natural misapprehension the next generation, so far as he moulded its opinion, regarded Theramenes as the champion of the democracy. So the story, as it comes down to us, transposes the rôles of the two actors in the scene; but that Theramenes just after the conclusion of the peace should have proposed (or at least advocated) the election of Thirty Commissioners to draw up the *πάτριος πολιτεία* in opposition to Lysander, who was bent upon setting up his decarchy, and should have quoted the words of the treaty against him, is entirely probable and is so inherent in the political position of the moment that it may be accepted without hesitation as true.

Nevertheless the quarrel, however acrimonious, could not be allowed to go too far, for both the two adversaries had motives for patching it up. Theramenes had reason to be conciliatory; he had won the first round in the contest, but more re-

¹ Xen. II. iii. 2, 3. Cf. Lys. XII. 71.

² Even if we could suppose, without a trace of evidence, that Theramenes attempted to revive the constitution of the Five Thousand, why should Lysander have watered down his dec-

archy into the Thirty?

³ E.g. among contemporaries Lysias (passim, e.g. XVIII, XXV.), Xenophon (II. iii. 17, 25-6), Andocides (I. 99), Isocrates (XVIII. 40).

⁴ Cf. Lys. XII. 76.

mained; the right against the republic; Lysander he had no and confr case; he terms of campaign in his year Samos, if

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¹ Lys. XII.

² Xen. II.

³ Plato (*E* the superior (*Ath. Pol.* 35 whether it d Ten in the account of th Ten: τῆς μ ἐνδεκα μὲν ἐ ἀγορὰν ἐκάτερ ἔδει—τριάκον αὐτοκράτορες. scholiast's a δορεῖ (awkw charged with

mained; his first success was, after all, negative, not constructive; he had blunted the right horn of his dilemma, but he had sharpened the left; the democratic revolt against the political implications of the surrender had given him serious trouble and been suppressed only by the incarceration of some of the highest officers of the republic¹; it warned him that he could not dispense with the pressure which Lysander alone was likely to exert. Lysander on his part was at a disadvantage; he had no overt grievance, for the conditions of the capitulation were simply his own, and confronted with the treaty, which was in the normal form, he had a very bad case; he was not prepared to challenge the Spartan government by violating its terms of peace; he was impatient of delay in settling the affairs of Athens, for the campaign against the Samians urgently claimed his presence and must be finished in his year of command; he could intervene later, perhaps on his way home from Samos, if his partisans needed his help at Athens.

Moreover, if I interpret the facts aright, Lysander saved his face and secured his hold on Attica by a characteristic stroke. The Piraeus, with the Long walls, had been surrendered to Agis under the armistice as a pledge for the execution of the terms of peace, but it was delivered over to Lysander at his triumphal entry on the 16th of Munychion, when Agis withdrew to Decelea and proceeded to evacuate Attica.² A conquered *enclave*, hitherto occupied by Lacedaemonian and Peloponnesian troops and under military administration, the Piraeus might be treated as being in a category of its own and might still be claimed as a guarantee for the performance of conditions not yet fulfilled. It appears to stand in a strange relation to the city during the domination of the Thirty; 'the Ten in the Piraeus' are quite distinct from the Thirty and seem to be their partners rather than their subordinates, at any rate delegates rather than mere assistants³; at the restoration of the democracy they are excluded from the amnesty as though independently responsible for their acts, and if they offer to submit to *εὐθυναί*, they are to be tried by a different court, *ἐν τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ*.⁴ Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 35. 1) alone of our sources purports to state precisely how these Ten were instituted; he tells us that the Thirty, having appointed (*καταστήσαντες*) 500 Councillors and the other magistrates *καὶ προσελόμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρχοντας δέκα, καὶ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλακας ἑνδεκά, καὶ μαστιγοφόρους τριακοσίους ὑπηρέτας*, kept the supreme authority in their own hands (*κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν δι' ἑαυτῶν*). Why does he change from *καταστήσαντες* to *προσελόμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς*? Because, I believe, it is present to his mind that the Thirty did not 'appoint' the Ten in the Piraeus, but 'adopted' them, that is to say associated with themselves a board of administrators already constituted.⁵ The appointments were made no doubt near the close of the year of the archon Alexias, which ended on July 3rd,⁶ to provide the ordinary civil service for the new year, and the adoption was, on Aristotle's evidence, at all events no earlier. The Ten on the contrary were

¹ Lys. XIII. 7, 17, 30-34.

² Xen. II. iii. 3.

³ Plato (*Epist.* vii. 324c) asserts emphatically the superior authority of the Thirty and Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 35. 1) implies it; but one may doubt whether it dated from the first institution of the Ten in the Piraeus. Plato gives a very odd account of the functions of the Eleven and these Ten: *τῆς μεταβολῆς . . . προύστησαν ἄρχοντες, ἑνδεκά μὲν ἐν δασει, δέκα δ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ—περὶ τε ἀγορὰν ἐκότεροι τούτων ὅσα τ' ἐν τοῖς δασει δικαιεῖν ἔδει—τριακοντα δὲ πάντων ἄρχοντες κατέστησαν αὐτοκράτορες*. The parenthesis reads like a scholiast's annotation, and are the words *ἐν τοῖς δασει* (awkward after *ἐν δασει*) to be regarded as charged with deep significance or as a solecism?

⁴ Xen. II. iv. 38; Aristotle. *Ath. Pol.* 39. 6.

⁵ That he means to put the Eleven and the Whips in that same category is questionable. One would naturally understand that he does, and the inclusion of the Eleven seems in itself probable, for otherwise one should expect them to be reckoned in *τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς*, and they receive the same treatment as the Ten under the amnesty. On the other hand the expression *προσελόμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς* seems hardly applicable to *ὑπηρέται*, and it is possible that the writer, having satisfied his historical conscience by the change of verb about the Ten, reverted mentally to *καταστήσαντες*, but felt that to repeat the word would be clumsy.

⁶ Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar*, p. 120.

presumably instituted when Agis evacuated the Piraeus and some form of civil government was needed to replace the military administration. But that was the date when Lysander (on April 22nd) sailed into the Piraeus and took over the Athenian ships and, of course, the harbours which contained them. Plutarch (*Lys.* 15) definitely ascribes the appointment of the Ten in the Piraeus to Lysander, but as he couples with it the appointment of the Thirty and the installation of Callibius and the Laconian hoplites on the Acropolis and his whole narrative is thoroughly confused, his statement cannot be pressed. But the facts themselves and the circumstances clearly point to the conclusion that the Ten were appointed by Lysander or on his demand, and that they were in truth his usual decarchy.

If so, may we not further surmise that the decarchy was backed by the usual harmost and garrison? Beloch¹ observes: 'Dass der Peiraeus, bis die Schleifung der Mauern vollendet war, von peloponnesischen Truppen besetzt blieb, ist doch selbstverständlich.' An equally cogent reason may be seen in the necessity of guarding the Athenian ships while Lysander was away at the siege of Samos; he took them with him when he went home to Laconia in the autumn,² and it is very unlikely that he had taken them to Samos and back. Lysander therefore had strong arguments to justify his retaining control of the Piraeus, and by treating it as a separate city he could evade the stipulations of the peace. Notwithstanding the silence of our authorities, whose attention is concentrated on Athens, the harmost and garrison seem to be more than probable.

So Lysander was not intransigent, and if the Piraeus was held for him by his own nominees he could well afford to concede a compromise; he got his decarchy, although not in Athens itself, and Theramenes got his Commission on the constitution. This, not merely the reduction of Athens by starvation, was the real object and fruit of Theramenes' long negotiations. It was not yet the *πάτριος πολιτεία*, the *πράγμα μέγα καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον* which he had promised, but it was at any rate the first and biggest step towards it; he had averted the dreaded decarchy and had substituted Thirty Commissioners charged with the duty of drawing up that ideal constitution, and they were to be, not the organ of the oligarchs alone, but representative of the three parties in the State. The results I hope to discuss in another article.

J. A. R. MUNRO.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

¹ G.G.² III. 2, p. 207.

² Xen. II. iii. 8-9.

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THE AVIARY THEORY IN THE *THEAETETUS*

AT 195B 9 it is pointed out that the Wax Block theory¹ does not cover that large class of judgments in which no sense-objects are concerned, e.g. judgments about numbers. How can we make the mistake of judging that $7+5=11$?

The simile of the Aviary, now introduced, is very simple. It illustrates the difference between potential (or latent) knowledge and actual knowledge, i.e. between knowledge at our disposal, because it has been learnt and stored away in the mind, and knowledge present and 'alive' at the moment. The theory is that when we make a mistake about the sum of 7 and 5 we are 'hunting for' the knowledge of 12, which we 'possess' (*κεκτησθαι*) as we might possess a bird in a cage, but which we have not 'got about us' (*ἔχειν*); but we mis-take, wrongly take our knowledge of 11, i.e. we call up before our mind a different piece of knowledge.

This seems quite a reasonable account of such errors, provided we understand 'knowledge of 12, or 11' to include respectively the knowledge that 12 is $7+5$ and 11 is $7+4$ (or $6+5$). It is quite reasonable to say that when computing the sum of 7 and 5 we are searching for the latent piece of knowledge $7+5=12$, and that instead of getting hold of that we get hold of another very similar piece of knowledge, viz. $7+4=11$ (or $6+5=11$). This is what I believe P. to mean when he sums up the theory at 199B *ὅταν θηρεύων . . . τότε ἄρα τὰ ἑνδεκά δώδεκα ψήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἑνδεκά ἐπιστήμης ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περισσεύουσας*.

The question may be asked why this happens. Is it not just as difficult to account for taking the wrong bird, $7+4=11$, out of the cage as for giving the wrong sum of 7 and 5? Is the error any more explained by the similarity between the birds in the cage than by the similarity of 11 to 12? My answer is that if 11 and 12 were known *merely as such* the mind would not recognize them as similar. It is because they are sums, because 12 contains one more unit than 11, that they stand next each other in the number-series, and their proximity in the number-series constitutes their similarity. The current interpretation of the Aviary amounts merely to saying that when I ask 'What is $7+5$?' I think of the number 11 instead of the similar number 12. That is no explanation of the mistake, but merely a re-statement of it. What Plato is asking himself is, 'Why do I think of 11?' His answer, as I understand it, is 'Because my knowledge of *what 11 is* (viz. the sum $1+1+1$ etc. or, written shortly, $7+4$ or $6+5$) is so similar to my knowledge of *what 12 is* that when these pieces of stored knowledge are drawn out the one may well be taken instead of the other'.

It may be added that although Socrates refers, in passing, to mistakes in adding larger numbers (196B), the theory will not explain all mistakes in addition. If I am adding 4391 and 3279 and give the answer 7660 my mistake is plainly due to asking myself an irrelevant question, viz. 'What is the sum of $9+7$?' instead of 'What is the sum of $9+7+1$?' But Plato is not concerning himself with addition-errors for their own sake, but only as illustrative of error not involving perception.

At 199C-D Socrates proceeds to demolish this theory. How, he asks, can error be the product of knowledge? How can we fail to recognize these latent pieces of knowledge when we call them up? If the actualizing of a piece of knowledge, which

¹ For which see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 120-127. I take this opportunity of acknowledging the debt which, in common with all students of the *Theaet.* and *Sophist*, I owe to this valuable book.

is *ex hypothesi* true, can give rise to a piece of ignorance, we ought logically to believe the converse, and say that the actualizing of a piece of ignorance (a latent false judgment) would give rise to a piece of knowledge.

Professor Cornford suggests (PTK p. 137) that P. has here overlooked the possibility of explaining false judgments of the kind here under consideration on the lines of the 'misfitting' of the Wax Block theory. He says 'Does the expression "piece of knowledge" include complex objects such as "the sum of 7 and 5"? This ought to be included; it consists of terms I am acquainted with and it is before my mind when I ask "What is the sum of 7 and 5?" It is this object that I identify with 11 when I make my false judgment. If it is a "piece of knowledge" and contained in the Aviary, then the false judgment can be explained as the wrong putting-together of two pieces of knowledge, as in the waxen block false judgment was the putting-together of a fresh impression and the wrong memory imprint. The result will be a false judgment entirely composed of "pieces of knowledge" (terms I am acquainted with). It seems thus that the Aviary apparatus is, after all, as adequate to explain false judgment where no perception is involved as the waxen block was to explain false judgment involving perception. It is hard to resist the impression that P. has overlooked this explanation. . . .'

I do not myself think that P. would accept this criticism. As I have said, I think that the knowledge that $7 + 5 = 12$ and $7 + 4$ (or $6 + 5 = 11$) are respectively *included* in the 'knowledge of 12 and 11'. I can see no meaning in the expression 'knowledge of 12' if it excludes knowledge of the sums of smaller numbers that produce 12. I therefore do not think that there could be any question of 'fitting together' such a piece of knowledge as $7 + 5 = 12$ with a *different* piece of knowledge, viz. the 'knowledge of 12'. They are not different pieces: they are the same piece. Socrates' difficulty is a real one, not due to any overlooking of an obvious explanation.

At 199e Theaetetus attempts to surmount it. There may be 'ignorances' as well as 'knowledges' in the Aviary. But, says Socrates, when you take an ignorance out you will not recognize it as an ignorance; you will suppose it to be a knowledge. And the difficulty in Theaet.'s new suggestion, says Socrates, lies just there: our destructive critic (ὁ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος) will urge that this is impossible. 'My dear good people', he will say (200b), 'does a man knowing both Knowledge and Ignorance suppose that one of these known things is another known thing? Or, while knowing neither, judge that one of the unknown things is another unknown thing? Or, while knowing one, and not the other, does he judge the known thing to be the unknown one, or the unknown one to be the known one? Or will you tell me that there are once again Knowledges about Knowledges and Ignorances, whose possessor shuts them up in some second sort of ridiculous aviaries or wax blocks, knowing them so long as he possesses them, even though he hasn't got them ready to hand in his mind? If that is so, you will be compelled to run round and round over and over again without ever getting any further'.

It is important to grasp what the critic means by his three alternatives. He cannot mean that it is possible not to know both, or either, of the notions in your mind. If a thing is in your mind you must know it. What he does mean is that it is possible to know what Knowledge—the fact or state of knowing—is, and what Ignorance—the fact or state of being ignorant—is; or again, we may know what one of these is, but not what the other is; or finally we may not know what either of them is.

It is essential to see that ἐπιστήμην and ἀνεπιστημοσύνην in 200b 1-2 do not mean 'a piece of knowledge' and 'a piece of ignorance' in the sense of a *particular thing known* or not known. The words denote not objects or things in the mind, but states of the mind. Otherwise the whole supposition of the critic is nonsense.

Now it is perfectly true that, as the critic urges, we cannot 'suppose that

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Ignorance is Knowledge' if by this phrase we refer to a state of mind which would lead us to say 'Ignorance is Knowledge'. But it is perfectly possible to 'suppose that Ignorance is Knowledge' in the sense of being in such a state of mind as would lead me to say 'I know that Charles II was executed'. And the possibility of supposing that Ignorance is Knowledge *in this sense* is quite unaffected by my knowing, or not knowing, what Knowledge and Ignorance themselves are.

The critic's argument is fallacious, inasmuch as it only disproves the possibility of mistaking Ignorance for Knowledge in the former of these two senses; and, because it only disproves that, it is without force as against Theaet.'s suggestion. For Theaet.'s suggestion was that false judgments which involve no perception may be accounted for by supposing that the mind contains a store of 'Ignorances' side by side with a store of 'Knowledges', and that we call up one of these Ignorances but suppose it to be one of the Knowledges. Thus, if I say 'Charles II was executed' my false assertion is due to my having as part of my mental furniture an incorrect knowledge of the lives and fortunes of the Stuarts. This explanation is perfectly reasonable, though not particularly helpful since (as Cornford points out) it merely pushes the problem of error a stage further back: it still leaves us with the question 'How did I ever come to make a confusion between Charles I and Charles II?' Theaet.'s theory is quite untouched by the critic's argument. In the instance taken I suppose that the piece of ignorance which I have called up is a piece of knowledge; a supposition which is perfectly possible, because it does not involve supposing that Ignorance is Knowledge in the sense in which that supposition is impossible.

At 200B 5 the imaginary critic suggests that Socrates might attempt to evade the difficulty by adding a second Aviary to the first; in other words, Socrates might say that the alternatives enumerated at B 1-5 are unreal inasmuch as we can 'possess' the knowledge of what Knowledge and Ignorance are without 'having that knowledge about us'. And he rightly objects that this would involve an infinite regress. If the first Aviary contains Ignorances as well as Knowledges, and they can only be discriminated by a second, there is just as much ground for supposing that the second contains Ignorances which can only be discriminated from Knowledges by a third, and so on.

But we should realize that this regress argument does not invalidate Theaet.'s theory: it only arises on a misrepresentation of that theory. For, as we have just seen, my mistaken supposition that a piece of ignorance is a piece of knowledge is not a supposition that 'Ignorance is Knowledge' in the critic's sense. The question 'How do I know that I know?' is not one which Theaet. has to face, since his theory implies that I *don't* know that I know; if I did, I should not suppose what is in fact a piece of ignorance to be a piece of knowledge.

I am inclined to think that P. himself saw, or half-saw, the fallacy of the argument, and that that is why he puts it into the mouth of $\delta \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \gamma \kappa \tau \iota \kappa \delta \varsigma \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \iota \nu \circ \varsigma$. The reference in these words must be to 197A, where it was said that an $\alpha \nu \tau \iota \lambda \omicron \gamma \iota \kappa \delta \varsigma \alpha \nu \eta \rho$ would object to our asking what $\tau \delta \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \theta \alpha \iota$ is like before we had defined what it is. That objection was brushed aside as unsubstantial, and we may believe that the present argument also is without substance.

R. HACKFORTH.

SIDNEY SUSSEX COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

ΤΡΙΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΗΣ: A RECONSIDERATION.

WHEN Demosthenes brought Aeschines to trial on a charge of malfeasance as an ambassador, he made what seems now the astonishing declaration in connection with Aeschines' acting of the part of Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*: ἵστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ' ὅτι ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐξαίρετόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ γέρας τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς τὸ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρ' ἔχοντας εἰσέναι.¹ Until the last generation (and even later) this was taken at face value as indicating that of the three actors² presenting a tragedy the third (and least important) was regularly assigned the part of royalty.³ But that the title rôle in such plays as Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* or an important character such as Creon in the *Antigone* should have been entrusted to the third ranking actor is incredible. How is the discrepancy to be explained?

In February, 1908, Rees published a dissertation, *The So-Called Rule of Three Actors in the Classical Greek Drama*, in which he contended that Aristotle was referring⁴ not to the total number of performers acting a play but rather to an aesthetic ideal observed by the poet—simplicity; that Greek dramatists, to avoid confusion, preferred to have not more than three speaking characters on simultaneously. Rees' objection to the traditional view of a three-actor limit is based (a) on the fact that three tragedies⁵ and eight comedies⁶ present scenes involving four speaking personages and consequently four actors; (b) on the inevitable division of a rôle between two or three actors in one tragedy⁷ and three comedies,⁸ if the plays were presented by only three performers; (c) on the overloading of parts, especially that of the third actor; (d) on the rapidity with which an actor would have to change costume in two tragedies⁹ and eight comedies¹⁰; (e) on the mechanically necessary assignment of inappropriate rôles; and (f) on the ground that such a limitation predicates an effort of the state to observe economy on its own part or on that of the choregus.

Not all these grounds are equally convincing. In particular, the use of comic practice as evidence for Aristotle's meaning appears hazardous; the argument cuts both ways. For if the presence of four speaking personages on at once in comedy tends to show that Aristotle was not thinking of a three-actor limit, it shows even more conclusively that he was not thinking of comedy at all (as, in fact, is obvious from a perusal of his context) even in regard to artistic principles; the exceptions are too numerous. Furthermore, if the state (as in the older view) limited the provision of performers to three for each tragedian presenting a tetralogy, it would not necessarily follow that the same limit was placed on comedians who were competing with but one play each. Again, since protagonists were assigned by lot, the difficulty of casting the parts suitably would still hold in regard to the chief

¹ xix, 247.

² It was assumed that when Aristotle speaks of the increase in actors to three under Sophocles (*A.P.* 1449a 15-19: καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Δισχύλος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς) he had in mind the number of performers at the disposal of the playwright.

³ E.g., Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* i² (1885), 239 f.; Jebb, *Antigone*³ (1900), p. 7; Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*³ (1927), 233.

⁴ Cf. n. 2 above. Horace, *A.P.* 192 (*nec quarta loqui persona laboret*) 'is but an echo of Aristotle's aesthetic law' (Rees, *op. cit.* p. 23).

⁵ Aesch. *Cho.* 886-891; Eur. *Andr.* 547-765; the *Rhesus* 642-667.

⁶ Ar. *Ach.* 98-125, 1068-1072; Nub. 1104 f.; Pax 1210-1240; Av. 1579-1693; Lys. 78-253, 431-613, 742-780, 1273-1321; Thes. 371-466; Ran. 549-578, 1411-1533; Ec. 1042-1065.

⁷ Soph. *O.C.* (Theseus).

⁸ Ar. *Plut.* (Plutus), *Eq.* (Servant B), *Vesp.* (Xanthias).

⁹ Aesch. *Cho.* 887-891; Eur. *Or.* 1353-1368.

¹⁰ Ar. *Ach.* 56-64, 126-135, 1077-1084; Thes. 927-929; Ran. 165-183; Ec. 1044-1049; Lys. 844 f.; Nub. 125-133, 220 f.; Av. 84-92, 1552-1565, 1693-1706; *Vesp.* 141-144, 1412-1417.

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¹ P. 65.

² Cf. O'Connor, *and Acting in*
pp. 31-36, 77
and *Romans* 144

³ A.P. 1449a
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Pol. 1338b
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⁴ Apoll. *L.*
Mus. 1141D;
Athen. 257B;

⁵ ταῦτα μνη
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⁶ Prae. *Ge.*
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performers. And finally, of the three tragedies adduced as exhibiting four speaking personages on at once, none is a really cogent instance; in the *Andromache* the child Molossus is a very minor character (presented, in the older view, by a *παραχορήγημα* or supernumerary not provided by the state); in the *Choephores* it would not seem impossible for an actor to shift cloak and mask within the space of five lines; in the *Rhesus* it would appear that Diomedes and Odysseus leave the scene about l. 637 to slay Rhesus, Paris (announced by Athena at 627) probably comes on at 642 and leaves probably at or about 664, Athena calls aloud a warning to Odysseus and Diomedes at 668 (*ὕμᾱς δ' ἀντῶ . . .*), after which Odysseus comes back on the scene, either alone or with Diomedes. Both the *Choephores* and the *Rhesus* should be considered under objection (*d*).

Strolling companies, which, according to Rees,¹ were in existence as early as the fifth century, and the travelling troupes organized by the guilds in the fourth century appear under natural economic pressure to have waived these objections,—overloading of parts, 'lightning changes', and all,—and to have presented their plays ordinarily by a group of three performers.

As for the positive evidence that had been thought to substantiate a three-performer limit in the fifth century B.C., Rees argues that the statement which appears (with some minor textual variants) in Byzantine lexicographers under *νεμῖσεις ὑποκριτῶν*, viz., *οἱ ποιῆται ἐλάμβανον τρεῖς ὑποκριτὰς κλήρῳ νεμηθέντας ὑποκρινομένους τὰ δράματα*, *ὧν ὁ νικήσας εἰς τοῦτιδιν ἄκριτος παρελαμβάνετο*, refers only to protagonists; that Aristotle and Horace (as already indicated) were dealing with an artistic consideration of the number of personages proper to engage in dialogue at one time; and that *τριταγωνιστής* in Demosthenes (with the lack of *τετραγωνιστής* or *πενταγωνιστής*) has no bearing on the question, since it is merely a term of opprobrium signifying 'a weak, third-rate performer'.

It is not my intention to debate the general thesis presented in Rees' valuable essay, but rather to review the meaning of *τριταγωνιστής* in Demosthenes, because Rees' interpretation, which seems to have won favour,² is one with which I find it hard to agree.

Rees traces out the history of the words *πρωταγωνιστής* (and *πρωταγωνιστεῖν*), *δευτεραγωνιστής*, and *τριταγωνιστής* (and *τριταγωνιστεῖν*) on pp. 31-40.

πρωταγωνιστής and *πρωταγωνιστεῖν*, he points out, are used figuratively by Aristotle in two passages³ and by later authors;⁴ do not occur at all in the inscriptional records; but are found with the technical meaning of first actor and his part in the scholium on Eur. *Phoen.* 95,⁵ Plutarch,⁶ Pollux,⁷ and Plotinus.⁸

¹ P. 65.

² Cf. O'Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece* (September, 1908), pp. 31-36, 77; Allen, *Stage Antiquities of the Greeks and Romans and their Influence* (1927), pp. 138 f.

³ A.P. 1449a 16 ff.: *πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος . . . τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν.*

⁴ Pol. 1338b 29 f.: *ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριώδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν.*

⁵ Apoll. *Lex. Hom.* s.v. *ὑποκρίναίτο*, [Plut.] *de Mus.* 1141D; Plut. *Mor.* 332D: Clearch. ap. Athen. 257B; Suid. s.v. *Χιωνίδης*.

⁶ ταῦτα μηχανᾶσθαι φασὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἵνα τὸν πρωταγωνιστὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς Ἰοκάστης προσώπου μετασκευάσῃ.

⁷ *Præc. Ger. Reip.* 21 (816F-817A): *ἄπονον γὰρ ἔστι τὸν μὲν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ πρωταγωνιστὴν, Θεόδωρον ἢ Πῶλον δὲνα, μισθωτῷ <τῷ> τὰ τρίτα λέγοντι πολλάκις ἐπεσθαι καὶ προσδιαιλέγεσθαι ταπεινῶς ἂν*

ἐκείνος ἔχη τὸ διάδημα καὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον, ἐν δὲ πράξειν ἀληθινᾶς καὶ πολιτείας τὸν πλοῦσιον καὶ ἐνδοξόν ὀλιγωρεῖν καὶ καταφρονεῖν ἐρχοντος ἰδιώτου καὶ πένητος. . . .

Lysand. 23: . . . οἷον ἐν τραγῳδίᾳς ἐπιεικῶς συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς τὸν μὲν ἀγγέλου τινὸς ἢ θεράποντος ἐπικείμενον πρόσωπον εὐδοκίμειν καὶ πρωταγωνιστεῖν, τὸν δὲ διάδημα καὶ σκῆπτρον φοροῦντα μὴδὲ ἀκούεσθαι φθεγγόμενον. . . .

⁷ *iv*, 124: *τριῶν δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν σκηνὴν θυρῶν ἡ μέση μὲν βασιλῆιον ἢ οἶκος ἐνδοξος ἢ πᾶν τοῦ πρωταγωνιστοῦντος τοῦ δράματος, ἡ δὲ δεξιὰ τοῦ δευτεραγωνιστοῦντος καταγῶγιον, ἡ δ' ἀριστερὰ τοῦ εὐτελέστατον ἔχει πρόσωπον ἢ ἱερὸν ἐξηρημαμένον ἢ δαικὸς ἔστιν.*

⁸ *iii*, 2, p. 484 Creuz.: *ὥσπερ ἐν δράμασι τὰ μὲν τάττει αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται οἷσιν ᾗδῃ· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πρωταγωνιστὴν οὐδὲ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ διδοὺς ἐκάστῳ τοὺς προσήκοντας λόγους. . . .*

The words *πρωταγωνιστής*, *πρωταγωνιστεῖν*, and *πρωταγωνιστικῶς* are used also in a military¹ or judicial² sphere in late writers in the sense of 'champion' or 'chief speaker' or 'first speaker'.

δευτεραγωνιστής is used by Demosthenes³ probably in the sense of 'second', 'second fiddle'; so by Lucian⁴ and Suidas.⁵ In a scholium on Demosthenes⁶ and in Pollux⁷ it means the second actor of a troupe.

τριταγωνιστής 'occurs often, but is a term apparently invented by Demosthenes, was applied only to Aeschines,⁸ and was never in any period a recognized title. The word is never mentioned in late writers except with direct reference to Aeschines,⁹ or in such a way that it is clearly but a reminiscence of Demosthenes' use of it.'

Soon after the institution of actors' contests in 449 B.C., Rees holds, the principal actors (the actual competitors) began to be termed *ἀγωνισταί*, the secondary actors *συναγωνισταί*; later the word *ἀγωνισταί* was applied to all alike, while *πρωταγωνιστής*, *δευτεραγωνιστής*, *τριταγωνιστής* designated relative grades of histrionic ability. The protagonist, or best actor, naturally took the leading part, and later under the *technitai*, when companies were limited to three, other parts also; similarly, the deuteragonist, or next best actor, took the second part, and in later times other rôles as well; and the tritagonist, or third-class actor, 'played the least important rôle or rôles as the case might be'. In the classical period these terms never indicated respectively actors of first, second, and third parts, because the various rôles in a play could not be so divided as to ensure all first-class parts going to one actor, all second-class to another, and all third-class to the poorest, who often has one or more rôles 'vastly more important than the minor rôles of the other two actors'.

¹ *Et. Mag.* s.v. *δαροι*; *Maccab.* II, xv, 30; *Greg. Nys.* p. 137D; etc.

² *Schol.* in *Dem.* xvii, 1 [p. 256, 27 Dind.]; xx, 1 [p. 455. 8]; xx, 18 [p. 467, 14].

³ *xix*, 10: . . . καὶ ἔχων Ἰσχανδρὸν τὸν Νεοπτολέμου δευτεραγωνιστὴν προσῶν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ προσῶν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τούτων καὶ πείσας ὑμᾶς πανταχοῦ πρέσβεις πέμψαι. . . .

⁴ *Peregr.* 36: . . . καὶ μάλιστα ὁ γεννάδας ὁ ἐκ Πατρῶν δῆδα ἔχων οὐ φαῖλος δευτεραγωνιστής.

⁵ *S.v.* 'Αβρογάστης'. 'Αβρογάστης Φράγγος, δὲ κατὰ ἀλκὴν σώματος καὶ θυμοῦ τραχύτητα φλογοειδὴς ἦν, δευτεραγωνιστοῦ [so Rees for -ης] τυγχάνων Βαῦδωνος.

⁶ *V*, 6 [p. 162, 1 ff. Dind.]: ὑποκριτὰς ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τοὺς νῦν τραγωδοὺς λεγόμενους, τοὺς ποιητὰς, οἷον τὸν Εὐριπίδην καὶ Ἀριστοφάνην, τοὺς δὲ νῦν ὑποκριτὰς (οὗτοι δὲ ἦσαν δύο) τὸν μὲν δευτεραγωνιστὴν τὸν δὲ τριταγωνιστὴν, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς ποιητὰς τῶν δραμάτων τραγωδοὺς καὶ τραγωδοδιδασκάλους.

⁷ Cf. the passage cited in n. 7, p. 31. [*Hesych.* is not clear: *δευτεραγωνιστής*: δεύτερος ἀγωνιζόμενος.]

⁸ 'Except in the *schol.* *Dem. De pace*. . . .'

⁹ *Rees* (p. 34, nn. 3 and 6) cites the following: *Schol. Dem. De pace* (quoted above in n. 6).

Vit. X. Orat. 840a: λαμπρόφρωνος δ' ὦν μετὰ ταῦτα τραγωδῶν ἤσκησεν· ὥς δὲ Δημοσθένης φησὶν, ὑπογραμματεύων καὶ τριταγωνιστῶν Ἀριστοδήμῳ ἐν τοῖς < κατὰ δήμους Blass > Διονυσίοις διέτελει, ἀναλαμβάνων ἐπὶ σχολῆς τὰς παλαιὰς τραγωδίας.

Bekker, Anecd. Graec. p. 309, 32: τριταγωνιστής· ὁ Ἀλκίχνης ὡς ἀδοκιμώτατος τῶν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τάξει καταριθμούμενος.

Suid. s.v. *Σοφοκλῆς*: οὗτος πρῶτος τρισὶν ἐχρήσατο ὑποκριταῖς καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ τριταγωνιστῇ.

Apollon. Vit. Aeschin. (§ 3 Blass): . . . ἔπειτα ἀποστὰς τούτου τριταγωνιστὴς ἐγένετο τραγωδιῶν καὶ ἐν Κολλυτῷ ποτε Οἰνύμαον ὑποκρινόμενος κατέπεσε.

Anon. Vit. Aeschin. (§ 7 Blass): Δημοκάρης δὲ ὁ ἀδελφίδου Δημοσθένους, εἰ ἄρα πιστευτέον αὐτῷ λέγοντι περὶ Ἀλκίχνου, φησὶν Ἰσχανδρὸν τοῦ τραγωδοποιοῦ τριταγωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τὸν Ἀλκίχνην καὶ ὑποκρινόμενον Οἰνύμαον διώκοντα Πέλοπα αἰσχρῶς πεσεῖν καὶ ἀναστῆναι ὑπὸ Σαννίωνος τοῦ χοροδιδασκάλου. . . .

Schol. in *Dem.* xix, 247 [p. 435, 28 ff., Dind.]: λέγει δὲ ὁ τὰς θεατρικὰς ἱστορίας συγγράψας [probably Juba; cf. *Athen.* 175D: Ἰόβας ἐν τετάρτῃ θεατρικῇ ἱστορίᾳ] διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς τὰς ὑποκρίσεις τῶν δυναστευόντων παρέχεσθαι ἐπειδὴ ἡττόν ἐστι παθητικὰ καὶ ὑπέρογκα.

'Of Antiphanes' play *Tritagonist* we know nothing'.

[*Aeschin.*] *Epist.* xii, 1: Ἐγὼ προσῆλθον τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι γεγονός· ἔτη τρία καὶ τριάκοντα, μὰ Δὲ οὐ τριταγωνιστὴν μαθὼν, ὡς Δημοσθένης ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τραφεὶς ἐλευθερίως. . . .

[There might have been added *Anon. Vit.* § 3 (Blass): γενόμενον δὲ μειράκιον ὑποκριθῆναι [sc. φασὶν αὐτὸν] τραγωδῶν ὥστε τριταγωνιστὴν . . .; *Phot. Bibl.* § 12 (Blass): τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐτριταγωνίστει μεγαλόφρωνος ὦν, ἔπειτα ἐγραμματεύει τῇ βουλῇ . . .; *Suid.* s.v. *τριταγωνιστής*: Ἀλκίχνης ἐν πολλοῖς σκώπτεται ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους ὡς ὑποκριτῇ τραγωδιῶν· καὶ τριταγωνιστὴν αὐτὸν φησιν ὡς ἀδοκιμώτατον τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει καταριθμῶν. τριταγωνιστής, ἀπὸ Σοφοκλέους, δὲ πρῶτος ἐχρήσατο τρισὶν ὑποκριταῖς καὶ τῷ καλουμένῳ τριταγωνιστῇ.]

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The basis of Demosthenes' taunting Aeschines with being a *τριταγωνιστής*, Rees concludes, is that the word meant a poor or third-rate performer, even though he was given an important rôle such as that of Creon in the *Antigone*. 'If custom had admitted four or five actors upon the scene at once' [which, by the way, is just what Rees insists was the case in eight out of eleven plays of Aristophanes, or about 75 per cent. of all the comedies that have come down to us] 'Demosthenes could surely have called Aeschines "tetragonist" or "pentagonist" quite as truly'. "Third-class", commonly speaking, is broad enough to include the lowest grade of an actor, with us as with the ancients; we never speak of "fourth-rate" actors'.

In the period of the *technitai*, Rees admits, when travelling companies were commonly limited to three actors, these three terms 'might well have been applied to the three actors who acted all the rôles of the play', although no inscriptional documents exhibit them; the leading actor or manager is regularly called *τραγῳδός* or *κωμῳδός* and his assistants *συναγωνισταί*.

This in outline is Rees' case¹ for his interpretation of *τριταγωνιστής* in Demosthenes, a case which seems to me vulnerable on three counts.

First is the admission² of a three-actor limit established under the fourth-century *technitai* and their predecessors, the informal strolling players whose activities 'extended far back into the fourth century and also into the fifth',³ with the three terms in use to designate a classification of the three actors. But this is precisely the period with which Demosthenes is dealing;⁴ and as Rees points out,⁵ 'it should be observed that wherever Aeschines is spoken of as "tritonist" to anyone, it is with reference to performances in the country', just where Rees maintains that a three-actor limit was in force. The word was certainly used in later times⁶ to indicate the third-ranking actor in a three-actor troupe, and Demosthenes applies it to one who did part (or perhaps all) of his acting⁷ as a member of just such a company.

Is it not a bit hazardous, then, to assert that Demosthenes 'invented'⁸ the word and used it in another sense? The idea of 'invention' is rather discredited by the fact that Antiphanes, whose first victory was won in 367 B.C.⁹ or perhaps about twenty years earlier,¹⁰ used *Τριταγωνιστής* as the title of a play.¹¹ And if Demosthenes were coining the word, in the sense of 'poor' or 'third-rate' actor, it might appear odd that he sticks so to an expression unfamiliar to his hearers in place of such easy variants as *φαῦλος ὑποκριτής* or *κακῶς ὑποκρίνεσθαι*.¹²

That *τριταγωνιστής* does not occur as a technical term in the inscriptional documents might weigh more heavily if it were not obvious that Demosthenes in other respects is not using the terminology found in those documents. He refers to the

¹ Of his documentation I have not been in a position to check the citations from Apollonius' *Lex. Hom.*, Bekker's *Anecdota*, Plotinus, and Gregory of Nyssa (nor the scholium on Aeschin. ii, 19 cited in n. 1, p. 36 from O'Connor, p. 83).

² Pp. 39 f., 68-70.

³ P. 65.

⁴ As indicated below, his references to Aeschines as *τριταγωνιστής* all come from orations xix (343 B.C.) and xviii (330 B.C.).

⁵ P. 34, n. 6.

⁶ See the passages quoted in n. 9, p. 32.

⁷ See n. 1, p. 36.

⁸ Rees, p. 34 ('apparently invented'); O'Connor, p. 77 ('Demosthenes invented for his benefit the word "tritonist"'); Allen, pp. 138 f. ('Again and again in the speeches of Demosthenes, by whom perhaps it was invented, this word is applied to his rival Aeschines and always as a term of ridicule and reproach with the

meaning "a third-rate actor". There is no evidence that it ever became a recognized title. Because of the uncertainty, therefore, that attaches to these two terms, deuteragonist and tritagonist, it would be better not to use them in discussing the theatrical conventions and practices of the ancients').

⁹ So Capps, *Am. Jour. of Phil.*, 1900, pp. 54 ff.

¹⁰ So Clinton, according to Capps l.c.

¹¹ Athen. 643D. And (although one would hesitate to press the point by itself) it must at least be noted that the scholiast on Dem. *De pace* (v. n. 6, p. 32) credits the terms *δευτεραγωνιστής* and *τριταγωνιστής* not to an individual but to 'the ancients'.

¹² *τριταγωνιστής* and *τριταγωνιστεῖν* occur eight times in two speeches; ordinary expressions of depreciation but twice: . . . *ὅτι . . . κακῶς ἐπέτριψας* (xviii, 180) and *τὰς ῥήσεις δὲ ἐλυμάλου* (ib. 267).

renowned actors Aristodemus¹ and Neoptolemus,² and likewise to Cleander,³ Satyrus,⁴ Molon,⁵ and the 'rangers' Simylus (or Simycas) and Socrates⁶ as ὑποκριταί, all of whom but the last three are shown by O'Connor to have won victories in the actors' competitions, a fact which would entitle them to be called in the official records for those events τραγῳδοί or κωμῳδοί. But Demosthenes (who does not use the word κωμῳδός) reserves τραγῳδός (in the plural) for 'dramatic festivals'.⁷ Again, if Demosthenes had been using the language of officialdom, he should have called Ischander (whether literally or figuratively) not δευτεραγωνιστής but συναγωνιστής.

The second weakness, as I see it, in Rees' argument is the attempt to draw a distinction⁸ for Demosthenes' time between πρωταγωνιστής, δευτεραγωνιστής, and τριταγωνιστής on the one hand, and on the other τὰ πρῶτα, τὰ δεύτερα, τὰ τρίτα λέγειν (ὑποκρίνεσθαι, ἀγωνίζεσθαι). The first group, he insists, refers to the quality of acting, the second to the rôles played.⁹ He overlooks the fact that Demosthenes uses both types of expression for Aeschines—and in the same passage,¹⁰ where they are used interchangeably. As for δευτεραγωνιστής in Demosthenes,¹¹ it makes no difference whether one follows Schaefer¹² and interprets 'Neoptolemus' deuteragonist' or takes the word metaphorically, 'Neoptolemus' son as coadjutor (second)' ; in either case the word can refer only to rank, not to quality of services. Aeschines either used Neoptolemus' second actor or used Neoptolemus' son as a supporter, not as a second-rate supporter. So πρωταγωνιστής and πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Aristotle¹³ are figures from a literal usage referring to rank, not to quality of performance.

The third difficulty about accepting the interpretation of τριταγωνιστής and τριταγωνιστεῖν as loose references to bad acting is their uncomfortable definiteness. There is a difference between 'third' and 'third-grade' ('of a third sort') just as clear-cut as between the identifying οὗτος or τίς and the descriptive τοιοῦτος or ποῖος. Other compounds of τριτο- (τριτέγγονος, τριτημόριος, τριτοβάμων, τριτόμημις, τριτοπάτωρ, τριτοπρόσωπος, τριτόσπονδος, τριτόσπορος, τριτοστάτης or -στάτης) show the word indicating merely the count or order of arrangement, not a quality. To get the notion of 'third-grade' in quality one would expect not τριτο- but something like τριταίο-¹⁴, i.e., τριταίωγωνιστής.

¹ xviii, 21.

² v, 6.

³ lvii, 18.

⁴ xix, 193.

⁵ xix, 246.

⁶ xviii, 262.

⁷ v, 7; xxi, 59, 156. It might be noted that the usage in Aeschines parallels that in Demosthenes; cf. ὑποκριτής in Aeschin. i, 115, 157; ii, 15, 52, 156 (all of men who, according to O'Connor, won in actors' contests); τραγῳδοί of the festivals iii, 34, 36, 41, 45, 154, 176, 204; so κωμῳδοί i, 157.

⁸ Pp. 35, n. 3; 36 f.

⁹ Rees cites on pp. 36 f. these pertinent passages:

Strattis frg. 1 (K):

Ἡγελοχὸν τὸν Κυνάρου
μισθωσάμενος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἐπῶν λέγειν

('. . . Strattis . . . alludes to the fact that the unfortunate Hegelochus played the title rôle. . .').

Men. Hypobol. frg. 484 (K):

τὰ δεύτερ' αἰετὴν γυναῖκα δεῖ λέγειν,
τὴν δ' ἡγεμονίαν τῶν δλων τὸν ἀνδρ' ἔχειν.
οἶκος δ' ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα πρωτεύει γυνή
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πῶτος οὐκ ἀπώλετο.

Id. Theophor. frg. 223 (K), 16 f.:

πράττει δ' ὁ κῶλαξ ἀριστα πάντων, δεύτερα
ὁ συκοφάντης, ὁ κακοῦς τρίτα λέγει

(' "plays the third rôle", παρὰ προσδοκίαν for τὰ τρίτα ἔχει').

Luc. Tyr. 22: μεμέρισται δὲ ἐς πολλοὺς τὸ ἔργον ὥσπερ ἐν δράματι· καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐγὼ ὑπεκράναμην, τὰ δεύτερα δὲ ὁ παῖς, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ὁ τύραννος αὐτός, τὸ ξίφος δὲ πᾶσιν ὑπηρετήσεν.

Plut. Mor. 816f (see n. 6, p. 31).

¹⁰ xix, 246 f.: . . . Θεόδωρος . . . Ἀριστόδημος . . . οἱς οὗτος τὰ τρίτα λέγων διέτελεσεν. . .

'Αντιγόνην δὲ Σοφοκλέους πολλάκις μὲν Θεόδωρος, πολλάκις δ' Ἀριστόδημος ὑποκρίεται, ἐν ᾗ πεπονημέν' λαμβεῖα καλῶς καὶ συμφέρωντως ἡμῖν πολλάκις αὐτῇ εἰρηκῶς καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξεπιστάμενος παρέλιπεν. ἵστε γὰρ δὴ πού τοῦδ' ὅτι ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐξαιρετὸν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ γέρας τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς τὸ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρ' ἔχοντας εἰσέναι. Here we have the phrase τὰ τρίτα λέγων replaced in the explanatory sentence by its synonym τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς.

¹¹ xix, 10, quoted in n. 3, p. 32.

¹² Cf. op. cit., p. 247: 'Als des Neoptolemus Deuteragonist wird uns Ischandros genannt'.

¹³ See n. 3, p. 2.

¹⁴ Which, of course, is actually found used only of time.

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In order to secure an exact idea of the meaning of *τριταγωνιστής* and *τριταγωνιστήν* in Demosthenes, it is worth while quoting the passages where these words occur.

xix, 199 f.: οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ τοὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰς βίβλους ἀναγινώσκοντά σε τῇ μητρὶ τελοῦσθαι . . . μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπογραμματοῦντα καὶ δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν δραχμῶν πονηρὸν ὄντα; τὰ τελευταῖα δ' ἐναγχος ἐν χορηγίοις ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπὶ τῷ τριταγωνιστεῖν ἀγαπητῶς παρατρεφόμενον;

Ib. 246 f. (quoted in n. 10, p. 34).

Ib. 337: . . . ὅτε μὲν τὰ θινέστου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ κάκ' ἡγωνίζετο, ἐξεβάλλετ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσπρίττετ' ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων καὶ μόνον οὐ κατελείβεθ' οὕτως ὥστε τελευτῶντα τοῦ τριταγωνιστεῖν ἀποστῆναι. . . .

xviii, 129: ἀπορῶ τοῦ πρώτου μνησθῶ πότερ' ὥς . . . ἢ ὥς ἡ μήτηρ . . . τὸν καλὸν ἀνδριάντα καὶ τριταγωνιστὴν ἄκρον ἐξέθρεψε σε.

Ib. 209: ἐμὲ δ', ὃ τριταγωνιστά, τὸν περὶ πρωτείων σύμβουλον τῇ πόλει παρίοντα τὸ τίνος φρόνημα λαβόντ' ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ' ἔδει;

Ib. 262: . . . μισθώσας σαντὸν τοῖς βαρυστόνοις ἐπικαλουμένοις [ἐκείνοις secl. Butcher] ὑποκριταῖς Σιμύλῳ [so O'Connor; Butcher accepts Σιμύκῳ] καὶ Σωκράτει ἐτριταγωνίστει, σῦκα καὶ βότρυς καὶ ἐλάας συλλέγων ὥσπερ ὀπωρώνης ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων χωρίων, πλείω λαμβάνων ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ τῶν ἀγώνων, οὓς ὑμεῖς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγωνίζεσθε.

Ib. 265: ἐδίδασκες γράμματα, ἐγὼ δ' ἐφοίτων· ἐτέλεις, ἐγὼ δ' ἐτελοῦμην· ἐγραμμάτευες, ἐγὼ δ' ἡκκλησιάζον· ἐτριταγωνίστεις, ἐγὼ δ' ἐθεώρουν· ἐξέπιπτες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριττον.

Ib. 267: . . . κακὸν κακῶς σε μάλιστα μὲν οἱ θεοί, ἔπειθ' οἱ πάντες ἀπολέσειαν, πονηρὸν ὄντα καὶ πολίτην καὶ τριταγωνιστήν.

Especially significant is the phraseology of the last citation. If *τριταγωνιστής* were merely a term of opprobrium indicating a poor actor, it would have been sufficient to say *πονηρὸν ὄντα πολίτην καὶ τριταγωνιστήν*; to call one *πονηρὸν τριταγωνιστήν* in that case would have been as otiose as to say instead of *πονηρὸν πολίτην* something like *πονηρὸν κίναϊδος* or *πονηρὸν πανοῦργον*.

Likewise in the first quotation from the speech *De Corona* the sarcastic *τριταγωνιστήν ἄκρον* is coupled with *καλὸν ἀνδριάντα*, where the sneer lies not in the use of nouns in themselves invidious but in the irony of the appended adjectives. Thus in xviii, 313 Demosthenes calls Aeschines in the same ironical fashion *ὑποκριτῆς ἀριστος*.

So in the first passage given above from the oration *De Falsa Legatione* the natural interpretation is that Aeschines was thankful to get even a third-ranking place in a dramatic troupe.

Again, in the series of antitheses between the relative positions of the two antagonists drawn in xviii, 265, would not the rhetorical force be weakened if Demosthenes meant by *ἐτριταγωνίστεις* what Rees supposes? Try substituting *φαύλως ὑπεκρίνου*; most of the sting, by this anticipation, is drawn from *ἐξέπιπτες*, which gets its chief effect from its very unexpectedness. Up to that point the orator has been contrasting *positions* (not *proficiency*): the two rivals had been on opposite sides of the fence at school, at church, in Parliament, in the theatre, one being a 'gentleman', the other a sort of menial. Then comes the jolting turn in the last antithesis.

Rees is troubled by Demosthenes' coupling of *τριταγωνιστής* with the clear statement that Aeschines played the rôle of Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone*, which is admittedly a part too good to have been assigned to a third-ranking actor. 'Demosthenes was addressing people who knew the facts and such a malicious misrepresentation of facts would not have gone by unchallenged'.¹ The first half of this statement is open to serious question; and the implication in the second half (that Demosthenes would not under the circumstances have indulged in such malicious misrepresentation) can be definitely disproved.

¹ P. 38.

As to the audience's knowing the facts, what ground is there for thinking that any large section of the Athenian people knew the details of the actor-manager's arrangements with his troupe, particularly if the company was playing in the 'provinces'?¹ Why should we assume that they were any better versed in details of stage management than in the tragic stories which were done and re-done² by the dramatists? These old religious and heroic tales dealt with characters as real to the Greeks as Moses to the ancient Hebrews, or Thor to the old Norse, or Hengist and Horsa, King Arthur, and King Alfred to the English-speaking races.³ And yet Aristotle tells us that they were familiar to only a small number.⁴

How averse was Demosthenes to distorting facts that must have been known to at least some of his hearers? Apparently not at all. Surely Aeschines' military career must have been known to many; and that it was of some distinction is manifest from his having been given honourable mention⁵ and once having been decorated with a wreath both on the field of battle and on his return home;⁶ facts which he substantiates by the testimony of his taxiarch Temenides and the general Phocion, as well as by the evidence of the public archives.⁷ And yet Demosthenes is as sarcastic about his military qualities as about his acting.⁸ The same is true with regard to the aspersions on Aeschines' parentage and home life, which Demosthenes assails⁹ on shaky grounds, and on which he is confuted adequately by Aeschines.¹⁰ Distortion of facts between these two men in their deadly feud was all too common.

The most reasonable interpretation of all the facts adducible in regard to Demosthenes' use of the word *τριταγωνιστής* appears to me to be as follows. During Aeschines' fairly brief career on the stage he served (at different times) both as tritagonist (third-ranking actor) and as deuteragonist. In the latter capacity, in spite

¹ That at least part of Aeschines' career was in the smaller outside theatres is implied in the plural *θεάτρων* (Dem. xix, 337 quoted above) and proved by the statements in Dem. xviii, 180: . . . σὲ δὲ . . . Κρεσφόντην ἢ Κρέοντα ἢ δὴ ἐν Κολλυνῷ ποτ' Οἰνύμαον κακῶς ἐπέτριψας (cf. ib. 242: ἀρουραίος Οἰνύμαος) and 262 (quoted above). There is no evidence that Aeschines performed on the Athenian stage at all (a fact which is denied in the passage cited by O'Connor (p. 76) from Bekker's *Anecdota Gr.* p. 211, 32: ἀρουραίος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς δῆμοις ἐπεδείκνυτο ἀνάξιος ὢν τῶν ἐν ἀστεί ἀγώνων). O'Connor argues that he must have acted in Athens because of 'his association with Aristodemus and Theodorus coupled with the fact that "old plays" were apparently given only at the City Dionysia',—this in spite of the fact that Aeschines acted in an 'old play', Sophocles' *Oenomaus*, at Collytus at the Rural Dionysia (cf. Aeschin. i, 157: ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀγροῦς Διονυσίοις κωμωδῶν ὄντων ἐν Κολλυνῷ). That Aristodemus, at least, acted at times outside of Athens is demonstrated from Aeschin. ii, 19: ἐν τῇ βουλῇ γράφει [sc. Δημοσθένους], ἵνα ἀξήμιος ὢν ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀριστόδημος συμπαρεσβέη, ἐλέσθαι πρέσβει ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐν αἷς εἶδει τὸν Ἀριστόδημον ἀγωνίζεσθαι οὔτινες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ παραιτήσονται τὰς ζημίας and the scholium: θέλει δὲ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀρραβῶνας ἦν δεξιόμενος ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ἀπὸ τινων πόλεων πρὸς τὸ ἀγωνίσασθαι ἐν αὐταῖς. ἦν γὰρ τραγῳδὸς καὶ εἶδει αὐτὸν ἢ ἀγωνίσασθαι ἢ διπλοῦν τὸν ἀρραβῶνα καταβαλεῖν. εἶδει οὖν πρέσβειων τῶν πεισόντων τὰς πόλεις μὴ διπλοῦν τὸν ἀρραβῶνα κομίσασθαι ἀλλ' ἀπλοῦν. And Theodorus appears to have acted at least at Delphi (v. O'Connor, p. 101).

² Christ, *Gr. Litt.* i⁸, p. 396 states that of the preserved titles of tragedies, 56 are known to have been handled by 2 authors, 16 by 3, 12 by 4, 5 by 5, 3 by 6, 2 by 7, and 1 (the story of Oedipus) by 12.

³ Cf., e.g., Socrates' vision of converse in the other world with Minos, Triptolemus, Orpheus, Hesiod, Homer, Palamedes, Sisyphus, and other men of olden times (Plat. *Apol.* 40E-41C); or Xenophon's dating Lycurgus in the time of the Heracleidae (*Resp. Lac.* x, 8); or the lines in Ar. *Ran.* 1052 f.:

ΕΤΡ. πότερον δ' οὐκ ὄντα λόγον τοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα;
ΑΓΩ. μὰ Δι' ἀλλ' ὄντ'.

⁴ A.P. 1451b 23-26: ὥστ' οὐ πάντως εἶναι ζητητῶν τῶν παραδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγωδίαί εἰσι, ἀντέχεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γινώμματα ὀλίγοις γινώμματα ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ὅμως εὐφραίνει πάντας. In view of Aristotle's scholarly temper one is entitled to regard as exaggerated the contrast drawn by Antiphanes (frg. 191 (K)) between the comic authors' hard work in fabricating new plots and the easy time enjoyed by the tragedians, whose 'tales are known to the audience before you tell them. . . . Just mention Oedipus and they know all the rest', etc.

⁵ Aeschin. ii, 168, 169.

⁶ Ib. 169.

⁷ Ib. 170.

⁸ xix, 113: . . . αὐτὸς ὢν, οἶμαι, θαυμάσιος στρατιώτης, ὦ Ζεῦ.

⁹ xix. 199-201, 237, 249, 281 (insinuations made more gross in xviii, 128-131, 258-361, 284).

¹⁰ ii, 78, 146-149.

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of his magnificent voice¹ and fine presence,² he had done poorly in several important rôles.³ Demosthenes, actuated not only by mortal opposition to Aeschines' foreign policy but also doubtless by jealousy of his superior oratorical equipment in physique and vocal powers, refuses to acknowledge that Aeschines ever rose to the second rank of an acting troupe, but continually twits him with his position as third-place actor.⁴ What could Aeschines say in reply? He might admit the fact that he had been a third-ranking actor, but insist that he had also risen sometimes to the second rank. But this would be touching a tender spot; it was just there, as deuteragonist, that he had failed to satisfy himself. Demosthenes was unfair in representing him as being always a third-ranking actor; but it was a sorry point to try to rebut. And Aeschines wisely leaves it alone; he defends himself against charges relating to his military career, his legitimacy as a citizen, his upbringing, his home life, and what not, but says not a word about his acting. Demosthenes' taunt had enough truth in it to sting and to prevent a cogent answer; Aeschines *had* been, at least part of the time, a third-string actor, and if he laboured to prove that he had also been sometimes deuteragonist, he would merely have been casting unwelcome light on his failures.

Suppose an opera singer to be engaged most of the time in the chorus, but occasionally to attain the distinction of a minor part among the principals, in which he does badly several times. What sort of an answer could he make if a detractor persisted in twitting him with being a 'member of operatic choruses'? Or assume that a man with histrionic ambitions plays his part normally among the supernumeraries, but on a few occasions gets a secondary rôle and murders it. What reply could he make to the taunt of being a 'stage super'?

Of course the word *τριταγωνιστής* in Demosthenes is derogatory (just as *γραμματεὺς* is), not because in itself it means 'third-rate performer' but because it lays stress on inferiority in rank, on the man's being in the lowest grade in the normal theatrical troupe of the times (at least so far as concerns performances outside of Athens), entailing an unmistakable *implication* as to the actor's ability. Under a three-actor arrangement, the protagonist would naturally get the most important rôle, and such others as would be required, even very minor ones; the deuteragonist would then be cast in the next most important rôle, with such others as the circumstances called for; and the tritagonist would get the leavings. It would of course be impossible⁵ to assure the protagonist that all his parts would be of prime quality; some would inevitably be inferior to the most important rôle of the tritagonist. And yet, the *chief* rôle assigned to each of the three performers would mark his class. And this was enough to make *τριταγωνιστής* a possible term of contumely, just as 'super' (no matter how well the supernumerary carried out his task) might be used opprobriously now. If an actor were never considered for any rôle higher than one of second or third importance, the natural inference drawn as to his relative qualifica-

¹ Grudgingly recognized time after time by Demosthenes: xix, 126, 199, 206, 216, 255, 336, 337-340; xviii, 259, 280, 285, 308, 313.

² Dem. xviii, 129: τὸν καλὸν ἀνδράντα.

³ How poorly, we cannot judge from the biased testimony of Demosthenes and his nephew Demochares. They give a definite and circumstantial tale of his contretemps in the part of Oenomaus (see Demochares' statement quoted in n. 9, p. 32, and Demosthenes' quoted in n. 1, p. 36); and Demosthenes (xix, 337 quoted above) clearly indicates his failure in the part of Thyestes and in some tragedy dealing with the 'woes at Troy', perhaps Euripides' *Τρωάδες*. One need not pay much attention to the fling in

xviii, 267 (τὰς ῥήσεις ἄς ἐλυμάλουν); and the statement in xviii, 265 (ἐξέπιπτες, ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριπτον) may well refer to the occasions mentioned in xix, 337.

⁴ Just as he taunts him with being a clerk (*γραμματεὺς*, *γραμματεῖν* xix, 95, 249, 314; xviii, 261, 265), an under-clerk (*ὑπογραμματεὺς*, *ὑπογραμματεῖν* xix, 70, 200, 237, 249), a 'damn'd clerk' (*δλεθρος γραμματεὺς* xviii, 127), or 'you hunched-over clerk!' (*ὦ . . . γραμματοκίφων* xviii, 209). Here again it is not the quality of his secretarial work but his rank that is thrown in his face; note especially the passage in xviii, 265 quoted above.

⁵ As Rees points out pp. 35 f.

tions would be unfavourable. But in using *τριταγωνιστής* of Aeschines all the time Demosthenes is covering up part of the truth; because at times Aeschines was clearly a deuteragonist. Demosthenes' statement¹ that 'You all, of course, are aware of the fact that in all the tragic plays the tritagonists have the prerogative, as it were, of coming on as monarchs, those that carry the sceptre' is merely an attempt to forestall any objections that might rise in the minds of some of the jury who remembered seeing or hearing of Aeschines acting the part of royalty. Demosthenes was taking no more chance of contradiction by this misstatement than he would have been taking if he had predicated such a thing of performers whose quality was 'weak' or 'third-rate.'

We should be careful about expecting Demosthenes, engaged in an intense political struggle aggravated by personal animosity, to handle technical terms with that high regard for truth which we associate with an Aristotle writing his *Διδασκαλία*. Demosthenes' argument forced him to admit that Aeschines had acted the part of Creon, which was something of a distinction; but he at once disparages this by asserting that 'of course' such parts always fell to actors of the third rank,—in which alone Aeschines had had an unchequered career. The risk attending such a distortion, I fancy, was less than when he was perverting the truth about Aeschines' private life or his military record.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA.

O. J. TODD.

¹ xix, 247 quoted in n. 10, p. 34.

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THE ORIGIN OF CORNELIUS GALLUS.

C. CORNELIUS GALLUS requires brief introduction or none at all. A poet in his own right, the friend of Virgil and of Pollio, Gallus is enshrined for ever in literature—and in literary legend, for the inept fictions of Servius and his tribe will survive the most damaging of revelations, remembered even when refuted.¹ Not only that—Gallus is a conspicuous figure in the social and political history of the revolutionary age.

The first appearance of Gallus puts him at once in select and lettered company. Pollio describes him as a friend.² Gallus cut a dash in high society—the freed-woman Volumnia, commonly known as Cytheris, the most accomplished courtesan of the day, accorded for a time her favours and inspiration to the poet. But Gallus was not only a poet and a lover. His earliest adventures in war and politics from 43 B.C. to the War of Actium have left no mark in authentic historical record.³ Pollio was a friend and adherent of Antonius; when Gallus turns up again, it is as one of the most prominent members of the faction of Octavianus. Active in the conquest of Egypt, he remained in the land as its first viceroy. His rule in Egypt, signalized by military exploits and the erection of magniloquent inscriptions,⁴ was the cause—or at least the pretext—of his ruin. Threatened with prosecution or actually condemned, Gallus took his own life (27 or 26 B.C.).

All this is part and parcel of common knowledge. 'Gallus et Hesperis et Gallus notus Eois'.⁵ There is one fact, however, that does not seem to have received the attention that it deserves—the place of his birth. According to the Chronicle of St. Jerome (under the year 27 B.C.), the poet was born at Forum Iulii—'Cornelius Gallus Foroiuliensis poeta, a quo primum Aegyptum rectam supra diximus, XLIII aetatis suae anno propria se manu interficit'.⁶ The notice, in so far as concerns Gallus' origin, is unimpeachable. Jerome derived most of his facts from Suetonius. His dates for the birth and death of literary figures, however, are sometimes his own.

Now comes a small difficulty. There were two places called Forum Iulii. When the name 'Foroiuliensis' is employed without qualification, which is meant, the naval harbour and colony of Roman veterans in Gallia Narbonensis (the modern Fréjus) or the *municipium* (Cividale di Friuli) in Italy beyond the Po? The first

¹ W. B. Anderson and E. Norden may fairly be held to have demolished at last Servius' allegation that the second half of the *Fourth Georgic* was originally devoted to the laudation of Gallus ('Gallus and the Fourth Georgic', *CQ* XXVII (1933), 36 ff.; 'Orpheus u. Eurydice', *Berl. S.B.* 1934, 627 ff.), and the present writer cannot dissemble his conviction that the stories about Pollio's son Saloninus and Pollio's capture of the town of Salonae are merely 'gelehrte Namenfabelei'—and not so 'gelehrt' at that ('Pollio, Saloninus and Salonae', *CQ* XXXI (1937), 39 ff.). Norden's observations about the value of the scholia on the Latin poets are timely and trenchant: they will support scepticism about Virgil's estate and Gallus' rôle in its recovery (below, n. 3).

² *Ad. fam.* 10, 32, 5, 'etiam praetextam, si

voles legere, Gallum Cornelium, familiarem meum, poscito'. Gallus is probably referred to in the earlier letter as well (31, 6).

³ He may well have served on Pollio's staff in Gallia Cisalpina in 42-40 B.C.: but the details of his activity as a land-commissioner or the like, and his service in saving the farm of Virgil, explicitly but not always consistently related by the scholiasts and ancient lives of Virgil (Diehl, *Die Vitae Vergilianae*, 51 ff.; *PIR* II², s.v. 'C. Cornelius Gallus'), may not safely be invoked. For this reason I cannot follow the learned and elegant reconstruction of J. Bayet, 'Virgile et les "triumviri agris dividundis"', *Rev. ét. lat.* VI (1928), 270 ff.

⁴ Dio 53, 23, 5 ff.; *ILS* 8995 (Philaë).

⁵ Ovid, *Am.* 1, 15, 29.

⁶ *Chron.*, 188 ol., p. 164 H.

choice should be for the former, without question or comment.¹ Yet some, in scrupulous praiseworthy but excessive, are unable to make up their minds;² and Camille Jullian, the historian of Gaul, in all the eight volumes of his massive work makes no mention of Gallus at all and by implication at least denies him a place among the Narbonensians illustrious in politics and in literature. Of the poets he writes 'en dehors de Varron, la Gaule n'a donné aucun grand nom à la poésie durant les trois premiers siècles de l'Empire'.³

Exclusion is brutal, doubt a supererogation. Had it not given a name to a region of Italy (Friuli), who today would know of that obscure settlement of the 'Foroiulienses cognomine Transpadani', whom the statistical Pliny the Elder mentions only because he must, and damns in the same breath, 'quos scrupulosius dicere non attineat'?⁴ On the other hand, the famous Narbonensian colony, 'vetus et illustris Foroiuliensium colonia', as Tacitus appropriately designates the home of his father-in-law,⁵ neither receives nor requires any regional qualification. There could be no confusion.

Jerome, dating Gallus' death to 27 B.C., says that he was then forty-three years old. That is to say, he was born in 70 B.C., coeval with Virgil. The date should not be pressed too closely; and quiet scepticism in the face of precise chronology in matters that were never easy to ascertain, never widely made public—or of any real importance—will do nobody any harm. Thus there were even differences of opinion among ancient scholars about the year of birth of the Emperor Tiberius.⁶ As for Gallus, the synchronism with Virgil may well excite suspicion; 70 B.C. was indeed an epochal year for students of Roman literary history.⁷ It will further be recalled how the chronology of Lucretius was established with reference to the life of Virgil. But this is irrelevant. Gallus was born about 70 B.C., that is near enough. At that time the Roman colony of Forum Iulii had not yet come into existence. What is one to make of that?

The history of the site and its neighbourhood will provide an explanation. The date of the foundation of the veteran colony is not quite certain. Some, such as C. Jullian,⁸ would take it back to the Dictatorship of Caesar, to 46 or 45 B.C. This is perhaps too early. The year 36 B.C. after the termination of the war against Sex. Pompeius, should not be at once excluded. However that may be, Kromayer argues (and most scholars since have followed him) that the colony was established soon after the Battle of Actium.⁹ But this was not the beginning of Forum Iulii; the place owed its name and organization to Julius Caesar. It was one of those *fova*, or

¹ E.g. Schanz-Hosius, *R. Literaturgesch.*, II⁴ (1935), 170; *PIR* II², s.v. 'C. Cornelius Gallus'; F. Plessis, *La poésie latine*, 290; Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome*² (1927), 550.

² C. Pascal, 'De Corneli Gallii vita', *Riv. di fil.* XVI (1887), 399; A. Stein, P-W, s.v. 'C. Cornelius Gallus', 1343 and *Der v. Ritterstand* (1927), 384.

³ *Histoire de la Gaule* VI, 147.

⁴ *NH* 3, 130.

⁵ *Agr.* 4.

⁶ Suetonius, *Tib.* 5.

⁷ Jerome dates the death of Gallus to 27 B.C., Dio, however (53, 23, 5 ff.), to 26 B.C. It is sometimes assumed that Dio must be right here (R. Helm, 'Hieronymus' Zusätze in Eusebius' Chronik und ihr Wert für die Literaturgeschichte', *Philologus*, Supp. XXI, II (1929), 60). But, given Dio's methods of composition, that is by no means certain. It is therefore unjustifiable to accept Jerome for the age of Gallus but

not for the date of his death and so put his birth in 69 or 68 (as Schanz-Hosius, *R. Literaturgesch.* II⁴ (1935), 170). That surely misses the point of the alleged synchronism with Virgil. (I would assume that Jerome's original datum, whether right or wrong, was the year 27 B.C. Hence, given the synchronism with Virgil, the age of Gallus could be calculated.) Note also that one, but strangely only one, of the Virgilian scholiasts (Probus, *Ecl. praef.*) makes Virgil a 'condiscipulus' of Gallus—possibly true but not authentic.

⁸ *Histoire de la Gaule* IV, 31.

⁹ J. Kromayer, 'Die Militärkolonien Octavianus und Caesars in Gallia Narbonensis', *Hermes* XXXI (1896), 1 ff.; E. Kornemann, P-W, s.v. Colonia, 529; E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus*³ (1922), 488; A. Donnadieu, *La Pompéi de la Provence: Fréjus* (1927), 12 ff.

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market-places, without full municipal rights, which were so frequently established at suitable points along the great roads. Forum Iulii lacked a good natural harbour, it is true; but the site was of great strategic importance, on the main route from Italy to Spain, the environment fertile and attractive. It would be tempting to assume that there was some kind of settlement here or nearby before Caesar's foundation, perhaps before the Roman conquest. So at least Jullian plausibly conjectures.¹ It is to be regretted that the neighbourhood can show as yet none of that archaeological evidence which makes the town of Glanum (Saint-Remy de Provence) so unequivocal a document of the early Hellenization and early Romanization of Gallia Narbonensis.²

At once the question arises, was Cornelius Gallus of native or of Italian extraction? The Romans founded a colony with full citizen rights at Narbo in 118 B.C.; and the province was invaded by Roman traders, business men and bankers.³ At the same time, the Roman citizenship spread among the natives, through patronage and gift of proconsuls, at a quite early date. The agency of C. Valerius Flaccus (82-80 B.C.) and of Cn. Pompeius Magnus is splendidly attested. Flaccus gave the franchise to Caburus, the chieftain of the Helvii: his son, C. Valerius Proculus (or Troucillus), a cultivated and admirable young man, was a friend of Julius Caesar.⁴ A dynast of the Vocontii fought for Pompeius in the Sertorian War and was suitably rewarded; his son, Pompeius Trogus, was the private secretary of Caesar; his grandson took to writing history.⁵

When the Romans established a provincial colony, they often associated in the foundation certain of the better sort of the natives with grant of the citizenship.⁶ In some places there were already Roman citizens to be found antedating the colony. Thus at Arelate the ancestors of Pompeius Paullinus probably go back before the Caesarian colony;⁷ likewise, at Forum Iulii itself, the family of Cn. Iulius Agricola presumably possessed the franchise before 30 B.C., having received it from Caesar. It may be conjectured that the great-grandfather was a local dynast, Celtic or rather perhaps Celto-Ligurian, wealthy, civilized and respected, resident in the neighbourhood of Forum Iulii. Is the origin of Cornelius Gallus to be discovered in this class?

Nomenclature often helps. Gallus was the son of a Roman citizen, his full name being C. Cornelius Cn. f. Gallus.⁸ His *cognomen* may suggest, but cannot alone prove, native extraction. What of the gentile name 'Cornelius'? It seems too common to be of any use. Sulla the Dictator liberated ten thousand slaves; and Corneli were so frequent at Rome, says Cicero, that they could form a guild of their own.⁹ Like the 'common soldiers' whom Sulla put into the Senate, the serried ranks of his freedmen exercise a baneful and perverse influence upon history; and the proportion of knights and senators of servile extraction in the first century of the Principate has been grossly exaggerated by prejudice or ignorance.¹⁰ Hence it has

¹ *Histoire de la Gaule* II, 459, 'je crois Fréjus une station commerciale antérieure à la conquête'.

² P. Jacobsthal and E. Neuffer, 'Gallia Graeca', *Préhistoire* II (1933), 1 ff.; P. de Brun, *Assoc. Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Nîmes* (1932), 136 ff.; H. Rolland, *Saint-Remy de Provence* (Bergerac, 1934).

³ *Pro Fonteio* 11, 13, 15, etc.

⁴ Caesar, *BG* 1, 19, 47 and 53: 7, 65. On the name, Proculus or Troucillus, cf. Rice Holmes' discussion, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul* 2, 652.

⁵ Justin 43, 5, 11 f. Caesar's secretary is perhaps, but not necessarily, the interpreter Cn. Pompeius (*BG* 5, 36).

⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.* 11, 24, 'cum specie deductarum

per orbem terrae legionum additis provincialium validissimis fesso imperio subventum est'.

⁷ Pliny (*NH* 33, 143) describes him as 'paterna gente pellitus'. If correct, and Pliny should have known, for he had served under Paullinus in Germania Superior (he uses the word 'scimus' when describing the legate's silver plate), this means that Pompeius Paullinus of Arelate was of native extraction: an ancestor will have got the franchise from Pompeius.

⁸ *ILS* 8995.

⁹ Asconius, in *Cornelianam* 67 (Clark, p. 75).

¹⁰ Not to be believed is the speaker in Tacitus (*Ann.* 13, 27), 'et plurimis equitum, plerisque senatoribus non aliunde originem trahi'.

sometimes been stated as a fact that Cornelius Gallus was the son of a freedman.¹

Gallus had been raised by the favour of Augustus from low estate, 'ex infima fortuna', as Suetonius says.² This looks bad. The statement has been accepted and enhanced by modern scholars.³ What does it really amount to? Gallus is already in high society (Pollio and Cytheris) before he makes his way as a partisan of Octavianus. The term 'ex infima fortuna' is relative—it must be interpreted in its own context, with reference to the station of viceroy of Egypt, without precedent or parallel. But that is not all. If the social terminology of Roman literature is coolly examined, it is seen that allegations of humble and obscure origin, common enough even when there is no patent hostility or prejudice, are attached by convention to *novi homines* in virtue of their lack of previous distinction in public life.⁴ Thus the first Pompeius to become consul at Rome is described as 'humili atque obscuro loco natus'.⁵ Such disgusting upstarts of lowly or unknown antecedents usually turn out to be highly respectable Roman knights and municipal aristocrats of ancient standing and wealth—'domi nobiles'.

Cn. Cornelius the father of the poet need not be regarded as a freedman or a man of lowly station in society. But the question still remains: if native and not a Roman by birth, where did he get the name 'Cornelius'? When a foreigner acquired the franchise, he had to assume, officially at least, a *praenomen* and *nomen*. If he did not Latinize or translate his own family name, he might adopt the name of the proconsul or magistrate empowered by law (or usurping the right) to grant the citizenship. Hence the names of C. Valerius Caburus and (Cn.?) Pompeius Trogus. But not always; a Roman friend, patron or benefactor might provide the gentile name of the new citizen. Thus the Sicilian P. Cornelius Megas, who received the franchise from Caesar, was so named to do honour to Cornelius Dolabella, as is expressly recorded.⁶ Again, certain Roman gentile names were favoured for historical, sentimental or social reasons. Sicilians were in the habit of usurping the name Cornelius, possibly a tribute to the Scipios, but largely because its very frequency baffled detection and encouraged impostors—'quorum civis Romanus nemo erat, sed Graeci sacrilegi iam pridem improbi, repente Corneli'.'⁷

The name 'Cornelius' seems quite hopeless as a clue. Light comes from an obscure and kindred problem. L. Cornelius Balbus, the Gaditane magnate, certainly owed the citizenship to Pompeius.⁸ Why then did he not take the name of Pompeius, as did so many others? It is an old problem. Some have invoked the *Lex Gellia Cornelia* of 72 B.C., which ratified Pompeius' *acta* in Gaul and Spain. That is not very likely. There is more to be said for the view propounded by Manutius centuries ago. Balbus, as later emerges, was bound by especial ties of friendship and gratitude to L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus.⁹ The origin of the relationship is unknown—but Lentulus may well have been with Pompeius in Spain at the time of the Pertorian War.

On this principle and parallel, it remains to look around for a patron or friend for the poet's father, called Cn. Cornelius. Not in vain. One has the choice of

¹ F. Plessis, *La poésie latine*, 290, 'c'est sans doute comme fils d'affranchi qu'il portait le nom de la gens Cornelia'.

² Suetonius, *Divus Aug.* 66, 'Salvidienum Rufum quem ad consulatum usque, et Cornelium Gallum, quem ad praefecturam Aegypti, ex infima utrumque fortuna, provexerat'.

³ F. Plessis, *o.c.*, 290, 'd'une très humble origine'; P-W, s.v. 'C. Cornelius Gallus', 1343, 'aus ganz ärmlichen Verhältnissen'; cf. E. Bickel, *Gesch. der r. Lit.* (1937), 533. Skutsch,

who nowhere mentions Gallus' Narbonensian origin, actually bases an argument upon his 'niedrige Herkunft' (*Gallus u. Vergil* (1906), 126).

⁴ Cf. above all M. Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der r. Republik*, 11 ff.

⁵ Cicero, *In Verrem* II, 5, 181.

⁶ Cicero, *Ad fam.* 13, 36.

⁷ Cicero, *In Verrem* II, 3, 69.

⁸ Cicero, *Pro Balbo*, *passim*.

⁹ Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 8, 15a, 2; 9, 7b, 2; Velleius 2, 51, 2.

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Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus the Pompeian consul of 72 B.C. or Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus (*cos.* 56). Both were legates of Pompeius in the war against the pirates, and both may also have served earlier under Pompeius, in Spain and Gaul. The one at least, Marcellinus, was probably Pompeius' quaestor c. 74, to judge by coins.¹

At the beginning of his special command in the West Pompeius seems to have held authority over Gaul. Not only did he fight wars and make dispositions on his way to Spain:² he wintered in Narbonensis in 77/6—and even again in 74/3. It might therefore be conjectured that the parent of the poet Gallus was a Narbonensian personage of some importance who rendered service to Rome and her representatives, and who, befriended by a Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, took the name of his patron when he received the reward of the Roman citizenship.

To resume: if the foregoing argument is correct, Gallus was not of *colonia* Roman or of freedman stock, but, like Caesar's friends Trogus and Procillus, the son of a local dynast of Gallia Narbonensis. These men came of a class that was eminently presentable and highly civilized, Greek before they were Roman; they are the precursors of the famous Narbonensian senators of the first century of the Empire. Caesar the Dictator admitted to the Roman Senate several members of this class, distinguished men and comparable to the Cornelii Balbi from Spain.³ Their names have not been recorded. Nor are the Narbonensian senators known under Augustus. Cornelius Gallus, the Prefect of Egypt, helps to bridge the gap. A knight of such exalted rank is the social equal of senators, politically a greater power than most consuls in the revived and fraudulent Republic of Augustus. Gallus is a phenomenon but not a portent; he is remarkable but not unique.

Gallus and the other Narbonensians cast a vivid and convincing light upon a process otherwise forbidding because it is in the main impersonal, the Romanization of the provinces of the West, and help to fill out a thin and neglected chapter in the social and political history of provinces and Empire. No less conspicuous, no less solid, is the gain for the study of Latin literature. Of the two great Narbonensian poets, the one, Gallus, was native in origin, not colonial Roman. Perhaps also the other. P. Terentius Varro, the poet of the *Argonautica*, is given by some authors the cognomen 'Atacinus';⁴ and Jerome states that he was born at the village of Atax in Narbonensis.⁵ Now the Atax (Aude) is the river that runs by the colony of Narbo; the geographer Mela describes Narbo itself as 'Atacinorum Decimanorumque colonia'.⁶ What is the explanation? We observe that Varro is nowhere called a citizen of the colony of Narbo. It is quite possible that he was, that 'Atacinus' is merely an unofficial, perhaps in origin familiar, depreciatory or poetical epithet applied to Varro to avoid confusion with the learned antiquary from the Sabine country, Varro Reatinus. If Jerome is right, however, and there really was a village called Atax, it may have been a native settlement in, or adjacent to, the territory of the colony of Narbo, into which it was subsequently incorporated with equal rights and full Roman citizenship.⁷ Certainty cannot be obtained here.

¹ H. A. Grueber, *BMC, R. Rep.* II, 491 f. For Pompeius' legates in the Pirate War, cf. Appian, *Mithr.* 95. The history of his relations with the Cornelii Lentuli deserves investigation (cf. above for L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus).

² Cf. esp. *Pro Fonteio* 14, 'ex Cn. Pompei decreto'. Similarly, C. Valerius Flaccus was active in both regions and triumphed 'ex Celtiberia et Gallia' (Granius Licinianus 39, Bonn).

³ Tacitus, *Ann.* II, 24, 'num paenitet Balbos ex Hispania nec minus insignis viros e Gallia Narbonensi transivisse'. On the social status and origin of Caesar's provincial senators, cf. R.

Syme, 'Who was Decidius Saxa?' *JRS* XXVII (1937), 127 ff. Saxa was probably of colonial Roman stock: not so the younger Balbus, the only other provincial recorded by name.

⁴ E.g., Horace, *Sat.* I, 10, 46; Quintilian 10, I, 87.

⁵ Jerome, *Chron.*, under 82 B.C. (p. 151 H.), 'vico Atace in provincia Narbonensi'.

⁶ Mela 2, 75.

⁷ As Mela's description of Narbo suggests—'Atacinorum Decimanorumque colonia'. Julian's view that Atax was a town-ward of Narbo (*Histoire de la Gaule* VI, 145) is not very helpful.

Whatever be thought of 'Atax' and the adjective 'Atacinus', Varro himself *may* not have been a Roman citizen by birth. One would like to know how and from whom he acquired the name of P. Terentius Varro. Gallus' poems were highly Hellenistic; but Varro, if Jerome be believed, did not learn Greek until the thirty-fifth year of his life.

Narbonensis can show two great poets, Varro and Gallus; and it will be recalled that the historian Cornelius Tacitus, who married the daughter of a senator from Forum Iulii, may himself be a Narbonensian—for certain indications point to that province or to provincial Italy, the land beyond the Po.¹ Once again the name 'Cornelius'—and no suspicion of freedman origin.

In the first century of the Roman Empire, Gallia Narbonensis stood in high repute—'agrorum cultu, virorum morumque dignatione, amplitudine opum nulli provinciarum postferenda breviterque Italia verius quam provincia'.² The convergent testimony of archaeology, history and literature will demonstrate how deep lie the roots of this splendid efflorescence of Graeco-Latin civilization.

RONALD SYME.

TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

For doubts about the existence of a place called Atax, see F. Lenz, P-W, s.v. 'P. Terentius Varro', 692; on the name 'Atacinus', O. Hey, *Archiv für lat. Lexikographie* XIV (1906), 269, and J. Wackernagel, *ib.*, 10 'abweichend *Atacinus* : *Atax*

als Ethnikon des bekannten Dichters; ich kann es nicht erklären'.

¹ Cf. M. L. Gordon, 'The *Patria* of Tacitus', *JRS* XXVI (1936), 145 ff.

² Pliny, *NH* 3, 31.

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A NEW PAPYRUS FRAGMENT OF EURIPIDES' *MEDEA*.

IN the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge there is a papyrus fragment, hitherto unpublished,¹ of Euripides' *Medea*. It was written early in the 2nd century A.D., or possibly at the end of the 1st century A.D. The hand is a good round medium upright, similar to that of P. Oxy. 1810, possibly a little older. The stop and apostrophe in Fr. 1 line 1174 were evidently added later. There are several smudges and blots. Elisions only. There were 35 lines to a column.

The papyrus provides one new reading, the inferior variant μέλος in v. 1176. It supports LP against AVB in three places (vv. 1173, 1174, 1195): but no valuable conclusion can be drawn from such scanty evidence. The only reading of great importance for the reconstruction of the text is παῖδας κεθεν in v. 1158: the significance of the papyrus in this place will be discussed in a forthcoming edition of Euripides' *Medea*.

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1166 ομμαςιν not ομμαςι prob. in II.

1168 λεχρία II rell. Σ: λεχρίαν V.

1171 After προσπόλων there is a blank space in II: δοξας[α του added later in margin in a small cursive hand.

1173 κατά IILP et ut vid. Σ: διά AVB.

1174 τ' IILP: δ' AVB.

1175 At beginning of line, the iota is written above and slightly to the left of μ: the rough breathing over αι doubtful but likely (end of horizontal stroke clearly visible): perhaps ομμα was corrected to αίμα.

1176 μέλος II, a new reading: μέγαν codd.

¹ But it was provisionally described and transcribed, with comments, by Professor A. S. Hunt in a note-book to which Mr. C. H. Roberts drew my attention.

FR. 2.

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1158 παῖδας σέθεν ΠΒΡ1: τέκνα σέθεν AV: παῖδας (om. σέθεν) L.

Col. ii.

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1192 There is a light cross in the left hand margin opposite this line.

1195 πίπτει ILP Chr. Pat. 1086: πεινεί AVB.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

DENYS PAGE.

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DEMOCRITUS' THEORY OF COGNITION

(A DISCUSSION OF TWO ARISTOTELIAN PASSAGES CONCERNING DEMOCRITUS).¹

1. *De Anima* A 2, 404a 27 = Diels, *Vorsokratiker* 5th edition 68A 101: ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ψυχὴν ταῦτόν καὶ νοῦν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον; and a 30-31: οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὥς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν.

2. *Metaφ.* Γ 5, 1009b 12 = D.V. 5th ed. 68A 112: ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἰσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι φασιν.

DEMOCRITUS' theory of cognition is known to us from a few fragments which Sextus Empiricus quotes, and from some mention of it in Aristotle. This is almost all we know on the matter. Those who have previously studied the subject have found one main difficulty: Aristotle's statement that Democritus found truth in appearance was believed to be inconsistent with the rest of our tradition concerning Democritus' theory of cognition, especially with the most reliable part of it, the Sextus fragments.² The various interpreters have vigorously supported or opposed Aristotle's account, which meant for them either acceptance or condemnation of the view of Democritus as a sensationalist. Even those, however, who tried to justify the account could not help thinking that it was slightly inexact in its diction. For instance Hirzel,³ the chief representative of the opinion—which he bases on Aristotle—that Democritus, like his follower Epicurus, was a sensationalist,⁴ cannot entirely reconcile Aristotle's account with the Sextus fragments without finding in the former some inaccuracy of expression. Yet we should hesitate to impute inaccuracy to Aristotle without the most careful investigation.

The view, readily adopted by nineteenth-century philosophers, that the Atomists were sensationalists, was disproved by Natorp, whose work on the subject⁵ shows both classical scholarship and philosophical insight. He proves that the Atomists found truth not in sensible appearance but in mental concepts.⁶ They 'did not abandon the standpoint of the Eleatics who based objective cognition on reason'.⁷ Natorp's interpretation of Democritus' position is due to his own philosophical views. But these views, too, prevent him from going on to inquire what is the nature of the object of mental conception. Natorp, as a Marburg Neo-Kantian, is mainly concerned with the theory of knowledge and therefore confines himself to trying to ascertain 'in what kind of cognition'⁸ Democritus believed that truth could be found.

¹ I am deeply indebted to my teachers Professor M. Heidegger of Freiburg, from whom I obtained an insight into philosophical problems in general and from whom I learned to understand the ontological character of Greek philosophy, and Professor P. Von der Mühll of Basel, who taught me the method of dealing with the Presocratics and for whose seminar the outline of this paper was originally written. I wish also to thank Mr. W. K. C. Guthrie for kindly assisting me to publish it in English.

² Diels, *Vorsokratiker* 68B 6-11.

³ *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften* I 113.

⁴ Another representative of the same opinion, Brieger ('Die angebliche Leugnung der Sinnes-

wahrheit bei Demokrit', *Hermes* 37, 1902, p. 56 sqq.), is hardly worth mentioning, as his discussion of the problem is not of a high standard. His arguments against Natorp are unsound.

⁵ *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum*, 1884, p. 164 sqq., and the supplementary article in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* I, 1888, p. 348 sqq.

⁶ *Forschungen*, p. 171: 'Das Wahre liegt keineswegs in den Erscheinungen der Sinne, sondern in Begriffen des Verstandes'.

⁷ 'Sie verliessen nicht den rationalen Boden der Begründung gegenständlicher Erkenntnis, welchen die Eleaten zuerst gelegt hatten'.

⁸ P. 177: 'in welcher Art von Erkenntnis'.

Thus he finds that Democritus did not believe in the *αἰσθησις* but in the *λόγος* as the superior source of knowledge. He was not a sensationalist but a rationalist. Now Natorp's conviction of the truth of this fact led him to dismiss Aristotle's account as unreliable. But in this conclusion it is not possible to follow him. He thinks that Aristotle's version, far from being the account of anything that Democritus ever actually said, is not even consistent with Democritean philosophy, and that it rests entirely on conclusions wrongly drawn by Aristotle. This distrustful attitude is shared by Zeller.¹

Recently Dr. Langerbeck tried to solve the problem by imputing to the Aristotelian *ἀλήθεια* the weaker meaning of 'distinctness' (*Deutlichkeit*) and 'apparentness' (*Scheinbarkeit*).² His suggestion, however, has been completely refuted by Professor Kapp.³

It is to be regretted that Professor Kapp, touching on the matter in a review only, has not dealt with the problem at length. He gives only some hints, albeit very important ones, which show that he thinks Aristotle's account quite compatible with Democritus' philosophy.

From these suggestions, which I fully accept, I have been led on to try to explain this compatibility, and what seems to me the solution of the problem is set forth in the following pages.

We cannot judge the trustworthiness of Aristotle's sentences without having previously made clear what is their character. This requires in the first place an exposition of what Aristotle meant to say.

Almost all commentators, whichever side they have taken, have concurred in the belief that Aristotle meant to describe Democritus as a crude sensationalist.

Our inquiry must begin with the fragments which Sextus has handed down to us, but they need not be commented on in detail. A few points only will suffice. According to Democritus we are not able to know anything truly (*ἔτεῃ*, B 10, 7, 8); what truly is (*τὸ ἔτεῃ ὄν, τὸ ἀτρεκές*) lies hidden and is thus unattainable for us (B 9, 8; and B 117: *ἐν βυθῷ ἡ ἀλήθεια*). There is a second point which forms somehow a rectification of the former, expounding the subject more accurately, namely Democritus' doctrine that there are two kinds of knowledge (B 11), the one being *γνώμη γνησίη*, legitimate knowing, the other *γνώμη σκοτήη*, dim knowing. There is no doubt that Democritus thinks of the first as having for its object the atoms and the void, for these are, according to him, the only things which truly and properly exist.⁴ Thus the ascribing of legitimate birth to this kind of cognition is founded on the true character of the atoms. Since they are first in the rank of being, the cognition concerned with them takes the first place in the rank of cognition. The object of 'dark cognition' on the other hand is constituted by the whole realm of the senses,⁵ and its value as a mode of cognition necessarily gives precedence to the *γνώμη γνησίη*. It does so in so far as and because its objects, the sensible things, are inferior to the

¹ *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 6th ed. I, pp. 1132-34.

² Langerbeck, *Δόξαι ἐπισυναγωγή*, 'Studien zu Demokrits Ethik und Erkenntnislehre,' *Neue philologische Untersuchungen*, 1935, p. 90.

Dr. Langerbeck rejects the account, taking up the argument that Aristotle is arguing purely logically and thus coming to a wrong conclusion. So he, too, believes that it has no historical value. Nevertheless he thinks that the concept of *ἀλήθεια* requires a new interpretation, because to him the context in *Met.* Γ 5 seems, even within

itself, to lack consistency. That Langerbeck misunderstood the train of thought in this whole passage, and how it should be interpreted, has been sufficiently shown by Professor Kapp. Compare the following footnote.

³ Cf. Kapp's review of Langerbeck's book, *Gnomon*, 1936.

⁴ We have to understand the *ἔτεῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν* in B 9 as the object of the *γνώμη γνησίη* in B 11.

⁵ B 11: *καὶ σκοτήης μὲν τὰδε σύμπαντα, ὅψις, ἀκοή, ὀσμὴ, γεύσις, ψαύσις*.

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Democritean ἀρχαί, the ἐτεῖ or ἀληθῶς ὄντα—inferior, that is, with respect to the ἀλήθεια of both of them, which means true being.

The point is here deliberately emphasized that the rank of the different kinds of knowledge is based on the rank of the different kinds of being. Commenting thus on Democritus, I go slightly beyond Sextus' account. I believe myself, however, to be correctly rendering Democritus' original view. For it is evident that Sextus differs widely from original Greek philosophy, his interest, as that of a sceptic in an age of the decline of creative thought, concentrating on the questions of cognition and the criteria of its truth (a view which narrows original philosophy, and which is partly derived from Aristotle, though he did not hold it). A realization of this will help us to reach our aim of understanding the meaning of Aristotle's sentences and of gaining a more consistent view of Democritean philosophy. Presocratic as well as classical Greek philosophy was mainly concerned with being, i.e. it was, strictly speaking, ontology. The search for being, which even as a problem is hardly understandable in later centuries, was the chief endeavour of Greek philosophers from Parmenides to Aristotle. This aim governs even those parts of their philosophy which apparently treat subject-matters of their own. The constitution of the problem of cognition as an independent realm of philosophy, separate from the problem of being, is certainly not Democritean, but is due to the traditional way in which, since Theophrastus, doxography handed down ancient philosophical thought. On Democritus' 'theory of cognition' which Sextus gives us (only very fragmentarily, fr. 11 especially breaking off just at the vital point) hardly any light can fall unless we connect it closely with the theory of the atoms and understand it as derived therefrom.

If we do so, however, the fragments show quite clearly that Democritus was neither a sceptic believing in no truth¹ nor a sensationalist in the strict sense of the term, as Epicurus certainly was. On the contrary, both in his 'epistemology' and his 'ontology' all the emphasis is on the central proposition that true being has to be ascribed to the atoms (and the void) which are the ἀρχαί τῶν ὄντων, and that no other knowledge but that concerned with them deserves the title of genuine knowledge.

Now suppose for a moment that Aristotle were to tell us that Democritus finds primary truth in the αἰσθητά and not in their ἀρχαί or, corresponding to this, that he attributes true cognition to the αἰσθησις and not to the λόγος that goes further back beyond the αἰσθητά. It is clear enough that in this case the inconsistency with genuine Democritean philosophy would be too great. As a warning against such a

¹ It is true that in *Met.* I 5 Aristotle says in a sentence immediately preceding ours, διὸ Δημόκριτος γέ φησιν ἦτοι οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἀληθινόν. But this, as we infer from the context, should be expounded as follows. In view of the fact that in the domain of sense-perception one truth will stand against its opposite, and that there is no criterion by which we can give preference to either, there is no other solution than to assume that either nothing is true or truth is not obvious to us, but hidden in the depth.—There can be no doubt that only the second alternative represents Democritus' conviction. Aristotle did not mean to indicate in this sentence that Democritus was a sceptic, but repeated one of the Democritean arguments against truth to be found in the αἰσθητά (in a narrow sense). In this matter, Democritus was in opposition to Protagoras, for whom all that appears was true. So far all is in agreement with the Sextus frag-

ments. But in the following sentence, the one with which we have to deal, Aristotle conversely places Democritus side by side with Protagoras and with those who deny the ὁρισμένον τι (1008a 34), i.e. those who maintain ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι (1008a 3) and τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (1009a 12). So he counts him among those who, 'on the whole' (ὅλως), saw truth in the αἰσθητά. But here αἰσθητά is meant in a new and wider sense, which must be interpreted in our text. The mere fact that Democritus is now placed in the ranks of his opponents indicates that Aristotle turns to a more fundamental view. The conjecture of Kranz, who substitutes ὅμως for ὅλως (in A 112, D.V. 5th ed., 1935, adopted by Capelle in his German translation of the Presocratics), errs by overlooking the fact that the train of thought here reaches far backwards. We must retain the ὅλως.

misinterpretation of the Atomists, Natorp rightly points out the rational and logical standpoint of their theory of cognition.

I believe, however, that the essential thing for an understanding of Aristotle's sentences about Democritus is to realize that they do not deal with the two opposites which the Democritean ontology knows as *αἰσθητά* and as *ἀρχαί*, or which the Democritean theory of knowledge distinguishes as *γνώμη σκοτιή*, and *γνώμη γνησίη*. It would be strange indeed if Aristotle had so misinterpreted the central point of Atomistic philosophy as to overlook in it the atoms and the genuine cognition dealing with them. For this would mean that he had found in it merely one side, the crudely sensationalist one, of a contrast which without doubt has been originated by Atomism.

Moreover, we have a proof that Aristotle well knew the essence of the Atomistic doctrine, and it seems most improbable that he ever lost sight of it. This proof is contained in the account he gives of the Atomists in *De gen. et corr.* A 8, 325a 23-27.¹ Among the texts bearing witness to the Atomists' theory of knowledge, this passage should have its place midway between the Sextus fragments and Aristotle's sentences about truth being found in appearance according to Democritus. For it is obviously consistent with the former, but in apparent disagreement with the latter. Thus the gulf, if it exists at all, would not only appear between Sextus (which means Democritus) and Aristotle but even within the works of Aristotle himself. For in this passage he characterizes the Atomists, sharply contrasting them with the Eleatics, in the following words: *Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ψῆθῃ λόγους, οἷτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρῆσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων. ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινόμενοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν κίνησιν οὐσαν ἀνεν κενού. . .* These sentences follow an account of the Eleatics the summary of which reads:² *ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δεόν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναι φασιν.* Here the contrast is formulated precisely. Certain *λόγοι* induced the Eleatics to 'pass over' the *αἴσθησις* and to 'overlook' it. These philosophers asserted that one has to follow the *λόγος*. Leukippus, however (and with him Democritus, we may add), started from sense-appearance and thought to seize hold of 'reasons' consistent with it. This means 'reasons' which would lead back to appearance, explain it and thus support it rather than cancel it. Thus the Atomists do justice to the Eleatic basis, the *λόγος*, and at the same time, unlike the Eleatics, to appearance.

This Aristotelian account clearly contains the above-mentioned contrast of two opposites. In it, moreover, these opposites are interpreted in such a way as to render obvious their connexion. Appearance is the starting point and is, as well, the point to which cognition finally turns back. On its way, cognition succeeds in explaining and reinforcing appearance through that truth which is deeply hidden and brought to light only by means of the *λόγοι*. This true being is the atoms and the void, 'being' in its proper sense.

According to the Sextus fragments, even the *γνώμη σκοτιή*, the cognition by means of the senses, is *γνώμη*. This means it is not delusive and therefore not to be rejected. We may somehow give credit to the *αἰσθητά* (Sextus tells us that Democritus ascribed to them *τὸ κράτος τῆς πίστεως*).³ They are reliable on condition that we proceed from them to what lies behind them, i.e. a being on which their being is founded. Thus both of them, *αἴσθησις* as well as *λόγος*, are duly appreciated by the Atomists, each in its appropriate function.⁴

¹ = D.V. Leukippus A 7.

² *De gen. et corr.* A 8, 325a 13 = D.V. Parmenides

A 25.

³ D.V. 68b 9.

⁴ We should interpret in the light of this the

fragment of Galen about Democritus (68b 123), that dialogue between senses and intellect, which are, as it were, engaged in a combat as to which of them shall lead. The final meaning, I think, is not contained in the statement that the in-

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It should be noted that Democritus has dealt explicitly with sense and the sensible as such,¹ whereas the being that is opposed to the sensible has not received equally positive treatment. The fragments tell us only that it is recognized by the γνώμη γνησίη, and Aristotle speaks of it as being revealed by the λόγοι. We know too, indeed, that this being is the ἀρχαί, atoms and void, but there is no title describing it as it should be conceived. This means that no Atomistic term has come down to us which would correspond to the title αἰσθητά. Sextus, it is true, speaks in this connexion of νοητά,² placing them side by side with Plato's νοητά, i.e. with the 'ideas', which are certainly non-sensible in their essence. But this term can by no means be proved to be Atomistic. It is, I think, a misnomer understandable as a term of post-Aristotelian doxographers who would too readily believe that the opposite to the αἰσθητόν must naturally be a νοητόν. For the problems to which this contrast has been due, and which had been originally ontological, and the far more subtle shades of distinction that Plato and Aristotle had in view had ceased to live.

Much depends on our avoiding Sextus' mistake of thinking that what is revealed through the λόγος is clearly a νοητόν. Nor must the λόγος, as a faculty of cognition, be identified with the νοῦς. There is not a single source that tells us that, according to Democritus, the γνώμη γνησίη would be performed by the νοῦς and as a νοεῖν.³

When we keep in mind that we must not misinterpret the object of Democritean true knowledge as a νοητόν, it will be easier to understand what Aristotle may mean when he says that Democritus found truth in sense-appearance, though he himself had interpreted Atomistic philosophy as assigning a specific office to both λόγος and αἰσθησις, and even giving preference to the λόγος.

We shall come still nearer to this understanding if we take into account *De gen. et corr.* A 1, 315b 6 sqq.:⁴ ἐπεὶ δ' ὅσοντο τὰληθὲς ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ἐναντία δὲ καὶ ἀπειρα τὰ φαινόμενα, τὰ σχήματα ἀπειρα ἐποίησαν. This passage seems puzzling. For here the first chapter of the same work in which we found the Atomists characterized in connexion with the Eleatics states that the Atomists believed truth to be found in appearance. This statement is the same as that contained in the two sentences

tellest's apparent victory is virtually its defeat. The metaphor of the combat is rather meant to show that each is capable of fulfilling its specific task.

¹ Cf. Theophrastus' full account in *de Sens.*, D.V. 68A 135.

² D.V. 68A 59: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον μὲν τὰ νοητὰ ὑπενόησαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι.

³ There remains a certain amount of obscurity as to how he believed it to take place. The fragments tell nothing about the way in which the true *ὄντα* are grasped, except that they give the name of γνώμη γνησίη. To this we have added as a complement the term λόγοι, found in *De gen. et corr.* This expression makes it somehow more conceivable by what means human understanding reaches the atoms and the void. It does so by a way of thinking which starts from the appearances and refers back, i.e. a discursive thinking. (Sextus says, in accordance with this, in B 11, διὰ τῆς διανοίας.) The term λόγος or λόγοι is derived from the Eleatics. It is probable that this use here is due not merely to Aristotle's interpretation but to Democritus himself. It may be assumed that the Atomists actually developed their philosophy partly in agreement with, partly in opposition to, that of

the Eleatics. (As Natorp observed, the philosopher to whom they principally referred was Melissos.) If, then, we are right in assuming λόγοι to be a Democritean term, the fragments would become clearer. In B 11 the context was presumably this, that the genuine cognizing begins to work where sense-perception is no longer able to proceed towards the more subtle. Now, if we may imagine that that which then begins to act is the λόγος, we can better understand the possibility of this ever more minute analysis of existing things, culminating in the atoms. The λόγοι are an indirect grasping and mediate thus the knowledge of true being. It seems at first puzzling that Democritus, although he knows of a γνώμη γνησίη, emphasizes so strongly that truth is deeply hidden from men. Now I think if we take into account the λόγοι, this proposition of truth being hidden possibly means that man lacks the faculty of seeing the *ἐρεῇ ὄντα* by immediate grasping.

In any case, we have to keep in mind that the λόγοι are an indirect grasping. We shall see that this is important for the understanding of Aristotle's view of Democritus.

⁴ = D.V. Leuk. A 9.

which form our subject-matter. But here it forms a premise and is meant to explain why the Atomists assumed the existence of *σχήματα*, i.e. atoms.¹ Thus we find the distinction of sensible appearances and atoms closely associated with the statement that truth was found in appearance. This makes it clear that Aristotle did not see any incompatibility between that distinction and this statement. And thus it appears certain that his speaking of truth in appearance cannot have a narrow sensationalistic meaning.

For further evidence in support of this conviction we finally turn to another group of Aristotle's remarks on Democritus which show impressively how highly he esteemed him. I mean the sentences in which he mentions Democritus as the only one of the Presocratics who had advanced even 'a little way' (*ἐπὶ μικρόν*) towards the *ὁρισμός*, i.e. the view of the *οὐσία* and the *τί ἦν εἶναι*.² Aristotle means that Democritus came fairly near the question of the *οὐσία*, since he searched for the *τί ἐστὶ* of the *ὄντα*, as is implied in his answer that the atoms constitute the real 'what it is' of extant things. Considering the significance of *ὁρισμός* and *οὐσία* in Aristotle's own philosophy, this emphasis on Atomistic doctrine is definitely meant to acknowledge the advanced position of their philosophy. It can no longer be doubted that we have to reject an interpretation which would maintain that Aristotle, in the passages under discussion, denied that the Atomists' sight reached beyond superficial appearance.

It must now be asked positively, what is the meaning of the two passages in *De Anima* and in *Met.* Γ 5?

Put briefly: what Aristotle has in mind as the opposite to the *αἰσθητά* is not the *ἀτομα* attainable by the *λόγοι*, i.e. the Atomists' *ἀρχαί*, but the Aristotelian *νοητά*.

That is why we have emphasized from the beginning the point that the philosophy of being constitutes the foundation of all philosophy of cognition, and that Greek philosophers, from the earliest ages down to Aristotle, primarily and essentially investigated being and only secondarily the human faculties of grasping being. Unless we start from the *ὄντα*, we cannot see the difference between Aristotelian *νοητά* and Atomistic *ἀρχαί*. But this is indispensable in order to understand the shortcomings of Democritean philosophy which Aristotle was bound to see.

We cannot interpret the passages at issue unless we bear in mind the specific Aristotelian tendency of philosophical investigation and consider the connexion of thought in which those passages appear.

There are, in the philosophy of Aristotle, two especially relevant distinctions which should be kept in mind, for they will throw light on our passages.

1. The distinction which Aristotle draws, separating *στοιχεῖα* from the proper *ἀρχαί*³ and *αἰτίαι*.

2. The specific character which he finds in the *νοῦς*, different from *διανοεῖσθαι* and *λέγειν*.

With both distinctions we touch the essence of Aristotle's philosophy. No wonder, therefore, that they penetrate almost every part of his main philosophical writings.

The distinction of the *αἰτίαι* and *ἀρχαί* (in a strict sense) from the mere *στοιχεῖα*, the former being the proper subject of philosophy, while the *στοιχεῖον* is unprofitable for real philosophical research, is to be found in *Phys.* A and B and particularly in

¹ Precisely speaking, from the infinity of appearances they inferred an infinity in the number and variety of the shapes of atoms.

² D.V. A 36 = *De part. anim.* A 1,642a 24 and *Met.* M 4, 1078b 19.

³ Here we use *ἀρχή* in the narrower sense in which Aristotle uses it. He sometimes employs

the term in a wider and more formal sense, in which *ἀρχή* includes even the *στοιχεῖον*. Therefore even for Aristotle it would be justifiable to call the atoms *ἀρχαί*, as did Democritus. But if this name is used, the essential philosophical difference remains hidden.

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Met. A. Furthermore, we have to remember the definition given of the στοιχείον in the first sentence of *Met. Δ 3*, in contrast to ἀρχή (*Δ 1*) and αἴτιον (*Δ 2*): στοιχείον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχοντος, ἀδιαίρετον τῷ εἶδει εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος. This sentence makes it clear that the ἀρχαί of Democritus, atoms and void, must be mere στοιχεῖα in Aristotle's view. Although being elements inaccessible to human senses and therefore ἀναίσθητα rather in an empirical sense of this word, they have, from an essentially philosophical point of view, the same character as what they compose. Although approachable only by intellectual reflection which works back to them, not by immediate sense-perception, they are, nevertheless, σώματα, and thus, in their ontological character, belong to the domain of αἰσθητά.

Under the title of ἀρχαί (in a strict sense), however, Aristotle investigates those 'origins' and 'grounds' of being which are fundamentally different from the αἰσθητά and from all that exists.¹ What Aristotle, like Plato, aims at is a being of a radically different order.

The ἀρχαί are meant to be the ground and foundation of existing things, i.e. the foundation of their being. If they themselves are called ὄντα, we must not be misled by that to assume that they would 'exist', i.e. that they 'are' in the same way as the αἰσθητά. Certainly they 'are', in their turn, but the way in which they are, i.e. their being, is fundamentally different from the being of existing things. To put it in another way, ὄν in this case has an abstract sense. These ὄντα cannot be reached by perception, but can only be conceived by the mind.

This, I think, it is essential to realize, that, though hidden under the name of ὄν, which both have in common, the ἀρχαί which Aristotle's inquiry seeks to discover differ essentially from the αἰσθητά. For those ἀρχαί are ὄντα in an abstract sense of ὄν, not identical with the ὄν as an existing thing or quality, but the essential element and foundation for it. While the latter is an αἰσθητόν, the ἀρχαί are νοητά. Moreover, this νοητόν is what Aristotle calls the 'being-ness' (οὐσία), according to the strictest philosophical use of this term. It is further the ἀκίνητον, thus contrasting with the moving, changing and passing-away of existing things and their existing qualities. And it is 'the pre-eminently true',² i.e. an ἀληθές without a ψεῦδος beside it, its only opposite being not-coming-to-be-grasped at all. Finally we note that Aristotle means these νοητά, whenever he speaks of ἀπλῶ.

So the phenomenon of the νοητόν occurs in Aristotle under various names and in methodically different investigations. He is dealing with this very phenomenon in *Met. Γ* and in *De Anima*, that is in those inquiries in which the sentences under discussion are contained.

In the *Metaphysics*, which constitute the inquiry into the ὄν ἢ ὄν, i.e. the being qua being, and this means the being-ness of the being, the νοητόν is naturally the theme. Towards it is directed the inquiry concerning ἀρχαί and αἰτίαι (*Book A*); it is meant by the οὐσία ἀκίνητος (which forms virtually the subject of investigation throughout the *Metaphysics*), and by the ἀληθές in *Θ 10*, designated as τὸ κυριώτατον ὄν and as ἀπλοῦν, free from any σύνθεσις and συμπλοκή.³

¹ By 'all that exists' or 'existing things' I try to render τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. Cf. ἐνυπάρχοντος in the above definition of στοιχείον.

² I refer to *Met. Θ 10*. Cp. the following footnote.

³ Professor Ross says in his notes on this chapter (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, p. 275/76): 'He (i.e. Aristotle) says in this chapter clearly enough that there can be no falsity with regard to them (i.e. to the "simple"), but he does not say as clearly as he might that there can be no truth either. That which could not possibly be false cannot without tautology, and therefore

absurdity, be said to be true. . . . But instead of saying this he says that truth in another than the ordinary sense is possible with regard to in-composites. The fault, however, is only in the expression; the distinction is probably clear enough in his mind'.

But the chapter which, indeed, already appeared difficult to the ancients has a definite meaning, as I have been convinced by Professor Heidegger's interpretation, given in his lectures in 1923-26, but not published. According to it Aristotle, in *Θ 10*, means to bring to light the peculiar truth of the 'simple'. This truth, which

Book Γ, which fulfils a preparatory function, is intended first of all to establish that there is something like this νοητόν, an οὐσία ἀκίνητος. Thus the attempt is made in it to show that, unless the mind has conceived something as identical with itself, all philosophy, moreover all discussion and speech and thus the life of men itself, would be impossible. The νοητόν constitutes the indispensable foundation on which human life and intercourse are based.¹ Aristotle discusses this question at a length unusual with him. He attacks it at various points, always aiming at the same problem. In this connexion he places those who deny that there is anything identical with itself (and this includes being different from its opposite) side by side with the Protagorists,² since neither saw the νοητόν. On this side, too, Aristotle, though only in passing, places Democritus. For him also, he says, the αἰσθητά, in a fundamental sense, will constitute the sphere of truth, i.e. of true being. He does not see the νοητά, which are, in Aristotle's view, the pre-eminently true'.³

We have still to expound the second distinction, that of νοεῖν and διανοεῖσθαι. It is closely connected with the first. For the faculty which apprehends and reveals those ἀρχαί, the νοητά, is the νοεῖν. It conceives immediately and it conceives a 'simple'. Thus the νοεῖν, and the νοῦς by which it is performed, are sharply contrasted with all διανοεῖσθαι. The latter always deals with a compound (συνγείμενον), i.e. with a plurality, and, separating and combining at the same time, it relates one to the other.⁴ Of the same character is the λέγειν, which is derived from the διανοεῖσθαι and corresponds to it, being its expression in language.

Now all λέγειν and διανοεῖσθαι and accordingly all συλλογίζεσθαι presuppose, as their ἀρχή, a pure νοεῖν, the conception of an ἀρχή. Thus the νοεῖν is the essential mode of revelation, as it alone can seize hold of the essential being, the ἀρχή, the νοητόν.

Hence, though the λόγος, as a mental way of cognition, is different from perception which is a sensible way, this certainly does not mean that the λόγος, as such, reveals a non-sensible object. It will never by itself lead to anything non-sensible. On the contrary, the λόγος presupposes the precedence of a pure νοεῖν, i.e. the immediate apprehension of a νοητόν. Hence it is clear what view Aristotle, from his own fuller perspective, was bound to take of the Atomists. Although they knew of a non-sensible method of cognition, namely the λόγοι, and gave preference to it over the sensible method, they had not advanced far enough to gain philosophical insight into the νοῦς and its object, the νοητόν.

Aristotle in different places emphasizes this fact that all λέγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are based upon the conceiving of the ἀρχή by means of the νοῦς. For theoretical affirmation and syllogistic reasoning he several times shows this in the *Analytics*.⁵

excludes any possibility of falsity beside it, constitutes the original and the pre-eminently 'true', in the Greek sense of this word, meaning what is not-hidden, or lifted from its hiddenness (ἀ-ληθής). Moreover, this primarily 'true' is, as such, even the pre-eminent being (τὸ κυριώτατον ὄν, 1051b 1). Hence we realize that this chapter rightly stands at the end of Book Θ.

I cannot here expound Heidegger's detailed interpretation at full length, and should only like to add that, according to this interpretation, one feels inclined to eliminate, in 1051b 1, the words ἢ ψεῦδος. They are likely to have been inserted by a copyist, in formal accordance with passages which deal with the secondary truth, i.e. truth (and falsity) in propositions.

Consequently we should probably read in 1051b 23/24, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθές θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές. Christ already bracketed, in his

edition of the *Metaphysics*, ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν. But, contrary to him, I hold that the ἀληθές following φάναι should be kept. I owe these textual suggestions, too, to Heidegger's lectures.

¹ Thus, to speak precisely, Book Γ is not intended to treat the principle of contradiction, i.e. the foundation of Logic, as is often believed. It rather deals with the first and essential ontological problem.

² Cp. above, p. 49, note 1.

³ I find this meaning of Γ 5 especially obvious from 1010a 1-3: αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τοσούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀληθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δ' ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον. For the 'pre-eminently true' compare above, p. 53, note 3.

⁴ Cp. below, p. 55, note 3.

⁵ E.g. 85a 1 sq., 88b 35, etc. Cp. especially the final chapter of *Posterior Analytics* (B 19).

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For the λόγος which explicates human action the same fact is shown in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹ In *Met.* Θ 10 this νοεῖν of the ἀπλοῦν is described by the metaphor of a touch:² ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀτάφασις καὶ φάσις.³

Aristotle has his own accuracy of method. Thus each aspect of this phenomenon, the conceiving of being, is discussed in its proper place. The *Metaphysics*, as we have seen, deal with the being which has to be conceived, since this work has being as its subject-matter. Now the conceiving itself is developed in the work on the 'soul', in the last book of which Aristotle discusses the νοῦς as the highest faculty of the soul, very concisely indeed, but leaving no doubt that he thinks this difficult subject to be most significant. In this connexion (though without mentioning Democritus by name), he deals with exactly the same problem as in our passage in *De An. A*. But in *A* he only gives a preliminary hint, it is not until Γ 3 that he actually discusses the question. What he intends is to show that thinking is fundamentally different from perception. In this connexion he refers again to the ἀρχαῖοι, saying that this essential difference had been hidden from them.⁴

It will now be seen why the two passages on Democritus have the same content. Furthermore we realize why in both of them the statement of truth lying in appearance according to Democritus is connected with the mention of the νοῦς. Democritus, we read, identifies νοῦς with ψυχή (*De An. A* 2), or the αἴσθησις is taken for φρόνησις (*Met.* Γ 5).⁵ The order of reasoning in the *De Anima* passage (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον) appears to be the converse of that in *Met.* Γ 5 (διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν τὴν αἴσθησιν). From this fact itself we gather that Aristotle did not mean to reproduce literally any Atomistic sentence. He did not imply that either the identity of mind and perception or the attribution of truth to the perceptible was a Democritean proposition. We cannot accept Philoponus' interpretation⁶ that one of them must have been actually taken from Democritus, the other concluded therefrom by Aristotle. We should realize that in both passages Aristotle subjects the Atomists' view as a whole to thorough criticism, without quoting explicitly. Even this criticism is only incidental and given as an instance, since in both passages he is concerned with his positive problem. It is in the nature of the phenomenon of νοῦς

¹ Especially in *Z* 6 and, besides, in 1142a 25 sqq. and 1143b 1.

² 1051b 23. Cp. above, p. 53, note 3.

³ For the object of κατάφασις is necessarily characterized by συμπλοκή. Hence it works as a combination of διαίρεσις and σύνθεσις. We know this as the way of performing a λέγειν and διανοεῖσθαι. In performing these, we denote something as something. In contrast to them the φάσις is a mere referring to a 'single'. It develops from the simple becoming aware of a simple and is the way in which the νοεῖν is performed.

Cp. above, p. 54 and p. 53, note 3.

⁴ Cp. the following footnote.

⁵ Compare *De An.* Γ 3, where we read about the Presocratics: τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναι φασιν (427a 22). Here the terms for the two objects of identification are the same as in *Met.* Γ 5. Aristotle uses here φρόνησις and φρονεῖν in a sense different from his own precise use of these words, according to which φρόνησις denotes reflexion in πράξις only. Here the word has its pre-Aristotelian sense as a general title for any kind of thinking. Thus it stands for

νοεῖν.

Another point in which *De An.* Γ 3 agrees with *Met.* Γ 5 is that here too failure to see the νοῦς is connected with seeing truth in appearance. We read that those who identify the νοῦς (or the φρόνησις) with αἴσθησις are bound to believe πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ (427b 3).

This chapter Γ 3 of *De Anima* is indispensable for an interpretation of our passage in *A* 2. In *A* 2, Aristotle deals with the soul as ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. He says that implicitly already the ancients saw the soul in this way, e.g. Democritus, though, meaning the soul, he speaks of the νοῦς. But he takes νοῦς differently from Anaxagoras. For Democritus definitely means 'νοῦς' to be simply identical with soul, for he holds that truth lies in appearance'. We could hardly understand the connexion of this without the parallel in Γ 3. But with it we can assume that Aristotle has in view the same problem in *A* 2. He intends to say here that Democritus, as he saw truth in appearance, did not know the νοῦς as a specific means of conceiving being. Where he mentions the νοῦς, this word means the soul.

⁶ D.V. 68A 113.

that failure to apprehend it means seeking truth in appearance, and conversely. This is the reason why Aristotle can speak of both problems combined, irrespective of any order of reasoning from one to the other.

To sum up what, in my opinion, Aristotle, on the basis of his own philosophy, says about that of the Atomists: the phenomenon of the νοῦς and its object, the νοητόν, was not apprehended by the Atomists. Democritus 'made no use of the νοῦς as a faculty concerning truth'¹ which means here concerning the νοητά. He sought therefore the ἀληθές (this includes the meaning of ὄν) within the domain of the αἰσθητά, where this term now, in the present fundamental discussion, includes the atoms.

Although the Atomists' *questioning* had taken the right direction towards the 'what it is' and the essence of being, the ἐπὶ μικρόν in the judgement about them² is still justified. For the *answer* they gave, declaring the atoms to be the τί τῶν ὄντων, shows that their ontology did not reach the deeper problem of the ὄν, on which, according to Aristotle, the proper constitution of philosophy depends.

This, I think, is the view which Aristotle had of the Atomists, and which finds its expression in the two passages quoted at the beginning of the present article.

HELENE WEISS.

NEWMHAM COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ *De An.* A 2, 404a 30/31. Compare the beginning of this article. ² Cf. above, p. 52.

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MACTE, MACTARE, MACULA.

THE old ritual word *macte* was only vaguely understood even in Republican times. As is well known, the ancient critics connected the word with *magis*, *magnus*, and explained it as *magis auctus* (so Servius on Verg. *Aen.* IX. 641; Nonius 81, 18; Paul. Fest. p. 112, Lindsay). A glance at Walde's *Wörterbuch* reveals that many attempts have been made in modern times to solve the mystery; but the formidable equipment of the modern philologist has yielded little better results than the popular etymology of the ancients, the most favoured view to-day seeing in *mactus*¹ the PPP of a verb **mago* (so L-H p. 405) with *macto* as the frequentative which replaces it. The supposed semantic development of this verb, originally meaning 'to increase', has been set forth by Warde Fowler in a well-known passage (*Rel. Exper.* 182 f.), to which recent authorities have accorded their assent and praise: 'the vitality of the deity . . . was really increased by placing on the altar the organs of life of the victim'. But this is a solution which ignores half the problem: *macte* and *maclare* are used not only of the deities but also of the victim (despite Warde Fowler and others, see below). One can perhaps understand *Iovem mactare* as 'to magnify J.', but not even by the most superficial analogy can we find a transition from here to the meaning typified in *mactare vinum*. Yet this is one of the most frequent usages of the word. So deep a gulf lies between the two semantic spheres of the verb that some scholars have sought to find in it two different verbs (so Walde). But this is a counsel of despair which the editor of the *Thesaurus* dismisses with a *non recte*. We must agree, then, with Hey (*A.f.l.L.* XIII, 223 ff.) that the modern explanation is 'sicher eine unrichtige' and with Meillet-Ernout that there exists 'aucune étymologie claire'. It is, therefore, surprising that so ill-founded a preconception should lead investigators to ignore or even dismiss important evidence which the ancient authorities offer for the solution of this problem.

Wünsch, for instance, in his treatment of the syntax of *macte* (*Rh. M.* 69, 127 ff.) quotes the well-known passage of Servius on *Aen.* IX, 641: *macte, magis aucte, adfecte gloria. et est sermo tractus a sacris. quotiens enim aut tus aut vinum super victimam fundebatur, dicebant 'mactus est taurus vino vel ture'*. The etymology is, of course, no better than we expect, but Servius' clear indication of the usage of the word is of the utmost importance and it cannot be ignored by any satisfactory attempt to explain the word. Yet observe Wünsch's treatment of his sources. 'Obwohl Servius hier einer guten Quelle folgt—da er in Etymologie mit Paulus zusammentrifft, möchte man an Verrius Flaccus denken—hat er doch ein Versehen begangen.'² Jene Formel

¹ There can be little doubt that *macte* is the vocative of *mactus*. This is the view of the *Thesaurus* and of Leumann-Hofmann p. 405. Birt (*Rh. M.* 77, 199 ff.) has made a laborious attempt to prove that there are two forms: *mactē* with *esse*, an adverb of the type of *bene sum* (this, incidentally, was Nettleship's view, *Contributions* p. 520), and *mactū* without the verb. Birt claims to have cut through all difficulties with this Alexandrian stroke; but doubts are aroused by the fact that he has to alter the accepted punctuation of Cicero *ad Att.* XV 29, 3, insert an *esto* in Cicero *Tusc.* I 40, make a verse and avoid a translation of *Trag. incert.* 231 (*age prospera mactenit*). None of his quotations from the early poets prove a spondaic value for *macte* (as he

himself recognizes), but he counters this with the remark that a trochaic value is not proved either. But in fact Vergil *Aen.* IX. 641 is the earliest passage in Roman literature where the quantity is beyond doubt: *macte nova virtute puer*. This is the obstacle which Birt surmounts with Roman diplomacy—*divide et impera*. We feel that we cannot agree with his own conclusion 'Es hindert nichts, meiner Auffassung zu folgen'. Kroll (*Glotta*, 19, 283 f.) has made this view still more unconvincing by pointing out that it is improbable that an adverb *macte* was formed at so early a date; *aucte* occurs first in the fourth century.

² So also Warde Fowler (*op. cit.* p. 184): 'undoubtedly Servius has made a mistake here'

richtete sich nicht an das Opfertier sondern an den Gott, denn bei Cato, wo sie wiederholt in alten Gebeten erscheint, werden damit Jupiter oder Janus angeredet'. The information is from a good source and yet it is wrong! Yet a glance at a Latin dictionary would have made it clear that the related word *macto* is also used both of deity and victim. A further point which should not be ignored is the double construction of *macto*: it is possible to say *Iovem vino mactare* or *vinum Iovi mactare*. Of this fact, too, we must give a satisfactory account. So before venturing to decry Servius it would be well to analyse the passages in which *macte*, *mactare* occur. This, indeed, is the indispensable preliminary to any etymology.

In essaying this analysis we propose to make use of a hitherto neglected instrument—morphological analysis. In etymology *ceteris paribus* a connection with a word or words in the same language is to be preferred to a connection with a hypothetical form or with words from widely removed languages. Scholars both ancient and modern have, consciously or unconsciously, recognized the validity of this principle when they seized upon the resemblance of *macte* to *magnus* etc., for **mago* is nothing but *magis auctus* in modern dress. This, however, is popular etymology at its crudest. We believe that morphological considerations will reveal a more plausible connection with other Latin words and provide us with an explanation which does not hitch its wagon to an asterisk. *Mactus, macto, mag-mentum*¹ forms a morphological group precisely parallel to *apto, apto, am-mentum* (= *ap-mentum*). Now it is well known that the Latin frequentative verbs tend to replace the corresponding basic verbs. In the latter of the above groups *apto* has replaced an earlier *apio* (only found in Ennius apart from the glossaries). So when we recall the precisely similar relationship between *capio* and *capto* etc., it is tempting to assume that *macto* has taken the place of a lost **macio*, and it is from this verb that the past participle passive *mactus* has been formed. We now look further into the morphological relations of these words. We observe that from many such verbs deverbative nouns are made ending in *-ula, -ulum*. *Apio* again provides us with a suggestive example in *copula* (= *co-apula*); from *iacio* we get *iaculum* and from *capio* *capula* (Meillet-Ernout 146). We have, therefore, the most cogent reasons for joining *macula* to the family of **macio, macto*. The meaning of this noun 'a spot' gives us a welcome indication of the semantic sphere in which to seek the meaning of our **macio*. This verb will have the basic significance 'to bespatter, to sprinkle'. When we recall the later meaning of *macto* 'to offer, to sacrifice', the parallel *immolare* immediately occurs to us, for, as is well known, this verb originally meant 'to sprinkle flour on'. No less significant is a parallel from the ritual vocabulary of Sanskrit; for here, too, *√vap + nis* has progressed from 'to sprinkle' to 'to offer, sacrifice'.² We now venture on the analysis of the texts to see if we can detect any traces of this basic meaning which we have postulated for **macio, macto*.

Hey, in his searching analysis of the usage of *macte* (*loc. cit.*), which has been undeservedly neglected, made it quite clear that the word once referred to some concrete ritual act. 'Aber welchen Weg die Bedeutungsentwicklung genommen, das lässt sich bei dem spärlichen Material und der Laune der Entwicklung, die uns unter den ältesten Belegstellen zweifellos abgeleitete Bedeutungen bewahrt hat, während ursprünglichere jünger erscheinen, nur vermuten'. But I hope to be able to show that the traditional material is not so barren or as 'launenhaft' as Hey supposed.

¹ Note that *magmentum* merely means 'an offering'. We quote Meillet-Ernout on this word: 'offrande (supplémentaire, sens développé sous l'influence de *magis*; cf. Varr. *L.L.* 5. 112: Cornutus définit justement le mot "*quicquid mactatur*", cf. Thes. Gloss. emend.,

offerte aux dieux'.

² This semantic development is explained by the significance which sprinkling has in ritual and in magical operations. On this subject see Eitrem *op. cit.* index sub *besprengen*.

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In a question of semantic origins it is obvious that the most archaic usages will have most significance. According to Warde Fowler (*op. cit.* p. 182) 'the only unquestionably genuine old Roman prayers used at sacrifice, taken from the books of the pontifices and preserved word for word, are those which Cato embodied in his treatise on agriculture'. It is fortunate that these prayers contain numerous examples of the word *macte*. The rites described belong to the oldest stratum in Roman religion; among the prayers the most striking in phraseology are those made to Iuppiter Dapalis and to Janus:

Iuppiter Dapalis macte vino inferio esto (132, 1)

Iane pater . . . macte vino inferio esto (134, 3)

It is significant that the phrase *mactus vino inferio* occurs also in the above-quoted passage of Servius (*in pontificalibus sacrificantes dicebant deo 'macte hoc vino inferio esto'*) and three times further in Arnobius 7, 31. This, then, is one of the central usages of the word. Now it has been cogently urged by a great authority on ancient ritual that *vinum inferium* is a ritual substitute for blood (Eitrem, *Opferritus* p. 456). At the festival of the Terminalia, further, Terminus was sprinkled with blood (Fowler, *op. cit.* p. 82, Bailey, *Phases* p. 6, 40). Such rites, which are scarcely to be distinguished from magic, may throw some light too on the cult of Janus, for we are told that just as Terminus 'is the name alike of the boundary stone . . . and of its presiding numen' (Rose, *Primitive Culture in Italy* p. 52), so Janus means both the gateway and the numen which guarded it. If Janus was in fact the door itself, it will be perhaps instructive to recall the significance which the door has in folklore; for we have the assurance of authorities on Roman religion that 'the magical element is very noticeable in all genuinely Italian cults of which we have any knowledge'. Perhaps door-magic will have something to tell us about early Janus worship.

In Babylon the door and the threshold were sprinkled with blood. A similar custom is still frequent among the Arabs (Eitrem p. 433). Austrian peasants, too, on January 6th sprinkle the door with holy water, a custom which, I am told, is still practised by Irish peasants and may well go back to pagan times. But fortunately we need not go so far afield for evidence of this custom in Rome. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* 28, 104 tells us that it is a guard against magicians if the door is sprinkled with hyena's blood and polenta. A further instance of door-magic is the smearing of the door-posts with wolf's fat by the Roman bride before she crossed her husband's threshold. We may, therefore, with some confidence venture to draw conclusions from this later door-magic about early door-ritual: Janus, like Terminus, was once sprinkled with *vinum inferium*.¹ This is a conclusion on which the philologist will await the confirmation of students of religion. But if it is true, as we venture to believe, then we have in **macio*, *macto* one more instance of the semantic development we observed in *immolare* and *√vap + nis*. We now see how close Hey was (*loc. cit.*) to the same solution of the problem when he wrote 'gewiss bezeichnete es (i.e. *macte*) ursprünglich eine bestimmte, sinfällige, am Opferbild selbst vorgenommene Opferhandlung'. If this act of ritual was, in the case of Janus, the door-god, the sprinkling of the door, then, in view of what the morphological analysis has revealed to us, it is probable that *macte vino inferio* meant originally 'sprinkled with infernal wine'. Now the despised passage of Servius, too, is seen in a new light. It reads: 'when wine or

¹ Eitrem (*op. cit.* p. 428) observes that the worship of the Lares also shows traces of blood offerings: 'man darf annehmen, dass der Libation mit reinem Wein öfters ein Libieren mit Blut als ältere der Entwicklung vorausging'. It is remarkable that this author, who has many illuminating pages on the cult of the dead and the ritual substitution of wine for blood, makes

no comment on *vinum inferium*. I have searched the pages of Warde Fowler, Bailey and others in vain for enlightenment on this phrase, which is remarkable both for the frequency with which it is attested and for the antiquity of its usage. Why should the rites of *Jupiter Dapalis* and *Janus* involve the use of *vinum inferium*?

incense was poured on the victim, they used to say "the bull is *sprinkled* with wine or incense".

We may now turn to some obscure usages of the corresponding frequentative verb *macto*. We saw above that such frequentative verbs are commonly almost identical in meaning with the simple verbs from which they are formed. If, then, our postulate about **macio* is correct, we should expect to find some traces of the meaning 'to sprinkle' in *macto*. With this clue in mind we may venture to examine another obscure passage which has defied commentators. In Cicero *poem. de cons.* (*Div.* I 18) we read:

Tu quoque cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis
lustrasti et *lacto mactasti lacte* Latinas
vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas.

The second line is usually translated 'when you poured a joyful libation of milk at the Latin festival'. But this is only a rough paraphrase. Hey, who was almost within the gate, turned back in despair: 'seltsam und schwer zu verstehen bleibt nur diese Stelle'. But this much is clear: 'the *feriae Latinae* was one of the few occasions for a sacrifice of a sacramental type in Roman religion, when by partaking in a common meal of a sacred victim the Latin race entered into communion with Jupiter and with each other' (Fowler, *op. cit.* p. 182). A necessary preliminary to such a sacrament is the ritual purification of the participants. It is clear that Cicero in the above passage is referring to some such purificatory rite (*lustrasti*), nor must we forget that *macte* was also used by Cato in connection with a *lustratio*. How this was performed we may see from Vergil *Aen.* VI, 229 ff.:

Idem ter socios pura circumtulit unda
spargens rore levi et ramo felicis olivae
lustravitque viros.

On the use of milk in a lustration we may quote Tibullus I, 1, 36 (after Eitrem):

Hinc ego pastoremque meum *lustrare* quot annis
et placidam soleo *spargere lacte* Palem.

In this lustration of beast and stable at the Parilia the stables were swept out and sprinkled by means of a laurel bough (Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kult.*² p. 200). Comparable is the use of milk in another passage of Tibullus I, 2, 47:

Iam tenet infernas magico stridore catervas
iam iubet *aspersas lacte* referre pedem.

In Varro, too (*Men.* 2), we find milk used in sacrificing a pig: *gründit tepido lacte satur mola mactatus porcus*, where the basic meaning 'sprinkled' is again apparent. We may, therefore, suggest with some confidence that in the above-quoted passage of Cicero *mactasti lacte* means 'sprinkled or purified with milk'.¹

If there now appear to be strong grounds for believing that both *macte* and *macto* originally denoted ritual sprinkling, then the explanation of these words which we have sketched in the foregoing pages clears up the morphological, syntactical, and semantic difficulties. It remains for us to fill in the details. The morphology has already been sufficiently indicated: *macte* is the vocative of the past participle

¹ I would not suggest that Cicero was aware that *macto* had this meaning 'to sprinkle'. He was undoubtedly merely using an archaic phrase from ritual vocabulary without any clear realization of its meaning. Otherwise it might be legitimately pointed out that it was not the *feriae*

Latinae which were sprinkled, but the participants. The juxtaposition of *lustrasti* makes it clear that Cicero understood the phrase to mean 'you purified with milk'. Such a semantic progression is both easy and natural.

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passive of a lost simplex **macio*. As for syntax, the double construction becomes clear when we reflect that it is possible to say (1) *Ianum vino *macio* 'I sprinkle Janus with wine' or (2) *vinum Iano *macio* 'I sprinkle wine for Janus'. This double syntactical construction now makes clear the semantic splitting of the verb which, as we saw, has proved so troublesome that some scholars have concluded that *macio* embodies two verbs of different origin. After the meaning of **macio* had become obscured, it was possible to interpret construction (1) as 'I honour Janus with wine'. This is the meaning of *mactus* in such contexts as *hac illace dape pollucenda macte esto* (Cato agr. 132, 1) and of *macio* in *puerorum extis deos manis mactare* (Cic. Vatin. 14). The meaning 'honoured, glorified' appears again in Ennius' *Livius inde redit magno mactatus triumpho*. Construction (2), on the other hand, was interpreted as 'I offer, sacrifice wine to Janus'. This meaning we find in *fabatam pultem dis mactant* (Varro fr. Non. 341, 34), *Iano struem ommoveto mactatogue* (Cato op. cit. 134, 4) etc. For the more general meaning 'to slaughter'¹ we can refer to the article *macio* in Thesaurus VIII, 1, 22. As the sprinkling was often purificatory, we also find the meaning 'to purify, make hallowed'. This meaning we have seen in the above-quoted passage of Cicero's poem, and we have some grounds for believing that this was originally the significance of *macte* in the phrase *macte virtute*. But this is largely tentative and is rather a consequence of our argument than an essential part of the proof. We reserve it, therefore, for fuller discussion in the excursus.

EXCURSUS ON MACTE VIRTUTE ESTO.

There can be little doubt that the religious conservatism which preserved *macte* in religious formulae was ignorant of its true meaning even in Republican times. Cicero, at any rate (*ad Att.* 12, 6, 3; 15, 29, 3) merely uses it vaguely as 'bravo!'. This sense is derived from a usage which we find as early as Pacuvius (*trag.* 146) and which Livy has preserved in a number of passages (see Weissenborn on 2, 12, 14): that is in the set phrase *macte virtute esto* addressed to soldiers returning from battle. At first it seemed clear that the phrase meant 'hallowed, ennobled by your virtue', the passage from 'sprinkled' to 'purified' being, as we have seen, easy and natural. But it is precisely on this point that Seneca gives us a hint which, if correctly interpreted, may give us some idea of the original application of the phrase. In Ep. 66, 50 we read: *aeque esse fortis potest qui pro vallo securus excubuit nullis hostibus castra temptantibus et qui succisis poplitibus in genua se excepit nec arma dimisit: macte virtute esto sanguinolentis ex acie redeuntibus dicitur*. In the context this means, roughly

¹ It is remarkable that in the ancient formulae quoted by Cato *macte* and *macio* are nowhere used of the slaughtering of an animal. Where such a sacrifice takes place the word used is *immolare* (e.g. 134, 1). This fact is all the more striking in that Servius on *Aen.* IV, 57 remarks: *verbum sacrorum kar' εὐθυμωμὸν dicitur; hostiae immolatae dicebantur mola salsa tactae; cum vero ietae et aliquid ex illis in aram datum, mactatae dicebantur per boni ominis significationem*. The relative chronology of the development of *immolare* and *mactare* is interesting. Even in the traditional prayers preserved in Cato *immolare* has taken on the general meaning 'sacrifice'. Servius here contradicts observed usage; but doubtless he is again etymologizing, though this time correctly. But *macio* in the sense we have postulated would certainly be a euphemism for 'to slaughter'. The ritual of *immolatio* is described by Wissowa (*op. cit.* p. 417): 'die von dem ausführendem Magistrat oder Priester vollzogene Opferhand-

lung geht in drei Abschnitten vor sich: der Opfernde bringt zunächst auf dem Feuerherd die Vorsepende von Weihrauch und Wein dar (*ture et vino in igne in focula fecit*), sodann spricht er das eigentliche Opfergebet (Cato de agr. 141) und vollzieht die *immolatio* (*immolavit vino mola cultroque*), d.h. er besprengt das Opfertier mit Wein, bestreut es mit *mola salsa* und zieht mit dem flach gehaltenen Opferrmesser einen Strich vom Kopfe bis zum Schwanz des Tieres'. We see here that the word *immolare* has already so far progressed in meaning that it can be used with *vinum* and *cultus* as well as with *mola*, where it is alone etymologically justified. Thus there are three distinct operations characterized by the verb *immolare*. It is probable that originally each separate ritual act had its own technical term. In view of Servius' evidence we suggest that *mactus*, *macio* originally referred to the sprinkling of the victim with blood or wine.

paraphrased, that the watcher on the rampart may be a brave man too, but it is the blood-stained warrior who gets the cheers. Nevertheless, although Seneca must be used cautiously as an authority, we have here a valuable hint. It is to be noticed that Seneca does not say that *victorious* soldiers are greeted with this salutation; *macte virtute* is addressed to *sanguinulentis*. When we recall that *macte* is a ritual word, we are tempted to see a ritual significance in the application of the phrase to persons stained with blood. The ritual impurity of bloodstained persons is expressed in the well-known lines from Vergil. *Aen.* II. 717 ff.

Tu genitor cape sacra manu patriosque penates.
me bello e tanto digressum et caede recenti
attractare nefas donec me flumine vivo
abluero.

On the subject of the ritual impurity of an army returning from battle Warde Fowler has an instructive passage. He writes (*op. cit.* p. 217): 'I may recall the fact that the calendar supplies us also with evidence that on the return of the host to their own territory all these lustrations had to be repeated in order to rid men, horses, arms, and trumpets of such evil contagion as they might have contracted during their absence. It may be that one special object of lustration after the return of an army was to rid it, with all belonging to it, of the taint of bloodshed, just as the Jewish warriors and their captives were purified before re-entering the camp. But in the Roman pontifical law this idea is hardly discernible, and the only trace I can find of it is a statement of Festus that the soldiers who followed the general's car in a triumph wore laurel wreaths "*ut quasi purgati a caede humana intrarent urbem*". It is tempting to see an echo of the same superstition in this address of the ritual word *macte* to *sanguinulentis*. It may be that the cry 'be ye made pure by your *virtus*' is a veiled reference to their ritual impurity; perhaps there may be even some obscure allusion to the resemblance of the blood-bespattered soldiers and the sacrificial victim *mactus vino*. On this we must await the verdict of those competent in religious matters. But whatever its significance, no explanation of the phrase can ignore the fact that *macte* is a ritual cry or the specific reference by Seneca to *sanguinulentis*.

L. R. PALMER.

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER.

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SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft. XIII. 3. 1937.

K. Schefold, *Archäologische Zeugnisse der griechischen Einwanderung*. Deals briefly with the whole problem and especially with the connection of protogeometric and geometric. Eight vases are illustrated.

XIII. 4. 1937.

J. Friedrich, *Verschollene Sprachen des Altertums und ihre Wiedererschliessung*. The first instalment of a lucid account of the methods and results of investigations into a large number of early scripts and languages, chiefly in Asia Minor.

Philologus. XCI. 2 (N.F. Bd. XLV. 2).

Kurt v. Fritz, *Die Danaidentrilogie des Aeschylus*. Inconsistencies in *Supp.* as to relation between Danaus and his daughters, perhaps reconciled in the later plays. The *Aegyptii* (the second play) cannot have gone beyond the wedding. In the *Danaides* did A. use (a) the Hypermestra story or (b) the contest between Danaus and Aegyptus or (c) the absolution of the Dan.; or (b) and (c); or (a) and (c)? *Dan. frag. 1* suggests he did not use (a). (To be concluded.) H. Strasburger, *Zu Thuk.* 6. 15. Combats Schadowaldt's view that καθεῖλεν (§ 3) and ἐσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν (§ 4) look forward to 404 B.C. Thuc. means only the Sicilian expedition, since Athens was not ruined in 413. F. Hampl, *Thuk.* 3. 75. 1 und der Terminus σπονδαί. Distinguishes σπονδαί from ξυμμαχία and would read καὶ πρὸς Ἀθ. <ξυμμαχίαν> ὥστε κ.τ.λ. R. Wagner, *Zum Wiederaufleben der antiken Musikschriststeller seit dem 16. Jahrhundert*. Greek musical notation was known in outline before Kircher; cf. Thiard (who owed much to Alypius). Distinction between vocal and instrumental signs also known before K., e.g. to Galilei. K. probably used Doni's table of notation (1635), not now extant. Max. Schäfer, *Diogenes als Mittelstoiker*. Diogenes the first of the πλατωνίζοντα στοά, as is proved by comparison of the Philodemus frags. with Plato on music and with Arist. on ἡδονή and with Plato's other successors. W. Kroll, *Rhetorica*. Cicero's account (borrowed from Hermagoras) of *negotialis constitutio* differs from Hermogenes', and Quint. (3. 6. 56) attacking Cic. misunderstands Hermag.'s πραγματική, the obscurity of which is revealed by a comparison of Cic. and Quint. on *qualitas*. H. Wagenvoort, *Princeps*. In *princeps* as used by Cic. the ideas of priority and superiority often combined; the plur. he uses as = (a) leading statesmen, (b) *senatores*, (c) *optimates*, (d) *boni*. (To be concluded.) J. Stroux, *Zu Quintilian*. Q.'s debts to and differences from Verginius Flavius on *qualitas*. Emends the text at 7. 1. 4, 8. 2. 24, 12. 11. 3, 11. 3. 178, 12. 2. 28, 8. 3. 26, 12. 10. 62. R. Syme, *A Governor of Syria under Nerva*. Suggests that A. Larcius Priscus (now known to have been *consul suffectus* in September 110) was quaestor of Africa in 96 or 97, and then while in command of IV *Scythica* became *pro leg. cons.* in Syria late in 97 or early in 98 (perhaps deputizing for Jav. Priscus). His command in Africa dated to 107/8-110.

MISZELLEN.—O. Schroeder, *Sapphos φαίνεται μοι ἵσος θεοῖσιν in neuer Beleuchtung*. A. Kurfess, *Zu den Oracula Sibyllina*. Emends 3. 1 and 8. 462. *Id.*, *Zu Val. Flacc. Arg. V 286 ff.*

LANGUAGE.

Indogermanische Forschungen. LIV (1936), 4.

A. Schmitt: a long and interesting article on the tasks of Comparative Philology, and its relationship with other disciplines (Erlangen inaugural lecture). E. Schwentner cites three Skt. compounds to show the common association of wolf and

dog (cf. LIV, 1). E. Hermann criticizes Koschmieder's views on the connexion of aspect and time indication. C. E. Bazell traces certain analogical transferences of case endings in *i*-stems and consonant stems in Germanic. W. Krogmann defends his interpretation of *wodini* as instrumental by quoting an Avestic parallel of the instrument of the person with a non-verbal adjective.

LV (1937), 1.

H. Lindroth prints in full his paper, read to the Fourth International Congress of Linguists at Copenhagen, on the definition and nature of 'Sprachgefühl', the contrasted aspects (e.g. 'latent' and 'manifest') in which it presents itself, methods of attack on such problems as the development of 'Sprachgefühl' in the mother tongue or in foreign tongues, linguistic mixture etc. E. Otto (another Copenhagen paper): the mutual relationships between phonetics and 'Phonologie' (i.e. phonemics). O. pleads for a modification of the traditional view, urging that phonetics also must have regard for meaning. A. von Blumenthal: to the recognized meanings and constructions of O.U. *anter* would add (3) *anter* with gen., in a temporal force, 'during', and (4) adv. 'meanwhile' (not convincing), Idem: interprets Osc. *pús* as 'praesto' (lit. **pos* or *post*) and *statif* as masc., for **statifos* (both improbable). Idem: following v. Grienberger takes *upsatuh* as n. pl. neut. 'facta', and hence *anei* as loc. sg. 'domi' of **an-nom*, i.e. **an-dom* = *ἐνδον*. Idem: in the gloss Paul. ex Fest. 235 L. s.v. *pipatio*, for *plorantis* read *potantis*, and take *pipatio* as 'potatio', cf. Fal. *pipajo*. W. Preusler: the reflexive-passive of Spanish, Italian and Roumanian is due to substratum-influence. N. van Wijk ascribes the Russian shift of *y* to *i* after gutturals, and analogous changes in other Slavonic languages, to (1) the tendency of Slav. *y* towards fronting, (2) the tendency of Slav. gutturals towards palatalization; while *k* and *g* were more easily palatalized than *x*, because they are in general further front. Hence these changes are phonological (phonemic) rather than phonetic. Reviews.

LV (1937), 2.

E. Fraenkel, Baltic Miscellany ctd., (3) on dissimilation, (a) of consonants, (b) of vowels; (4) on imperative forms in Tverečius and Kupiskis, loss of vocalic monosyllabic ending, quasi-interjectional verbal forms of command; (5) Lith. compound comparative particles, the regular *kaip jei* and the frequent *kaip hač* (Žem.) for the simple *kaip*, like Gr. *ὥς εἰ* and *ὥς ὅτε* for *ὥς*. Slavonic parallels. F. Brender: on the use of loc. in certain personal expressions in modern written Lith., e.g. *Dievuje* for *Dieve*, cf. *Kristuje* in N.T. (especially the epistles), so that (as in some other languages) the locative expression develops an independent usage with narrower meaning. This arose because in some words (e.g. *Dieve*) loc. and voc. forms are identical. H. Krahe argues that in C.I.L. i, ed. 2, 379 *deda* is not a verb, or a third name, but an appellative of *Pola Livia*, Illyr. *deda* (cf. Gr. *τῆθη*) from **dhēdhā* (cf. Goth. *daddjan* 'suckle'); the word is said still to survive, as the Illyr. accentuation does in the name *Pésaro* itself. M. Runes attempts to bolster up his earlier wild guess (1926) that *uātes* was borrowed from Etruscan, and hence the Keltic (*fāith*) from Latin. E. A. Kock maintains that in 14th century O. Icl. *+* after a consonant (*Finnr*) became *-ur* (*Finnur*) when a consonant came at the beginning of the next word (so in Árni Jónsson), or (other writers) before an accented vowel at the beginning of the next word; before *h* the usage fluctuates. E. Hermann replies to Augstals (I.F. 53, 195) on Lith. *mote*, insisting on the meaning (inter alia) 'mother'. G. Bonfante writes on the place of Hittite in the I.Eu. languages (cf. I.F. 52, 221), enumerating some dozen points of phonology, morphology and vocabulary in support of his view that it belongs to a 'central' group.

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